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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation approaches metaphysical and metaethical questions concerning 
the nature of the human person, the existence and nature of God, and the nature of moral 
judgment through contemporary neuroscience, cognitive science, scientific moral 
psychology, and analytic philosophy of mind. Contrary to proposals that seek a 
harmonious integration of “religion and science” this dissertation argues that 
contemporary bio-psychological sciences give one ample reason to be skeptical of many 
of the metaphysical and metaethical claims embedded in religious traditions like 
Christianity and Buddhism. The first three chapters of the dissertation focus on the 
metaphysical issue of mind-body dualism, while the fourth chapter addresses closely 
related metaethical issues concerning the nature and origin of moral judgment.  
Chapter One calls into question the truth of dualism and defends a version of 
psychoneural identity theory as the most adequate solution to the mind-body problem. If 
dualism is not true, why is it so ubiquitous across cultures? Drawing on research in both 
neuroscience and cognitive science, Chapter Two offers a naturalistic, bio-psychological 
explanation of dualism. Chapter Three applies the conclusions of the first two chapters to 
religious and theological concerns. The link between mind-body dualism and theism is 
highlighted, and it is argued that the collapse of mind-body dualism renders many 
versions of theism problematic. Philip Clayton’s attempt to integrate an emergentist 
doctrine of the human person with a dualist doctrine of God is critiqued, as is B. Alan 
  x 
Wallace’s more experiential defense of religious dualism from a Buddhist perspective.  
Along with a commitment to dualism, many religious traditions understand moral 
judgment as something objectively grounded in divine commands and/or reason. Chapter 
Four argues that research in scientific moral psychology implicating the emotions in 
moral judgment raises significant questions for theological and reason-based accounts of 
moral judgment. 
 1 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 This dissertation is concerned with interdisciplinary work at the interface of 
religion and science, interdisciplinary work at the interface of mind and brain, and their 
mutual relationship. While questions concerning “religion and science” and questions 
concerning “mind and brain” are typically pursued independently of one another, the 
issue of the relationship between these two domains of interdisciplinary inquiry becomes 
increasingly hard to avoid. Contemporary cognitive science, neuroscience, and 
philosophy of mind do not merely form topics that can be “related to” or “integrated 
with” some religious tradition. Rather, contemporary bio-psychological science and 
philosophy have the potential to radically reconfigure human self-understanding, and 
along with it, the ways in which religion, science, and their respective claims are 
understood—or so it will be argued. 
 Contrary to proposals that seek a harmonious integration of “religion and 
science,” this dissertation argues that the contemporary bio-psychological sciences give 
one ample reason to be skeptical of many of the metaphysical and metaethical claims 
embedded in religious traditions. Many religious traditions presume a commitment to 
fairly robust versions of metaphysical dualism, while contemporary mind science not 
only gives one every reason to think that the mind is the brain, it also has begun to offer 
compelling bio-psychological explanations for the ubiquity of God and soul concepts 
across cultures.  Along with a commitment to metaphysical dualism, many religious 
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traditions also tend to understand morality as rooted in divine commands or as grounded 
in an objective transcendent realm that exists independently of human minds. The mind 
sciences—especially contemporary moral psychology—also give one reason for 
skepticism about these claims, as the centrality of emotion in moral judgment has been 
highlighted.   
 This dissertation pursues both metaphysics and morals as interesting points of 
intersection between religion and science. The first three chapters focus on the 
metaphysical intersection, in particular, the mind-body or brain-consciousness problem.  
The guiding question for the first three chapters is the following: How does contemporary 
work in the mind sciences impact the mind-body problem, and how does this impact 
upon religious claims? The fourth and final chapter shifts the religion and science 
conversation from metaphysics to morals, specifically the question of how work in 
contemporary scientific moral psychology impacts metaethical questions about the 
origins of morality and how this impacts both normative ethics and religion. 
 Chapter One first establishes the link between religion and dualism across a wide 
range of positions in both the Christian and Buddhist traditions. It then goes on to address 
issues concerning the impact of science on the mind-body problem. In assessing the 
impact of the bio-psychological sciences on the mind-body problem, Chapter One 
presents the mind-body or brain-consciousness problem as a problem of vertical 
integration between various explanatory levels—phenomenal, psychological, and 
neurological. The central question it pursues is whether contemporary cognitive science 
and neuroscience are in a position to explain something like phenomenal consciousness, 
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or if there are principled reasons to be skeptical about a scientific, especially brain-based, 
account of consciousness and the conscious self. A number of prominent analytic 
philosophers of mind—Thomas Nagel, Saul Kripke, Joseph Levine, Frank Jackson, and 
David Chalmers—have defended property dualist positions on consciousness and thus 
voiced skepticism about the possibility of brain-based explanations of consciousness.  
Even more naturalistically oriented philosophers like (early) Hilary Putnam and Jerry 
Fodor have defended the autonomy of psychology from lower level neuroscientific 
explanations. Dualist and functionalist arguments present the strongest objections to bio-
psychological explanations of consciousness and identity theories of mind. Chapter One 
criticizes dualist and functionalist arguments and defends an account of bio-psychological 
explanation and a version of mind-brain identity theory that responds to the worries of 
both dualists and functionalists.   
 If dualism is not true, why is it so ubiquitous across cultures? Chapter Two offers 
a naturalistic, bio-psychological explanation of dualism. Here too, one encounters 
principled objections to such an explanatory strategy. Just as dualists and functionalists 
object to bio-psychological explanations of consciousness, humanist scholars object to 
attempts to offer a scientific account of religious phenomena like dualist beliefs and 
experiences. It is argued that such principled distinctions between the humanities and the 
sciences are themselves rooted in a residual dualism, and one that is no longer tenable 
given the conclusions of Chapter One. Having blocked principled humanist objections, 
the remaining sections offer a bio-psychological explanation of dualism. Building on the 
insights of Chapter One, Chapter Two first sketches an account of the conscious self and 
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draws on the work of neurophilosopher Thomas Metzinger and the neuroscientists Antti 
Revonsuo and Olaf Blanke to explain two potent sources of dualism: ordinary “out-of-
brain” experiences and more extraordinary out-of-body experiences. The chapter then 
turns to psychological explanations of dualism, drawing particularly on the work of Paul 
Bloom and Jesse Bering. It is then shown how intuitive dualism combines with a 
tendency to over-attribute agency and design to generate other immaterial mind concepts 
like God concepts. 
 Chapter One calls into question the truth of dualism, while Chapter Two explains 
the ubiquity of such dualism. Chapter Three applies these conclusions directly to 
religious concerns. The link between dualism and theism is first addressed.   
Contemporary classical theists see claims about God and the soul as intimately related.  
As a result, they have attempted to defend substance dualism as a doctrine about the 
human person. For classical theists, substance dualism not only affects Christian views on 
the afterlife, it also has bearing on fundamental issues concerning the existence and 
nature of God. It is argued that substance dualists are fundamentally right about the link 
between dualism and theism but wrong to think that substance dualism can be saved as a 
doctrine about the human person. The remainder of Chapter Three focuses on attempts to 
integrate dualist religious views with mind science. Philip Clayton’s attempt to integrate 
an emergentist doctrine of the human person with a dualist doctrine of God is first 
addressed. Clayton’s version of emergentism is critiqued as a version of property 
dualism, as is his attempt to move from a downwardly dependent account of human 
minds to a divine mind that is not downwardly dependent. The chapter concludes with a 
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consideration of B. Alan Wallace’s more experientially focused defense of religious 
dualism from a Buddhist perspective. Both Wallace’s account of consciousness and his 
attempts to ground religion universal experience are critiqued. 
 Chapter Four then surveys the conclusions of the dissertation thus far and their 
bearing on issues concerning the relationship of religion and science. It is argued that 
claims about dualism are an area of conflict between religion and science, and this 
conflict is not favorable to traditional religious positions. It is argued that conflict need 
not be a conversation stopper, nor does it rule out other areas of intersection between 
religion and science. Chapter Four explores one of these other areas of intersection, 
moving from issues of metaphysics to morals. The final chapter focuses on the 
implications of the mind sciences for metaethical questions concerning the nature and 
origin of moral judgment and the bearing of this on both normative ethics and religion. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
NATURALISM, DUALISM, AND BIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE CONSCIOUS SELF 
 
This chapter first establishes the link between mind-body dualism and religion. It 
then goes on to show why such dualism has become problematic on scientific grounds 
and argues that psychoneural identity theory provides the plausible solution to the mind-
body or consciousness-brain problem in light of both established scientific conclusions 
and ongoing scientific research on consciousness. 
Dualism and Religion 
The concern of this section is simply to point to a link between mind-body 
dualism and religious traditions like Christianity and Buddhism. Dualist assumptions 
have a long history in both traditions, and these dualist positions continue to be defended 
by a number of contemporary theologians and religious thinkers. Such dualist claims are 
intimately linked to beliefs about the origin, transformation, and destiny of human beings, 
and, indeed, the entire cosmos. As such, they are hardly tangential claims.   
While there are very important differences between religious dualists, they 
typically share a commitment to two metaphysical theses regarding the relationship of 
consciousness to the brain. The first thesis, we can call the Correlation Claim (CC): 
Conscious mental properties are ontologically distinct from physical (e.g., neurological) 
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properties. Thus the relationship between consciousness and the brain can only be 
understood in terms of correlation and not identity. 
The correlation claim is a claim that all dualists will share. Property dualists 
typically hold either the position that (1) consciousness is dependent upon the brain (e.g., 
emergentism), or (2) consciousness and the brain are lawfully correlated (e.g., 
panpsychism).1
The remainder of this section cites specific examples of religious dualism. The 
purpose is to demonstrate that all of these representatives hold both CC and NNCC and 
also to demarcate important differences between various dualist positions. Religious 
dualism is not a marginal or idiosyncratic position, nor is it limited to doctrines about the 
human person and claims about ‘the soul’ in the Christian tradition. Theism itself is often 
 Substance dualists—those who defend the notion of a soul—hold that 
this correlation involves no downward dependence; the soul must be directly created by 
God.  Religious dualists can be substance dualists or property dualists about human 
minds; however, religious dualists—even if they are property dualists and acknowledge 
the downward dependency of the human mind on the brain—are committed to a more 
robust metaphysical thesis about consciousness and the brain. This is the claim that there 
are actual (as opposed to merely possible) cases where consciousness or the conscious 
self exists without any ties to a nervous system or indeed any physical substrate. We can 
call this the No Neural Correlates Claim (NNCC): Consciousness or the conscious self is 
capable of existing without any neural or physical correlates (e.g., the post-mortem soul, 
God, substrate consciousness). 
                                                          
1Non-religious defenders of property dualism typically only entertain mind and brain coming apart 
in possible worlds and not the actual world.   
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articulated in dualist terms. As the remainder of this section will illustrate, this 
commitment to theistic dualism is found not only within classical Christian theism but 
also in revisionist forms of theism, such as the process panentheism of Philip Clayton.  
Further, dualism about consciousness is present within versions of Buddhism that eschew 
a substance ontology of God and the soul. 
Varieties of Religious Dualism 
Perhaps the most obvious example of religious dualism comes from within 
classical Christian theism. Within classical Christian theism, God is understood 
straightforwardly as an immaterial person.  Richard Swinburne captures this 
understanding well when he defines God as “[a] person without a body (i.e. a spirit) 
present everywhere, the creator and sustainer of the universe….”2 Alvin Plantinga nicely 
spells out some of the implications of this understanding of God: “Given Christian 
theism, we know that it is at any rate possible that there be immaterial thinking things, 
since God Himself is such a thing.”3
The Church teaches that every spiritual soul is created immediately by 
God… and that it is immortal: it does not perish when it separates from the 
body at death, and it will be united with the body in the final resurrection.
 As Plantinga’s quote illustrates, the notion of God as 
an immaterial person relates intimately to the notion of human beings possessing an 
immaterial soul along the lines described in the Catechism of the Catholic Church: 
4
 
 
                                                          
2Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 2. 
 
3Alvin Plantinga, "Materialism and Christian Belief," in Persons: Human and Divine, ed. Peter 
van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 100. 
 
4Catechism of the Catholic Church, #366. 
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Of course, a significant number of Christian philosophers and theologians reject 
the notion of the soul. As Dean Zimmerman writes: 
Christianity is often thought to require a dualistic conception of human 
persons, according to which each of us has (or perhaps simply is) an 
immaterial soul that survives death and awaits reunion with the body at a 
general resurrection….For several decades, however philosophers and 
theologians have been questioning the inevitability of Christian opposition 
to materialism. Indeed, at present there seem to be more Christian 
philosophers [and theologians] defending materialism (as a theory about 
human persons, not about the deity) than dualism—at least in print.5
 
 
 Notice, however, in Zimmerman’s quote that “materialism” is embraced as a local 
doctrine about human minds, the notion of God as an immaterial person remains strong in 
such position. This revisionist stance certainly takes much more of a naturalistic 
perspective than does classical theism; however, its embrace of theism still places it 
firmly within a dualistic framework. At least one case of an immaterial mind remains 
within these revisionist forms of theism. The fundamentally dualist nature of these 
revisionist forms of theism can be seen in the writings of Philip Clayton.6
While this position [theistic emergentism] affirms that all mental 
phenomena in the empirical world are dependent on a biological substrate, 
it postulates that transcendent mind is not downwardly dependent in this 
way. This fact accounts for the ineliminable element of dualism in the 
 Clayton 
repudiates both classical theism and substance dualism in favor of process panentheism 
and emergentism, but the notion of God as immaterial mind floating free from any 
physical substrate remains strong.   
                                                          
5Dean Zimmerman, "Three Introductory Questions," in Persons: Human and Divine, ed. Peter van 
Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 2. 
 
6Clayton’s views about theism are hardly idiosyncratic; indeed, they are representative of the 
views of the majority of Christian theologians interested in religion and science: Ian Barbour, John 
Polkinghorne, Arthur Peacocke, Nancey Murphy, John Haught, and Gregory Peterson all defend similar 
positions.  
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theistic hypothesis.…[T]his move forces the chain of explanation beyond 
the framework that one otherwise uses to explain mental properties, in so 
far as it imagines a mind that is distinct in essence from the natural order 
taken as a whole.7
 
 (Emphasis added.)  
Christian religious dualists thus differ sharply over the issue of dualism as a 
doctrine about human persons and the implications of that understanding for their 
doctrine of God.   
There are also important interreligious differences between religious dualists over 
exactly what kind of immaterial minds are thought to exist. Notions of immaterial mind 
and consciousness also figure prominently in a tradition like Buddhism that lacks both 
the notion of God and a substantial soul. This can be seen in the recent writings of the 
fourteenth Dalai Lama and his English translator, B. Alan Wallace.8
Buddhist contemplatives claim that with the achievement of a highly 
advanced degree of Samadhi[sustained attention] known as samatha, or 
meditative quiescence, one gains experiential access to the relative ground 
state of consciousness known in the Great Perfection (Dzogchen) school 
of Tibetan Buddhism as the “substrate consciousness” (alayavijnana).  
This, they claim, is the individual stream of consciousness from which the 
psyche and all the physical senses emerge. According to their findings, the 
psyche is conditioned by the body and its physical interaction with the 
environment, but it emerges from the substrate consciousness.… In the 
course of a human life, these mental events are conditioned by the brain 
 Wallace, in 
particular, has highlighted the important role immaterial consciousness plays within 
Tibetan Buddhism in his recent works on Buddhism and contemporary mind science. 
Wallace writes: 
                                                          
7Philip Clayton, Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 183-184. 
 
8Dalai Lama, The Universe in a Single Atom: The Convergence of Science and Spirituality; B. 
Alan Wallace, The Taboo of Subjectivity: Toward a New Science of Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000); Contemplative Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
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and environment, but they emerge from and dissolve back into the 
substrate consciousness. Likewise, these mental events influence the brain, 
body, and the physical environment, but they do not transform into those 
physical phenomena. In short, from this Buddhist perspective, the “hard 
problem” of how the brain produces subjective mental experience is a 
false problem, for such experience actually arise from the substrate 
consciousness.9
 
 (Emphasis in original.) 
 The general nature of religious dualism has been spelled out in terms of CC and 
NNCC and specific versions religious dualism have been cited. The remaining chapters 
of this dissertation will show how problematic such claims have become in light of 
contemporary mind science. 
When one reads contemporary scientific and philosophical literature on the 
conscious self one cannot but be stuck by its distance from the metaphysical and 
methodological commitments of even the most scientifically informed religious dualists.   
Bio-psychological explanations of the conscious self are being actively pursued, and most 
of these research programs are guided by the assumption that mind can be identified with 
the brain. Mind scientists are well aware of the metaphysical implications of their work 
and don’t hesitate to point them out (much to the irritation of the philosophers and 
theologians who disagree with them).10
                                                          
9B. Alan Wallace, Contemplative Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 15-17. 
 Part of the burden of this chapter is to show that 
this tension is real by investigating the tenability of identity theory in philosophy of mind.  
Scientists and philosophers working at the mind-brain, psychology-neuroscience 
interface are not captive to the “ideologies” of materialism, reductionism, and scientism.  
 
10Francis Crick, for example, entitles the final chapter of his book on consciousness “Dr. Crick’s 
Sunday Morning Service.”  See Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the 
Soul (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 255-263.  
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Rather work in this area gives us every reason to think that the mind is the brain. This 
work stands in substantial tension with dualist understandings of the conscious self as it 
calls into question the mildly dualist Correlation Claim (CC) and the strongly dualist No 
Neural Correlates Claim (NNCC).  
Naturalism and Identity Theory: 
An Overview of the Argument of Chapter One 
This chapter points to the significant pressures the scientific study of mind puts 
upon religious dualism. It addresses the mind-body problem and defends a bio-
psychological, specifically neurophilosophical, form of identity theory. Its goal is neither 
definitive proof of mind-brain identity or definitive disproof of dualism. It rather seeks to 
establish the fundamental plausibility of mind-brain identity theory as the most relatively 
adequate position in comparison to other understandings of the mind-brain relation.   
The argument of the chapter unfolds in the following manner. It begins with the 
presentation of the mind-body or brain-consciousness problem in light of the issue of bio-
psychological explanation and outlines the five canonical positions in the philosophy of 
mind taken in response to the mind-body problem. In light of this background, this 
chapter then stakes out its own position on the issue, defending a neurophilosophical 
form of identity theory. Identity theory, however, has fallen upon some tough times in 
recent analytic philosophy of mind. This chapter first states major contemporary dualist 
objections to physicalist understandings of consciousness. Dualism is then critiqued in 
light of a naturalistic account of subjectivity.   
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However, there have also been pitched battles between physicalists in the 
contemporary philosophy of mind, particularly over the issue of “reductive” versus “non-
reductive” forms of physicalism. It is argued that much of this debate is rooted in 
understandings of explanation and intertheoretic reduction no longer tenable in the 
philosophy of psychology, biology, and neuroscience. A new understanding of identity 
theory is articulated in light of the notions of mechanistic explanation and explanatory 
pluralism.   
Scientific Constraints and the Mind-Body Problem 
With characteristic bluntness, John Searle opens a book on the mind-body 
problem with the following statement: 
The famous mind-body problem, the source of so much controversy over 
the past two millennia, has a simple solution. This solution has been 
available to any educated person since serious work began on the brain 
nearly a century ago, and, in a sense, we all know it to be true. Here it is: 
Mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in the 
brain and are themselves features of the brain. To distinguish this view 
from the many others in the field, I call it “biological naturalism.” Mental 
events and processes are as much part of our biological natural history as 
digestion, mitosis, meiosis, or enzyme secretion.11
 
 
This dissertation defends a specific approach to the mind-body problem, a version of 
identity theory not unlike Searle’s biological naturalism. Searle’s remark is rooted in an 
understanding of how significantly modern science has reshaped our worldview and our 
philosophical options. Even prior to the advent of “serious” neuroscience in the twentieth 
century, scientific advances placed significant constraints on philosophical theorizing.  
                                                          
11John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 1. 
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Identity theory becomes a compelling position when one considers three such constraints: 
call these the physics constraint, the biology constraint, and the neuroscience constraint.   
 The first constraint, highly significant for the issue of mental causation, we can 
call the physics constraint. It seems an obvious empirical fact about the world that the 
conscious self has physical effects in the world (e.g., I go to the refrigerator to get a drink 
because I am thirsty). Now, physics places important constraints upon our thinking about 
such activities. Physics operates under conservation laws and the notion that every 
physical effect has a physical cause (the causal closure of the physical). If the mind is 
non-physical, one runs into massive difficulties in trying to account for mental causation.  
As Owen Flanagan writes: 
[T]he principle of conservation of energy requires that the total amount of 
energy in the universe remain constant, even as it is continually transferred 
and transformed in and among the myriad systems of causal relations.…In 
order…for physical energy to increase in any system, it has to have been 
transferred from some other physical system….If we accept the principle 
of the conversation of energy we seem committed either to denying that 
the nonphysical mind exists, or to denying that it could cause anything to 
happen, or to making very implausible ad hoc adjustments in our 
physics.12
 
 
The physics constraint has been operative since Descartes, and it is significant that most 
defenders of dualism defend epiphenomenalism rather than interactionist dualism.13
Next, consider the biology constraint.  Evolution is a process operating on 
physical systems; that the human mind is also a physical system makes perfect sense in 
an evolutionary framework.  As Paul Churchland writes: 
   
                                                          
12Owen Flanagan, The Science of the Mind (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1991), 21. 
 
13Most significantly Frank Jackson and David Chalmers. 
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[T]he important point about the standard evolutionary story is that the 
human species and all of its features are the wholly physical outcome of a 
purely physical process. Like all but the simplest of organisms, we have a 
nervous system. And for the same reason: a nervous system permits the 
discriminative guidance of behavior. But a nervous system is just an active 
matrix of cells, and a cell is just an active matrix of molecules. We are 
notable only in that our nervous system is more complex and powerful 
than those of our fellow creatures. Our inner nature differs from that of 
simpler creatures in degree, but not in kind. 
If this is the correct account of our origins, then there seems 
neither need, nor room, to fit any nonphysical substances or properties into 
our theoretical account of ourselves. We are creatures of matter. And we 
should learn to live with that fact.14
 
 
Finally consider the mind-brain correlations and dependencies described by the 
contemporary neurosciences. As Patricia Churchland notes: 
The degeneration of cognitive function in various dementias such as 
Alzheimer’s disease is closely tied to the degeneration of neurons. The 
loss of specific functions such as the capacity to feel fear or see visual 
motion are closely tied to defects in highly specific brain structures in both 
animals and humans. The shift from being awake to being asleep is 
characterized by highly specific changes in patters of neuronal activity in 
inter-connected regions. The adaptation of eye movements when reversing 
spectacles are worn is explained by highly predictable modifications in 
very specific and coordinated regions of the cerebellum and brainstem 
….One of the most metaphysically profound discoveries in this century 
showed that a human’s mental life is disconnected if the two hemispheres 
of his brain are disconnected….In careful postoperative studies of the 
capacities of “the split-brain” subjects, Roger Sperry, Joseph Bogen, and 
their colleagues found that each hemisphere could have perceptual 
experiences or make movement decisions independently of the 
other….These remarkable results demonstrate that the unity of mental life 
is dependent on the anatomical connections in the brain itself.  This seems 
reasonable enough on the hypothesis that mental life is activity in the 
brain.15
                                                          
14Paul M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), 21. 
  
 
15Patricia Smith Churchland, Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2002), 43-44. 
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However, in spite of the explosive growth of the neurosciences in the past century, much 
work in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind doubts that the brain will have 
anything significant to tell us about the nature of mind. To understand why this is the 
case, it is necessary to examine the contemporary mind-body problem in some detail. 
Explaining Consciousness: The Contemporary Mind-Body Problem 
as a Problem of Vertical Integration 
 The mind-body problem is an ancient problem, receiving one of its early 
articulations in Plato’s Phaedo. However, the terms and precise nature of the mind-body 
problem have changed dramatically as a result of the history of philosophy and the 
history of science. The modern mind-body problem arises from the birth of a new physics 
in the seventeenth century and receives its classic articulation in Descartes and his early 
modern contemporaries. Mental causation is the major focus within the modern 
articulation of the mind-body problem. Mental and physical realms are assumed to be 
separate, and questions are then raised as to whether and how two such distinct realms 
could interact with one another.    
While mental causation looms large in the current debate, the contemporary 
mind-body—or, more accurately the brain-consciousness—problem focuses on issues of 
consciousness and its explanation. In the words of Colin McGinn, it focuses on questions 
of how soggy gray matter gives rise to technicolor phenomenology.16
                                                          
16See Colin McGinn, The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World (New York: 
Basic Books, 1999). 
 The contemporary 
mind-brain problem is framed not just by considerations concerning modern physics and 
evolutionary biology, but also by the explosive growth of the sciences of the mind and 
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brain within the twentieth century, and by the question of whether a science of 
consciousness is in fact possible at all.   
The Mind-Body Problem and the Quest for Vertical Integration 
The contemporary mind-body problem is perhaps most fruitfully presented as a 
problem of bio-psychological explanation concerning the relationship between 
phenomenal consciousness/common sense psychology, scientific psychology, and 
neuroscience.17 It is thus intimately related to what has been called the “interface 
problem” in the philosophy of psychology, the problem of how our common sense or folk 
psychology (here specifically phenomenal consciousness) interfaces with explanations 
given by scientific psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and other levels in the 
explanatory hierarchy.18 As I am presenting it, the contemporary mind-brain problem is a 
problem concerning the possibility of “vertical integration” or “reflective equilibrium” 
between phenomenal consciousness, cognitive science, and neuroscience.19
                                                          
17For an articulation of the mind-brain problem along these lines, see John Bickle, Psychoneural 
Reduction: The New Wave (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998). 
 The 
neurophilosophical form of identity theory defended in this dissertation is optimistic 
about the possibility of genuinely explanatory interdisciplinary bridges being built 
between first-person phenomenology, scientific psychology, and neuroscience, and about 
the ontological explanation of the conscious self in terms of the brain. However, many 
 
18This statement of the interface problem is adapted from Jose Luis Bermudez, Philosophy of 
Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction (New York and London: Routledge, 2005).  Bermudez himself 
tends to place emphasis on distinguishing the interface problem from the mind-body problem, see pp. 13-15 
and 35ff. 
 
19Edward Slingerland discusses the notion of “vertical integration” in Edward Slingerland, What 
Science Teaches the Humanities: The Integration of Body and Culture (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008); Owen Flanagan discusses consciousness in light of the notion of “reflective 
equilibrium” in Owen Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992). 
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doubt the possibility of a bio-psychological explanation of consciousness and thus the 
plausibility of any sort of identity theory of mind. Identity theory has fallen upon tough 
times, and there has been an eclipse of the brain in much recent analytic philosophy of 
mind. 
Positions in the Philosophy of Mind in Light of the 
 
Issue of Vertical Integration 
 
 There are typically five canonical positions stated in relationship to the mind-
body problem: substance dualism, property dualism, functionalism, identity theory 
(reductive materialism) and eliminative materialism.20 All of these positions understand 
the relationship between phenomenal consciousness, scientific psychology, and 
neuroscience quite differently. An important issue here concerns the criteria by which 
consciousness is explained. Identity theory is frequently referred to as reductive 
physicalism, reflecting the fact that identity theory quickly became linked with treatments 
of intertheoretic reduction in the philosophy of science, specifically Ernest Nagel’s model 
of intertheoretic reduction.21
                                                          
20See, for example, Paul Churchland’s discussion in Matter and Consciousness or John Heil's 
discussion in John Heil, Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2004). 
 Drawing upon a deductive-nomological (D-N) 
understanding of scientific explanation, Nagel understood reduction as a relationship 
between theories (where theories are understood as sets of laws), and argued that 
reduction should be understood as a deduction of the reduced theory from the reducing 
  
21See Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961). 
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theory. The notion of reduction as deduction and deductive criteria of explanation have 
framed much of the discussion in contemporary philosophy of mind.    
Substance dualism, property dualism, and functionalism are strong anti-reductive 
positions and each position in its own way denies that the brain will tell us anything very 
interesting about the mind. Dualism in principle denies the possibility of vertical 
integration of phenomenal consciousness, cognitive science, and neuroscience because 
consciousness just isn’t physical. Interactionist substance dualism denies that 
consciousness and free will can be explained in naturalistic terms; being non-physical 
they exist outside the causal nexus described by the natural sciences. Interactionist 
emergentism also places principled limits on the explanatory power of lower level 
sciences. All forms of interactionism are also premised on a denial of the notion of the 
causal closure of the physical world or attempt to circumvent the principle. The form of 
property dualism advocated by most contemporary philosophers maintains that conscious 
mental properties (qualia) escape the net of lower level functional and physical 
explanation. Many of the most prominent arguments for dualism today rely on deductive 
criteria of explanation. It is precisely the failure to be able to deduce consciousness from 
the physical facts that leads these thinkers to dualist conclusions. 
There are also questions raised about vertical integration from within physicalism.   
As it developed historically, identity theory envisions a smooth Nagel-reduction of 
common sense psychology and scientific psychology to neuroscience. Functionalism and 
eliminativism both call into question this understanding of the relationship between 
 
 
 
20 
mental states and brain states, and in doing so, also understand the interdisciplinary 
interface between psychology and neuroscience quite differently.   
Functionalism is the most common form of non-reductive physicalism. For 
functionalists, the essence of a mental state is its causal role linking perceptual inputs, 
other mental states, and behavioral outputs. According to the functionalist these abstract 
mental states can be realized in any number of physical systems; mental states are 
multiply realizable. The implication of this is the autonomy of psychology from lower 
level neuroscience. For functionalists, the wildly disjunctive nature of mind to brain 
mappings also rules out deductive entailment.  
Identity theory and eliminativism are typically the understandings of mind that 
take the brain most seriously. Both theories, however, understand vertical integration or 
reflective equilibrium in terms of reduction. Identity theory is frequently seen as 
synonymous with reductive materialism or physicalism. The theory anticipates 
neuroscience smoothly reducing common sense and scientific psychology. Eliminativism 
is skeptical about a smooth reduction and anticipates a wholesale elimination of common 
sense psychology and scientific psychology by a matured neuroscience.  
Identity Theory: A Phenomenally Realist, Pluralist, Neurophilosophical Version 
 
All of the positions surveyed above are problematic. This chapter defends a 
phenomenally realist, pluralist, neurophilosophical form of identity theory. Originally 
developed by Paul and Patricia Churchland,22
                                                          
22For an early statement of neurophilosophy see Patricia Smith Churchland, Neurophilosophy: 
Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986). 
 neurophilosophy is a particular form of 
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naturalism that seeks to bring the resources of neuroscience to bear on traditional 
philosophical issues. 
[T]he nature of the mind (including the nature of memory and learning, 
consciousness, and free will) have traditionally been subjects within the 
purview of philosophy. Philosophers, by tradition, have wrestled with       
these topics and the work continues. Neurophilosophy arises out of the 
recognition that at long last, the brain sciences and their adjunct 
technology are sufficiently advanced that real progress can be made in 
understanding the mind-brain. More brashly, it predicts that philosophy of 
mind conducted with no understanding of neurons and the brain is likely 
to be sterile. Neurophilosophy, as a result, focuses on problems at the 
intersection of a greening neuroscience and a graying philosophy.23
 
 
The Churchlands are known not only for the advocacy of neurophilosophy, but 
also for their defense of eliminative materialism. Neurophilosophy and eliminativism 
have been linked in the minds of many, but the two theses are distinct. This chapter 
endorses neurophilosophy but not the eliminativist understanding of vertical integration.  
It will show that one can take the brain seriously without eliminating higher-level mind 
science and common sense psychology from one’s explanatory framework. This chapter 
also endorses a version of identity theory, but not the form of reductionism with which 
identity theory is usually associated. The success of neurophilosophy as a program, of 
course, depends on the neurosciences having a certain degree of explanatory power and 
for these explanations to be able to yield ontological conclusions. As noted above, 
dualists and functionalists offer principled objections about the explanatory and 
ontological implications of the neurosciences. 
  This chapter thus begins by discussing these dualist and functionalist concerns.  
It is argued that while neither dualist nor functionalist arguments are compelling, both 
                                                          
23Churchland, Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy, 2-3. 
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theories contain important insights. Dualism is correct to stress the subjectivity of 
consciousness; however, it is argued that naturalism is better positioned to account for 
subjectivity than dualism. The form of identity theory defended thus embraces 
phenomenal realism.  
Phenomenal realism or Inflationism is the view that consciousness is a 
substantial property that cannot be conceptually reduced or otherwise 
philosophically reduced in non-phenomenal terms….According to most 
contemporary inflationists, consciousness plays a causal role and its nature 
may be found empirically as the sciences of consciousness advance.  
Inflationism is compatible with the empirical scientific reduction of 
consciousness to neurological or computational properties of the brain….  
Inflationism accepts the Hard Problem but aims for an empirical solution 
to it.24
 
 
The form of identity theory defended is also pluralist in its understanding of 
explanation. Functionalism is correct to stress the importance of higher-level cognitive 
science in the explanation of consciousness, but is wrong in its conclusions about the 
autonomy of psychology based on multiple realizability arguments. Recent debates 
between advocates of “reductive” and “non-reductive” physicalism tend to pit 
psychology and neuroscience against one another in a zero-sum game. The pluralist 
stance is an attempt to move beyond debates concerning non-reductive and reductive 
forms of physicalism. This pluralist stance draws upon models of mechanistic 
explanation and explanatory pluralism in recent philosophy of psychology and 
philosophy of neuroscience, and argues that the project of vertical integration need not be 
exclusively understood in reductionist or eliminativist terms.   
                                                          
24Ned Block, "Consciousness, Philosophical Issues About," (2002).  Retrieved from: 
www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/ecs.pdf  (accessed 1/15/09). 
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Dualism and Consciousness 
 Dualists argue that consciousness cannot be explained by lower level cognitive 
science and neuroscience because consciousness just isn’t physical. Religious dualists 
typically regard the entire conscious self as beyond the functional-physical explanatory 
framework of the sciences. Within contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, the debate 
focuses more narrowly on the issue of phenomenal consciousness and subjective qualities 
of experience or qualia. This section provides an overview of the major anti-reductionist 
arguments based on consciousness in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind.     
Thomas Nagel: “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” 
Thomas Nagel was one of the first to draw anti-reductionist, anti-physicalist (but 
not pro-dualist) conclusions based on consciousness. The terms in which Nagel posed the 
mind-body problem in “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” echo through later treatments of the 
issue. For Nagel, it is consciousness that makes the mind-body problem really 
intractable.25 According to Nagel, “the fact that an organism has conscious experience at 
all means, basically that there is something it is like to be that organism.”26 Now 
according to Nagel, if naturalism is to be defended, phenomenal consciousness must also 
be given a physical account. Nagel argues that this is impossible, however, due to the fact 
that “every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected to a single point of view, and 
it seems inevitable that an objective physical theory will abandon that point of view.”27
                                                          
25Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" in Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, 
ed. John Heil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 528. 
  
 
26Ibid., 529. 
 
27Ibid., 530. 
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All of this has implications for the mind-body problem, for it is a mystery “how the true 
character of experiences could be revealed in the physical operations of that organism.”28
We appear to be faced with a general difficulty about psychophysical 
reduction. In other areas, the process of reduction is a move in the 
direction of greater objectivity, toward a more accurate view of the real 
nature of things. This is accomplished by reducing our dependence on 
individual or species-specific points of view toward the object of 
investigation….Experience itself, however, does not seem to fit the 
pattern.  The idea of moving from appearance to reality seems to make no 
sense here.
 
Phenomenal consciousness simply does not fit typical patterns of reduction in the 
sciences: 
29
   
 
Saul Kripke and A Posteriori Necessity 
Work in modal logic by Saul Kripke also challenged the analogy between mind-
brain identity and other scientifically discovered identities.30
                                                          
28Ibid., 533. 
 Early identity theorists 
argued that psycho-neural identity was similar to others empirically discovered scientific 
identities like heat = mean molecular kinetic energy or water = H2O. As these identities 
are discovered a posteriori, these thinkers also argued that these identities were 
contingent. Significantly, Kripke argued that if identity claims were true at all, they were 
true in all possible worlds. Regardless if the claim is discovered empirically or not, if it is 
an identity claim, it holds of necessity. Scientific identities, while discovered a posteriori, 
like heat = mean molecular kinetic energy or water = H2O were thus necessary claims.  
 
29Ibid., 535. 
 
30See Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972); Saul 
Kripke, "Identity and Necessity," in Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology, ed. John Heil (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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Kripke realized that such empirically discovered scientific identities certainly 
don’t seem necessary, however. Kripke argued that in cases of genuine identity the 
appearance of contingency could be explained away. Kripke’s strategy for doing this 
again trades on an appearance/reality distinction. The appearance of contingency with 
scientifically established identities occurs in virtue of the fact that the everyday terms 
involved in such identities (e.g., water, heat) have their references picked out by 
contingent properties (i.e., their appearances).31 With everyday terms like heat or water 
reference is fixed by these contingent surface properties rather than the actual nature of 
the everyday term. Thus water is identified as “the odorless, colorless stuff that falls from 
the sky” or heat is identified as “the stuff that causes heat sensations.” The relationship 
between water and “the odorless, colorless stuff that falls from the sky” or heat and “the 
stuff that causes heat sensations” is contingent, and it is precisely because these 
properties fix reference that an illusion of contingency is generated. The contingency lies 
not with the nature of water (H2O) but with surface properties that human beings use to 
pick out water. Once appearance (the odorless, colorless stuff that falls from the sky) is 
distinguished from reality (H2O) the appearance of contingency can be explained away.32
Kripke’s insights into the logic of identity had important implications for the 
mind-body problem, for he argued that there was a profound difference between identity 
statements like Heat = mean molecular kinetic energy and Pain = c-fibers firing. With 
purported mind-brain identities, Kripke argued, the strategy of explaining away the 
 
                                                          
31Ibid., 130. 
 
32Ibid. 
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contingency used with other scientific identities is not available. We explain away the 
contingency with other scientific identities by making a distinction between the way heat 
appears to us and the phenomena itself. Heat appears to us as “the stuff that causes heat 
sensations” but it is really the motion of molecules. An appearance-reality distinction is 
not available, in the case of mind-brain identities because the appearance is the reality.  
“The experience has to be this experience, and I cannot say that it is contingent property 
of the pain I now have that it is a pain.”33
The identity theorist who holds that pain is the brain state, also has to hold 
that it necessarily is a brain state….He has to hold that we are under some 
illusion in thinking that we can imagine that there could have been pains 
without brain states. And the only model I can think of for what the 
illusion might be, or at least the model given by the analogy the 
materialists suggest, namely, heat and molecular motion, simply does not 
work in this case. So the materialist is up against a very stiff challenge.  
He has to show that these things we think we can see to be possible are in 
fact not possible. He has to show that these things which we can imagine 
are not in fact things we can imagine. And that requires some very 
different philosophical argument from the sort which has been given in the 
case of heat and molecular motion. And it would have to be a deeper and 
subtler argument than I can fathom and subtler than has ever appeared in 
any materialist literature that I have read. So the conclusion of this 
investigation would be that the analytical tools we are using go against the 
identity thesis and so go against the general thesis that mental states are 
just physical states.
 The sensation of pain counts as pain itself and 
it seems that pain can come apart from c-fibers firing. According to Kripke, the challenge 
for physicalists is thus quite steep: 
34
 
  
                                                          
33Ibid., 131. 
 
34Ibid., 132. 
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The early anti-naturalist sentiments articulated by Nagel and Kripke in the 1970s were 
shaped into distinctive arguments by Joseph Levine, Frank Jackson, and David Chalmers 
in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Joseph Levine and the Explanatory Gap 
 
While rejecting the metaphysical conclusions of Kripke’s modal argument, Joseph 
Levine amplifies its fundamental epistemological point in “Materialism and Qualia: The 
Explanatory Gap.”35 Kripke’s analysis pointed to the difference between statements like 
“heat is the motion of molecules” and psycho-neural identity statements like “pain is the 
firing of c-fibers.” According to Kripke, if these statements are genuine identities, they 
must be necessary. In the case of heat, the felt contingency can be explained away; 
however, the felt contingency with the psycho-neural identity cannot be explained away 
in the same manner. Levine is concerned with probing why this is the case. He does so in 
light of the notion of fully explanatory identity. “Fully explanatory identities,” according 
to Levine, are identities that leave nothing crucial out. Thus the identification of heat with 
the motion of molecules “is explanatory in the sense that our knowledge of chemistry and 
physics makes intelligible how it is that something like the motion of molecules could 
play the causal role we associate with heat. Furthermore, antecedent to our discovery of 
the essential nature of heat, its causal role…exhausts our notion of it.”36
                                                          
35Joseph Levine, "Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap," Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly 64 (1983). 
   
 
36Ibid., 357. 
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Levine argues that the psycho-neural identity, “pain is the firing of c-fibers,” is 
also explanatory in this sense, but his point is that in the case of such psycho-neural 
identities physical and functional analysis does not exhaustively explain the concept 
“pain.”   
[T]here is more to our concept of pain than its causal role, there is its 
qualitative character, how it feels; and what is left unexplained by the 
discovery of C-fiber firing is why pain should feel the way it does! For 
there seems to be nothing about C-fiber firing which makes it naturally 
“fit” the phenomenal properties of pain, any more than it would fit some 
other set of phenomenal properties. Unlike its functional role, the 
identification of the qualitative side of pain with C-fiber firing…leaves the 
connection between it and what we identify it with completely 
mysterious.37
 
 
Because qualia cannot be captured in physical or functional terms, it is natural to imagine 
that these purported identities can in fact come apart: 
If there is nothing we can determine about C-fiber firing that explains why 
having one’s C-fibers fire has the qualitative character that it does—or, to 
put it another way, if what’s it’s particularly like to have one’s C-fibers 
fire is not explained, or made intelligible, by understanding the physical or 
functional properties of C-fibers firings—it immediately becomes 
imaginable that there be C-fiber firings without the feeling of pain, and 
vice versa. We don’t have the corresponding intuition in the case of heat 
and the motion of molecules—once we get clear about the right way to 
characterize what we imagine—because whatever there is to explain about 
heat is explained by its being the motion of molecules.38
 
 
Levine’s argument is an argument from the absence of conceptual analysis.  
Because consciousness cannot be exhaustively analyzed in physical or functional terms 
an explanatory gap will always remain between properties of the brain and conscious 
mental properties. Importantly, Levine’s argument from the absence of conceptual 
                                                          
37Ibid. 
 
38Ibid., 359. 
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analysis is an epistemological argument. Physicalism may be true; we just don’t 
understand how it can be true. For both Frank Jackson and David Chalmers the lack of 
deductive entailment between consciousness and the physical implies that conscious 
mental properties are non-physical. 
Frank Jackson and the Knowledge Argument 
 
 The lack of entailment from physical facts to phenomenal facts is the focus of a 
famous thought experiment by Frank Jackson. In “Epiphenomenl Qualia,” Jackson 
explicitly seeks to avoid mere clashes of intuition about qualia by developing an 
argument whose premises are obvious to all. 
There are many qualia freaks, and some of them say that their rejection of 
physicalism is an unargued intuition. I think they are being unfair to 
themselves. They have the following argument. Nothing you could tell of 
a physical sort captures the smell of a rose, for instance. Therefore, 
physicalism is false. By our lights this is a perfectly good argument.… I 
must, however, admit that it is weak from a polemical point of view. There 
are, unfortunately for us, many who do not find the premise intuitively 
obvious. The task then is to present an argument whose premises are 
obvious to all, or at least to as many as possible.39
 
 
The result is his now famous color scientist Mary: 
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to 
investigate the world from a black-and-white room via a black-and-white 
television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and 
acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain 
about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms 
like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on….What will happen when Mary is released 
from her black-and-white room or is given a color-television monitor? 
Will she learn anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn 
something about our world and our visual experience of it. But then it is 
inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all 
                                                          
39Frank Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia," in There's Something About Mary: Essays on 
Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, ed. Yujin Nagasawa, Peter 
Ludlow, and Daniel Stoljar (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 40. 
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the physical information.  Ergo there is more to have than that, and 
physicalism is false.40
 
 
In a later article, Jackson presents “a convenient and accurate” way to present the 
argument: 
(1) Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to know 
about other people. 
(2) Mary (before her release) does not know everything there is to know 
about other people (because she learns something about them on her 
release). 
Therefore, 
(3) There are truths about other people (and herself) which escape the 
physicalist story.41
 
 
The argument is an attempt to show that there is no deductive entailment between the 
physical and the phenomenal; and as a result physical and phenomenal properties must be 
thought of as distinct. Brian Loar summarizes the argument well: 
Consider any phenomenal quality and any physical property however 
complex. We can know that a person has the physical property without 
knowing that she experiences the phenomenal quality. And no amount of a 
priori reasoning or construction can bridge this conceptual gap. That is the 
intuitive premise. The conclusion is drawn that the phenomenal quality 
cannot be identical to the physical property. The argument is equivalent to 
this: since physical and phenomenal conceptions can be connected only a 
posteriori, physical properties must be distinct from phenomenal 
properties.42
 
 
                                                          
40Ibid. 
 
41Frank Jackson, "What Mary Didn't Know," in There's Something About Mary: Essays on 
Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, ed. Yujin Nagasawa, Peter 
Ludlow, and Daniel Stoljar (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 54. 
 
42Brian Loar, "Phenomenal States (Revised Version)," in There's Something About Mary: Essays 
on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument ed. Yujin Nagasawa, Peter 
Ludlow, and Daniel Stoljar (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 221. 
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David Chalmers and the Hard Problem 
 In his 1996 work, The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers brings together both 
modal arguments and knowledge arguments as part of a defense of property dualism.43
 In discussing the explanation of consciousness, Chalmers draws upon the notions 
of supervenience and reductive explanation. Importantly, Chalmers distinguishes between 
two types of supervenience: logical supervenience and natural supervenience.  “B-
properties supervene logically on A-properties if no two logically possible situations are 
identical with respect to their A-properties but distinct with respect to their B-
properties.”
 
Chalmers famously distinguishes between “easy problems” and the “hard problem” in the 
philosophy of mind. In making this distinction, Chalmers differentiates two concepts of 
mind: the psychological and the phenomenal. Psychological aspects of mind, including 
psychological aspects of consciousness may be scientifically perplexing, but they are not 
particularly philosophically perplexing because the psychological mind can be analyzed 
in functional and physical terms. Echoing Levine and Jackson, however, Chalmers argues 
that no such analysis is available for phenomenal consciousness. The “hard problem” is 
thus the problem of how objective brains give rise to subjective experience. Chalmers 
argues that consciousness cannot be explained in physicalist terms and then moves to the 
conclusion that physicalism is false.  
44
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 However, Chalmers points out there are other forms of supervenience than 
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logical supervenience. This occurs in cases where there are systematic correlations 
between two sets of properties in the natural world. This is natural supervenience: “In 
general, B-properties supervene naturally on A-properties if any two naturally possible 
situations with the same A-properties have the same B-properties.”45
For almost every natural phenomenon above the level of microscopic 
physics, there seems in principle to exist a reductive explanation: that is, 
an explanation wholly in terms of simpler entities. In these cases, when we 
give an appropriate account of lower-level processes, an explanation of the 
higher-level phenomenon falls out.
 Logical 
supervenience is linked closely to Chalmers’ notion of reductive explanation. 
46
 
 
Logical supervenience is related to reductive explanation in the following manner: 
“A natural phenomenon is reductively explainable in terms of some low-level properties 
precisely when it is logically supervenient on these properties. It is reductively 
explainable in terms of physical properties—or simply “reductively explainable” when it 
is logically supervenient on the physical.”47
(1) Absent Qualia: It is logically possible to conceive of a creature—a 
philosophical zombie—who is physically and functionally identical to me but 
lacks conscious experience. Of course, such a being is empirically impossible, 
but the conceivability of zombies shows the failure of logical supervenience 
and reductive explanation. 
 Chalmers argues that consciousness fails to 
logically supervene upon the physical and thus escapes the net of reductive explanation. 
Chalmers bases his conclusions about the failure of logical supervenience and reductive 
explanation on a number of dualist arguments under consideration. 
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(2) Inverted Qualia: One can imagine two people who are physically and 
functionally identical but who have inverted conscious experiences. When I 
have a red experience my inverted twin has a blue experience and vice versa. 
As a logical possibility, it seems coherent that experiences could be inverted 
while physical structure is duplicated exactly. 
 
(3) The Knowledge Argument: Mary cannot know what it is like to see red on 
the basis of physical facts. Subjective facts escape the physicalist story. 
 
(4)  Absence of Conceptual Analysis: No sort of physicalist conceptual 
analysis—i.e. structural and functional analysis—is possible with 
consciousness: “For consciousness to be entailed by a set of physical facts, 
one would need some kind of analysis of the notion of consciousness—the 
kind of analysis whose satisfaction physical facts could imply—and there is 
no such analysis to be had.”48
 
 
On the basis of these arguments, Chalmers argues that scientific explanations of 
consciousness might well be able to explain psychological properties of the mind and 
even psychological consciousness, but they fail to explain phenomenal consciousness. In 
other words, they explain “easy problems” but not the “hard problem.” Writing on a 
number of different scientific explanations of consciousness, Chalmers argues: 
The problems with the models and theories presented here do not lie in the 
details; at least, we have not needed to consider the details in order to see 
what is wrong with them. The problem lies in the overall explanatory 
strategy. These models and theories are simply not the sort of thing that 
could explain consciousness.49
 
  
For Chalmers, the failure of reductive explanation shows that physicalism is false. The 
failure of logical supervenience and reductive explanation establish consciousness as a 
further fact, over and above the physical facts of the world. Chalmers thus advocates a 
form of property dualism: 
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The arguments do not lead us to a dualism such as that of Descartes, with 
a separate realm of mental substance that exerts its own influence on 
physical processes. The best evidence of contemporary science tells us 
that the physical world is more or less causally closed: for every physical 
event, there is a physical sufficient cause. If so, there is no room for a 
mental “ghost in the machine” to do any extra causal work….The dualism 
implied here is instead a kind of property dualism: conscious experience 
involves properties of an individual that are not entailed by the physical 
properties of that individual, although they may depend lawfully on those 
properties. Consciousness is a feature of the world over and above the 
physical features of the world…[T]here are properties of individuals in the 
world—the phenomenal properties—that are ontologically independent of 
physical properties.50
 
 
Dualism in Question 
 
 The ambitious nature of the arguments of Kripke, Jackson, and Chalmers should 
not be missed. They seek to establish the truth of dualism and the falsity of physicalism 
by a priori means alone. The sections that follow mount a critique and response to 
dualism. Dualist arguments are first critiqued in light of the incompleteness of our 
concepts concerning consciousness and the brain. Dualist arguments based on a priori 
conceptual analysis assume that our concepts of both consciousness and brain processes 
are complete and that the identity conditions for both sensations and brain processes are 
fully understood. If our knowledge of such concepts and their mutual relationships is not 
complete, this casts significant doubt on dualist arguments. Conceptual incompleteness 
cannot establish physicalism, but it does give substantial reasons to be skeptical of dualist 
arguments.    
Even though their conclusions are false, much can be learned from dualist 
arguments.  Dualist arguments do establish the importance of taking conscious 
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subjectivity seriously and the inadequacy of any approach that does not do so. However, 
contrary to dualist claims, one can fully affirm subjectivity while remaining a card-
carrying physicalist. Thus a naturalistic account of subjectivity is developed following the 
critique of dualism.  It is argued that a naturalistic account enables one to take 
subjectivity seriously while not ruling out explanations at the levels of scientific 
psychology and neuroscience. 
The Incomplete Concepts Strategy 
 
The methodological and ontological problems for neurophilosophy and identity 
theory seem enormous indeed. Neurophilosophy and identity theory are predicated on the 
possibility of some sort of “reflective equilibrium” being established by phenomenal 
consciousness, cognitive science, and neuroscience.51
The arguments of Kripke, Jackson, and Chalmers are rooted in a certain 
conception of philosophy, a conception that appeals to hypothetical a priori reasoning in 
order to establish metaphysical truths about the fundamental nature of reality. Note that 
dualism is already at odds with the physics, biology, and neuroscience constraints 
 Modal and knowledge arguments 
seem to call into question the entire ontology of physicalism. If consciousness is, as 
Chalmers claims, a deep further fact about the world, the most one will be able to expect 
from cognitive and neuroscientific theories of consciousness are lawful correlations.  
Consciousness just isn’t the sort of thing that can be explained scientifically. However, 
there are ample reasons to doubt the property dualism proposed by Kripke, Jackson, and 
Chalmers. 
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discussed earlier. It is surely wrongheaded simply to dismiss such arguments, but a 
certain amount of skepticism is more than justified. Dualism does not cohere well with 
our current knowledge of physics, evolutionary biology, and neuroscience. There are also 
ample reasons to be skeptical of dualist arguments in light of inductive evidence from the 
history of science. Indeed, the history of modern science reads as a long litany of once 
indisputable explanatory gaps being closed. Seventeenth century physics, particularly 
Newton’s physics, closed the explanatory gap between sublunary and superlunary realms 
so central in Aristotelian physics. While Immanuel Kant confidently declared that there 
would never be a Newton of a blade of grass, nineteenth and twentieth century biology 
closed the explanatory gap between life and mechanistic physical processes. The point of 
this section is not to establish physicalism or naturalism, but rather to cast significant 
doubt about the rather robust claims advanced in arguments by Kripke, Jackson, and 
Chalmers.   
The fundamental issue at stake is whether our concepts of phenomenal 
consciousness and our concepts of neurophysiological states are well developed enough 
to draw dualist conclusions about them. Philosophers like Robert Van Gulick, Patricia 
Churchland, and Thomas Polger have voiced skepticism about the metaphysical 
conclusions drawn by Kripke, Jackson, and Chalmers. Note that the debate revolves 
around empirical concepts and a posteriori necessity, and as Kripke and Chalmers both 
acknowledge, it is possible to be misled by conceivability arguments concerning a 
posteriori necessity. We might think that heat can come apart from mean molecular 
kinetic energy or that water can come apart from H20, but it really is not possible. Such 
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thoughts might be conceivable in some sense, but they are not really possible. 
Significantly, for Kripke and Chalmers, we can explain away the appearance of 
contingency with other identities, but this strategy is not available with consciousness and 
brain processes. However, examples like heat and water come from largely completed 
sciences like chemistry and physics. 
The disanalogy between purported mind-brain identities and other empirically 
discovered identities might be due to the fact that neuroscience is simply a very young 
science. Debates concerning vitalism in biology provide an instructive example. Life was 
thought to be a fact “over and above” the physical structures and functions of an 
organism; however, thanks to nineteenth and twentieth century advances in the life 
sciences, we know that life is not a deep further fact—it just is certain underlying 
mechanical processes. Dualists have a ready reply to the vitalism analogy. It is possible to 
conceptually analyze the concept “life” in functionalist terms while it is impossible to do 
this with phenomenal consciousness. Note, however, that this example of conceptual 
analysis is applied post facto to a largely completed science. It was by no means evident 
in the nineteenth century that such a conceptual analysis was available.  
Robert Van Gulick has highlighted these issues in what he calls an argument from 
“parallel conceptual inadequacy.” He argues that one could imagine a nineteenth century 
vitalist biologist deploying the following argument: 
1. I can conceive of creatures that are just like actual creatures (say actual cats) 
in all physical respects but that have no ability to reproduce. 
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2. Therefore the ability to reproduce does not logically supervene on a creature’s 
physical structure.52
 
 
With the benefit of nineteenth and twentieth century science, however, we know that the 
vitalist conclusion is just dead wrong. The vitalist lacks both an adequate concept of 
reproduction and an adequate concept of the total physical structure of the organism, as 
well as an adequate theory of how the two might fit together. 
The vitalist might have conjoined his concept of the total physical 
structure of a cat with the negation of his concept of the ability to 
reproduce without generating any a priori contradictions, but given the 
radical incompleteness of his concepts vis-à-vis the natures of the two 
phenomena to which he applied them, nothing really follows regarding 
what relations of logical (or metaphysical) possibility might hold between 
these phenomena themselves.53
 
 
The implications for consciousness become clear. Our concepts of consciousness and 
neurophysiology are simply too primitive to draw any putative conclusions regarding 
their non-identity. Now, as Van Gulick acknowledges, the vitalist analogy also leaves the 
naturalist with a hefty IOU. The nineteenth century materialist seeking to reply to the 
vitalist lacked adequate conceptual tools by which to do so, but “carrying the burden of a 
large promissory note is not the same as having been refuted.”54
 Patricia Churchland has raised similar reservations about the adequacy of our 
concepts of consciousness. Churchland draws attention to the fact that conceptual 
boundaries are constantly being re-drawn in the history of science. Fire provides an 
 
                                                          
52Robert Van Gulick, "Conceiving Beyond Our Means: The Limits of Thought Experiments," 
Toward a Science of Consciousness 3 (2003).  Retrieved from: http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/ 
TUCSON3/Van_Gulick.html (accessed 11/17/08). 
 
53Ibid. 
 
54Ibid. 
 
 
 
39 
instructive example of conceptual re-classification.55
My suspicion with respect to the Hard Problem strategy is that it seems to 
take the class of conscious experiences to be much better defined than it is.  
The point is, if you are careful to restrict your focus to the prototypical 
cases, you can easily be hornswoggled into assuming the class is well-
defined. As soon as you broaden your horizons, troublesome questions 
about fuzzy boundaries, about the connections between attention, short 
term memory and awareness, are present in full, what-do-we-do-with-that 
glory.
 Pre-theoretically “fire” included any 
phenomena that emitted heat and light. Thus burning wood and the sun were thought to 
share the same “fiery” essence; burning wood, rusting, and bodily metabolism were seen 
as utterly distinct phenomena. From the benefit of modern physics and chemistry,  we 
now know that burning wood and the sun are governed by two entirely different 
processes: fast oxidation and nuclear fusion; we also know that burning wood, rusting, 
and bodily metabolism are in fact examples of the same process: oxidation. The moral of 
all this for Churchland is that explicit definitions only become available fairly late in the 
game, as the science that embeds them firms up and matures. In light of this, Churchland 
voices skepticism regarding Chalmers’s hard-and-fast division of consciousness into hard 
and easy problems.   
56
 
 
Conceptual inadequacy thus provides a clear response to both the modal argument and 
the knowledge argument. With regard to Kripke’s modal arguments, conceptual 
inadequacy becomes a way of explaining away contingencies without appealing to 
appearance/reality distinctions. In order to know whether a purported identity holds or 
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doesn’t hold, one must be aware of its identity conditions. However, at present, we do not 
know the identity conditions of either sensations or brain processes. This might in fact 
explain the appearance of contingency. That is all a response to Kripke requires. As 
Thomas Polger notes: 
I argue that, in our current ignorance of identity conditions of both 
sensations and brain processes, as far as we know sensations and brain 
processes may be identical. This is enough…to explain why we might 
think that the relationship between sensations and brain processes is 
contingent even if it is not….Remember Kripke’s challenge to the 
naturalist: if we cannot explain the appearance of contingency between the 
objects of putative identity, then we must deny the identity; but if we can 
explain the appearance of contingency, then it is possible that the items are 
identical.57
 
 
The conceptual inadequacy strategy also provides an initial response to the knowledge 
argument. At the very least, it suggests that caution is appropriate when drawing strong 
metaphysical conclusions based on hypothetical reasoning about incomplete concepts. As 
Robert Van Gulick observes: 
The hypothetical epistemic situation is so unlike the real world contexts in 
which we operate that it is difficult to have uncontroversial intuitions 
about it. Can the knowledge argument’s defenders make the case that their 
imagined scenario of Mary’s postrelease surprise is the only a priori 
acceptable one? Can they assume that the alternative imagined by its 
critics—can be ruled out as impossible by pure a priori reflection on our 
concepts?  It is a big assumption to make, and one can already feel the 
counterbalancing of plausibility between the argument’s assumptions and 
its radical conclusion. The argument’s need for a decisive intuitive 
judgment in favor of its preferred scenario may seem a thin reed on which 
to hang so momentous a metaphysical result.58
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Daniel Dennett, in particular, has exploited this style of response to the knowledge 
argument, arguing that it is just as plausible to assume that Mary doesn’t learn anything 
upon her release, given her exhaustive knowledge of all the physical facts. Dennett has us 
imagine Mary being presented with a blue banana upon her release: 
And so, one day, Mary’s captors decided it was time for her to see colors.  
As a trick, they prepared a bright blue banana to present as her first color 
experience ever. Mary took one look at it and said ‘Hey! You tried to trick 
me!  Bananas are yellow, but this one is blue!’ Her captors were 
dumbfounded.  How did she do it? “Simple,” she replied. “You have to 
remember that I know everything—absolutely everything—that could ever 
be known about the physical causes and effects of color vision. So of 
course before you brought the banana in, I had already written down, in 
exquisite detail, exactly what physical impression a yellow object or a blue 
object would have upon my nervous system. So I already knew exactly 
what thoughts I would have (because, after all, the ‘mere disposition’ to 
think about this or that is not one of your famous qualia is it?). I was not in 
the slightest surprised by my experience of blue….I realize it is hard for 
you to imagine that I could know so much about my reactive dispositions 
that the way blue affected me came as no surprise. Of course it’s hard for 
you to imagine. It’s hard for anyone to imagine the consequences of 
someone knowing everything physical about anything!59
 
 
Dennett’s point is not that his twist on the knowledge argument establishes physicalism, 
it is rather that one should not mistake “a failure of imagination for an insight into 
necessity.”60
Considerations of conceptual inadequacy do not establish physicalism, but they 
certainly raise suspicion about the dualist conclusions drawn by Kripke, Jackson, and 
Chalmers. The conceptual inadequacy strategy is helpful in refuting arguments 
maintaining in principle that one cannot identify consciousness and brain processes; 
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however, it isn’t a particularly constructive strategy. Indeed, considerations of conceptual 
inadequacy lead Colin McGinn to maintain that there can in principle be no constructive 
account of the mind-body problem.61 As a naturalist, McGinn is convinced that such a 
concept must exist; however, knowledge of such a concept simply exceeds the cognitive 
abilities of human beings. McGinn’s anti-constructive naturalism or mysterian position is 
not warranted however.62
If one wants to be a constructive naturalist, one owes more of an account of the 
place of subjectivity in the natural world than the conceptual inadequacy strategy 
provides. The knowledge argument is a failure as an argument for dualism, but it is of 
great heuristic value for physicalists. It clues one into what an adequate account of 
physicalism must amount to. In particular, it points to the importance of taking 
subjectivity seriously. Physicalism is thought to preclude a robust account of subjectivity, 
but this is not the case. The next section examines issues of physicalism and subjectivity 
in response to the knowledge argument. 
  
Subjectivity Naturalized: Neurophilosophical Identity Theory 
 
and Phenomenal Realism 
 
The incomplete concepts strategy effectively blocks arguments for property 
dualism; however, this is just a first pass. The refutation of property dualism certainly 
doesn’t suffice to establish naturalism as a compelling position. More needs to be said 
about naturalism and its relationship to subjectivity. The next sections will argue that 
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naturalism is able to respond to the concern that naturalism “leaves out what it is like;” it 
argues in fact, that naturalism provides the most compelling account of subjectivity 
currently available.   
Naturalism and Phenomenal Realism 
 
Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument proves particularly helpful as a point of 
departure in exploring issues concerning phenomenal consciousness and naturalism. Let 
us first review Jackson’s “convenient and accurate” way of displaying the knowledge 
argument: 
(1) Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to know 
about other people. 
(2) Mary (before her release) does not know everything there is to know 
about other people (because she learns something about them on her 
release). 
Therefore, 
(3) There are truths about other people (and herself) which escape the 
physicalist story.63
 
 
The two responses to the argument seem to be either agreeing with Jackson that 
Mary learns something on her release, which leads to property dualism, or rejecting 
premise (2) and denying that Mary learns anything. But, might one be able to admit that 
Mary does indeed learn something in a fairly robust sense and still remain a physicalist?  
In approaching this question, Ned Block’s distinction between inflationist and deflationist 
forms of physicalism is helpful.64
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conceptually analyzed in non-phenomenal terms, thus Mary does not learn anything upon 
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her release. Inflationist physicalism, on the other hand, is a form of phenomenal realism.  
Inflationists argue that consciousness cannot be conceptually reduced or otherwise 
philosophically reduced in non-phenomenological terms, but that consciousness is 
nonetheless physical.65
Jackson’s argument equates physical knowledge with third person physical 
concepts that refer to physical properties of the brain.
     
66
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 These physical science facts are 
taken to be exhaustive of the physical. Mary has knowledge of all the physical concepts 
and these concepts refer to all the physical properties of the brain. Because Mary gains 
knowledge, Jackson argues that consciousness must involve non-physical properties. 
Subjective facts are thus non-physical facts. However, physical knowledge might involve 
first person phenomenal concepts as well as third person physical concepts. Both first 
person phenomenal concepts and third person physical concepts refer to physical 
properties in the brain, but phenomenal concepts may only be acquired through 
experience. Mary might have knowledge of all the physical properties of the brain, but 
she knows these facts only in virtue of physical concepts. Because she has never seen red, 
she lacks the phenomenal concepts that also refer to the same physical properties in the 
brain. In this sense, “physical knowledge” might extend beyond objective physical 
science fact and include states that obtain in virtue of the physical science facts. In this 
sense, physical knowledge might be both objective and subjective, and one has an 
account of how Mary might gain knowledge without this involving any non-physical 
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facts or non-physical properties. Mary’s acquisition of new knowledge may be purely 
epistemological rather than metaphysical.  
In this account, seeing red is an entirely physical experience. Prior to her release, 
Mary knows all about this experience from a third person, objective perspective, but her 
red channels have never been activated. Upon her release the perceptual/phenomenal 
concept is trigged in Mary’s mind by the basic biological mechanisms that subserve 
normal color perception. Now an experience of red is not the language of physics. But an 
experience of red is a physical event in a suitably hooked-up system, a subjective 
physical fact. As Owen Flanagan notes: 
Completed physics, chemistry, and neuroscience, along with a functional-
role description, will explain what an experience of red is, in the sense that 
they will explain how red experiences are realized, what their functional 
role is, and so on. But no linguistic description will completely capture 
what a first-person experience of red is like. That is only captured in the 
first-person. You have to be there….[W]e need to beware of the 
temptation to think that for physicalism to be true, the basic physical 
sciences must be able to capture all truths. This is stronger than requiring 
that physicalism be true; that is, it is stronger than requiring that 
everything that happens is physical. Physicalism can be true in this sense 
without being able to explain everything, let alone capture everything in 
the languages of the basic physical sciences.67
 
 
The issue at stake is really epistemological and semantic and not ontological. Third 
person physical concepts do not suffice for picking out every state of affairs in the world. 
Physicalism/naturalism is not scientism. Everything that is real is physical in the sense 
that it is in some way or another realized by underlying physical processes or structures. 
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But the universality of physical realization is compatible with our epistemic and 
theoretical need for a diversity of means of representing and modeling reality.68
 One can remain a card carrying physicalist and yet admit that the knowledge 
argument reveals something important about consciousness: namely, that we have two 
ways of thinking about it with third-person person physical science concepts and first-
person phenomenal concepts.
   
69
Responses are thus available for all of the arguments that naturalism cannot in 
principle explain consciousness. Because two concepts are available for thinking about 
consciousness, we can be led into thinking that the physical and the phenomenal can be 
separated—as in the case of philosophical zombies—when, in fact they cannot. 
Philosophical zombies may be conceivable but they are not possible. Mary does indeed 
learn something upon her release, but as we have seen, that is no brief against 
physicalism. The world is exhausted by physical facts but certain physical facts—
subjective physical facts—can only be had through experience. The argument is really an 
 The key point is that the dualism is not at the level of 
substances or properties but rather the concepts of properties. H20 and water both name 
the same properties but they are distinct concepts. In Fregean terms, the reference is the 
same but the sense is different. Prior to her release, Mary knew all about the subjective 
experience of red via physical concepts, after she left the room she acquired a 
phenomenal concept of the same property. Mary thus indeed learns something new. She 
learns new ways to think about consciousness that she did not have before. 
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argument for empiricism and the limits of discursive knowledge rather than any sort of 
argument against physicalism. None of the arguments for property dualism are 
successful.  But naturalism is more than anti-dualism. More needs to be said about the 
place of the conscious self in the natural world. 
Subjectivity and Naturalism: Leaving Out ‘What It Is Like’? 
If the arguments in the previous sections have been successful, it is clear that 
dualist arguments in the philosophy of mind are not successful. But what about the claim 
that naturalistic accounts of consciousness “leave out what it is like”? As Thomas Nagel 
objected, “[A]ny shift to greater objectivity—does not take us nearer to the real nature of 
the phenomenon it takes us farther away.”70
Owen Flanagan has offered an important critique of Nagel’s line of thought, 
particularly with regard to ambiguities in the use of the term “real nature.” “Real nature” 
might mean (1) the way things seem for a particular person (the sense probably intended 
by Nagel), (2) what is going on with the cognitive system as a whole.
      
71
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first sense, Flanagan acknowledges that it is true that a purely objective account cannot 
capture points of view or the way things seem to someone. However, it should be noted 
that such a critique equates physicalism with objective physical facts, but, as the previous 
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Nagel makes precisely the same mistake as Jackson. Objective analysis cannot 
capture points of view, but that is no brief against naturalism, for the doctrine of 
naturalism includes both objective physical facts and subjective physical facts. As 
Flanagan notes naturalism is perfectly well positioned to explain “why only you can 
capture what it’s like to be you: “Only your sensory receptors and brain are properly 
hooked up to each other and to the rest of you so that what is received at those receptors 
accrues to you as your experiences.”72
Despite the plausibility of Nagel’s line of argument, I think that 
physicalism can meet the challenge he poses….For a start, we should 
immediately concede that there is one sense in which we human beings are 
indeed cut off from the facts of bat experiences. We do not have 
echolocatory experiences, whereas bats do. In this sense it is undoubtedly 
true that we ‘lack access to’, ‘cannot appreciate’, or whatever phrase you 
prefer, the ‘subjective reality’ of bat experience. But this observation in 
itself clearly yields no argument against physicalism. For physicalists are 
just as well placed as anybody else to explain this difference between bats 
and humans. Physicalists think that conscious experiences are identical 
with certain physical events in the brain. So physicalists can say that the 
difference between bats, who have echolocatory experiences, and humans, 
who do not, is simply that certain physical events, namely those which 
constitute echolocatory experiences, occur in bats, but not in humans. In 
this sense the physicalist can happily agree that bats have access to 
experiences which humans cannot appreciate. 
 This same point has been made by David 
Papineau: 
The point is central to the physicalist view of conscious 
experience.  Physicalism does not deny that there are conscious 
experiences, nor if you wish, ‘that it is like something to have them.’ The 
claim is only that this is nothing different from what it is to be a physical 
system of the relevant kind.73
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In the second sense of “real nature”—referring to the cognitive system as a 
whole—a naturalist account does not take one away from the “real nature” of the 
phenomena at all, anymore than an analysis of water as H20 takes one away from the 
“real nature” of water. Precisely because subjective facts are physical facts means they 
can be analyzed in third person scientific terms. As Flanagan notes: “The important point 
is this: there is absolutely no reason why a naturalist cannot both acknowledge the 
existence of subjectivity and view getting an accurate description of it as part of the 
overall project of understanding human nature….It is crucial to see that description at the 
phenomenal level is something that can be provided from the first-person point of view 
and the third-person point of view.”74
As Flanagan writes: 
 Subjective physical facts and objective physical 
facts are merely two sides of the same coin. But what about the complaint that objective 
physical facts do not “capture” the “true” character of phenomenal experience? This 
complaint misses the mark. Third person descriptions explain consciousness, they do not 
create consciousness any more than a theory of digestion creates digestion.   
[W]e do understand how physicalism can be true. It can be true if every 
mental event is realized in the brain. Those of us who believe that all 
mental events, conscious and unconscious, are tokened in the brain do not 
believe that the theory that eventually explains how they are tokened will 
capture “the true character of the experiences” as experiences. The whole 
idea that the qualitative feel of some experience should reveal itself in a 
theoretical description of how that experience is realized fails to 
acknowledge the abstract relation between any theory and the phenomena 
it accounts for…. [T]he naturalist is the first to accept that a particular 
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realization will be an experience only for the agent who is causally 
connected to the realization in the right sort of way.75
 
 
Consciousness and the Brain: Explaining the Intuition of Distinctness 
Mind-brain identity is thus similar in ways to identities like H20 = water, but an 
intuition of distinctness remains with mind-brain identities that does not with other 
identities. There is, in fact, growing evidence from developmental and cognitive science 
that mind-body dualism is the cognitive default of human beings;76
If we had an external skeleton, the concept of how movement is generated 
might be just as incomprehensible to us as is the concept of thinking or 
mindness. Having an internal skeleton, means that we become quite aware 
of our muscles from birth. We can see their movement and feel their 
contractions and clearly understand, in a very intimate way, their relation 
 this issue will be 
explored in much greater detail in Chapter Three. However, other reasons for the 
“intuition of distinctness” can be found in the anatomy and physiology of our brains, in 
the structure of our conscious experience, and in our concepts of conscious experience. 
Mind and brain seem distinct because all of our experiences are “out-of-brain” 
experiences. There are several factors behind the “out-of-brain” nature of conscious 
experience. Our subjective experiences don’t seem to be brain experiences. In terms of 
basic anatomy and physiology, the cranium prevents us from observing the workings of 
our own brains in the way that we can observe the workings of our muscles. As Rodolfo 
Llinas has observed, this is no small thing: 
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to the movement of our different body parts. Unfortunately, we do not 
have such direct knowledge concerning the workings of our brain. Why 
not?  Because from a cerebral mass point of view, we are crustaceans—
our brains and spinal cord are covered by exoskeleton! 
If we could observe or feel the brain at work, it would be 
immediately obvious that neuronal function is as related to how we see, 
interpret, and react, as muscle contractions are related to the movements 
we make.77
 
 
 Access to the brain is limited in an even more significant manner due to the fact 
that the brain has no sensory apparatus directed toward itself; “the brain is not about 
itself."78
As Globus puts it, the brain does not “represent in any way its own 
structure to the subject.” There is no way that the subject can become 
aware of his own neurons “from the inside.” They can be known only 
objectively from the “outside.” We have already seen that there is no 
“inner eye,” no inner homunculus watching the brain itself, perceiving its 
own neurons, no “brain-skin” which feels the neurosurgeon’s knife. When 
I test a patients’ pinprick sensitivity by applying a pin to the hand, and ask 
them to localize where on the body the sensation is, no one has ever 
pointed to their head. Conscious neural activity refers to things, not to the 
brain itself. Conscious neural states are about things, not about the 
neurons themselves.
 As Todd Feinberg observes: 
79
 
  
Precisely because conscious neural states are about things and not about the neurons 
themselves it is very easy to confuse the qualities of conscious experience with the 
qualities of the objects experienced. U.T. Place dubbed this the “phenomenological 
fallacy.” Once the distinction is made, and once we realize that consciousness has a depth 
structure hidden from introspective access, identity theory becomes much more plausible.     
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Finally, the nature of our concepts of consciousness easily fuels the intuition of 
distinctness. There are two ways of thinking about consciousness: with third-person 
physical concepts and with first-person phenomenal concepts. As thinkers like David 
Papineau have pointed out, phenomenal concepts have the peculiar feature of resembling 
the conscious properties they are referring to. When we deploy a phenomenal concept 
either through imagination or introspection we recreate the experience itself; exercising a 
phenomenal concept feels like having the experience itself. No such thing happens with 
material concepts of the same experience. These two ways about thinking about 
concepts—via phenomenal concepts and via material concepts—can very easily lead us 
to believe that they are referring to entirely different things. 
There is a sense in which material concepts do ‘leave out’ the feelings.  
They do not use the experiences in question—they do not activate them, 
by contrast with phenomenal concepts which do activate the experiences.  
But it simply does not follow that material concepts ‘leave out’ the 
feelings in the sense of failing to mention them. They can still refer to the 
feelings, even though they don’t activate them.   
After all, most concepts don’t use or involve the things they refer 
to. When I think of being rich, say, or having measles, this doesn’t in any 
sense make me rich or give me measles. In using the states they mention, 
phenomenal concepts are very much the exception. So we shouldn’t 
conclude on this account that material concepts, which work in the normal 
way of most concepts, in not using the states they mention, fail to refer to 
these states. 
This then offers a natural account of the intuitive feeling that 
conscious experiences must be distinct from any material states. This 
feeling arises because we have a special way of thinking about our 
conscious experiences—namely by using phenomenal concepts. We can 
think about our conscious experiences using concepts to which they bear a 
phenomenal resemblance. And this then creates the fallacious impression 
that other, material ways of thinking about those experiences fail to refer 
to the felt experiences themselves.80
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But this is simply a use-mention fallacy: because third-person ways of thinking 
about conscious experience do not use versions of those conscious experiences, we 
conclude falsely that these third person ways of thinking about consciousness do not 
mention those conscious experiences, but only physical states.81
Ruskin coined the phrase ‘pathetic fallacy’ for the poetic figure of speech 
which attributes human feelings to nature….I am currently discussing a 
converse fallacy, where we refuse to recognize that conscious feelings 
inhere in certain parts of nature, namely the brains of conscious beings.
 Papineau calls this 
fallacy the “antipathetic fallacy.”  
82
 
  
Naturalism and Qualia 
Subjectivity thus has no dire consequences for physicalism. There are no 
principled reasons why qualia cannot be explained in a naturalistic perspective. However, 
an opposite problem presents itself within certain forms of naturalism. Some philosophers 
of a naturalistic bent have argued that the entire notion of “qualia” should be jettisoned. 
Daniel Dennett proposes just such a move in Consciousness Explained: 
When your kite string gets snarled up, in principle it can be unsnarled, 
especially if you’re patient and analytic. But there’s a point beyond which 
principle lapses and practicality triumphs. Some snarls should just be 
abandoned. Go get a new kite string. It’s actually cheaper in the end than 
the labor it would take to salvage the old one, and you get your kite 
airborne again sooner. That’s how it is, in my opinion, with the 
philosophical topic of qualia, a tormented snarl of increasingly convoluted 
and bizarre thought experiments, jargon, in-jokes, allusions to putative 
refutations, “received” results that should be returned to sender, and a 
bounty of other sidetrackers and time-wasters.83
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This section offers a more nuanced assessment of qualia. We can talk intelligently 
about qualia while avoiding either dualist or eliminativist conclusions about them. A 
naturalistic account that aims to take subjectivity seriously must address the issue of 
qualia or the way things seem. Owen Flanagan has offered a number of important 
insights about qualia from a naturalistic perspective. Flanagan importantly distinguishes 
between two ways in which qualia can be understood. In the first and unproblematic 
sense, qualia are simply the ways things seem. In the second and problematic sense, 
qualia are understood to possess additional features; qualia are understood to be atomic, 
non-relational, ineffable, incomparable and incorrigibly accessible from the first-person 
point of view. The problem for Flanagan is not one snarled kite string, but rather two kite 
strings that have become ensnarled together: 
One string is attached to an ordinary box kite that announces that there are 
certain ways things seem. The other string is attached to a gaudy kite that 
ostentatiously flies banners announcing that the ways things seem consists 
of a set of atomic, non-relational states that possess ineffable properties 
known deeply, incorrigibly, and exclusively from the first-person point of 
view. We can immediately improve matters by freeing the box kite from 
the extraneous one tangled up with it, the one that immodestly depicts 
qualia as possessing special problematic features…84
 
    
Flanagan offers compelling reasons why it is important to retain the first notion of qualia.  
The concept of qualia is needed to distinguish mental states with “feel” from those 
without feel, to taxonomize various forms of subjective experience, and to set the agenda 
for hypothesis generation and theory construction at lower levels.85
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 Color experiences are typically appealed to as the quintessential examples of 
qualia. Opponents of naturalism have articulated some fairly robust claims about the 
nature of color qualia, arguing that subjective experience is beyond the predictive and 
explanatory powers of any physical theory. Dualistic conclusions are thus drawn about 
the metaphysical distinctness and irreducibility of qualia. These conclusions however are 
dubious.   
Paul Churchland’s Neurophilosophical Model of Qualia 
In his article, “Chimerical Colors” Paul Churchland provides a striking example 
of work being done at the interface of psychology and neuroscience.86
 What exactly is the H-J net? The H-J net is a theoretical model of human color 
vision that begins with retinal cone cells (inputs) and ends with color opponent cells 
(outputs). Cone cells are broadly tuned to different wavelengths of light: short (blue), 
medium(green), long(red), and background illumination. The three types of color-
opponent cells (red-green, blue-yellow, and white-black) are the site of completion 
 Color vision has 
long been a topic of psychological research with the psychologist Munsell mapping 
phenomenological color space nearly a century ago. More recently, cognitive 
neuroscientists have attempted to model and understand the mechanisms of human color 
vision. The Hurvich-Jameson network—what Churchland calls the “standard model of 
color perception”—is an attempt to explain the structure of color space in terms of the 
human visual system and has yielded some striking results.   
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between excitatory and inhibitory signals arriving from the cone cells. The H-J net 
converts a four-tuple of inputs: S, M, L, B into a three-tuple of outputs (A B/Y, A G/R,         
A W/B).87
These patterns of activation can be represented as coding vectors. The resting or 
default level is postulated to be 50% of the maximum activation levels. Thus the seen 
color gray results from a <50,50,50> coding vector. Color variations result when the 
excitatory/inhibitory signals coming in from the cones send the activation levels above or 
below 50. Increasingly saturated red results from excitatory signals from the cones, 
sending the number over 50, e.g. <50,90,50>, while increasingly saturated green results 
from inhibitory signals sending activation levels below 50, e.g. <50, 10,50>. 
   
 Significantly, this configuration of coding vectors is structurally almost identical 
to the structure of phenomenal color space independently mapped by Munsell nearly a 
century ago. As Churchland notes: 
[T]his peculiar configuration of possible coding vectors is structurally 
almost identical to the peculiar configuration, originally and independently 
reconstructed by Munsell, of possible color experiences in normal 
humans.… [T]he family of distance relations between all of the color 
experiences internal to the Munsell space is roughly identical with the 
family of distance relations between all of the coding triplets internal to 
the H-J spindle….From precisely such global isomorphisms are 
speculative thoughts of intertheoretic identities likely to be born. The 
systematic parallels here described—though highly improbable on a priori 
grounds—become entirely nonmysterious if human color experiences (at a 
given point in one’s visual field) simple are the output coding vectors (at a 
suitable place within some topographical brain-map of the retina) 
produced by some neuronal instantiation of the H-J net.88
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The H-J network also yields a number of explanations and predictions regarding 
colored after images. When one fixates on a red circle against a gray background and 
then moves one’s gaze to a neutral gray background, a circular green afterimage is seen 
against the gray background. Why?   
This happens because, when the (now fatigued) opponent cells 
representing the circular red stimulus are suddenly asked to fall back to 
representing a less-demanding middle-gray stimulus, they overshoot the 
required <50,50,50> coding vector by an amount equal to whatever 
fatigue or potentiation has been acquired in each of the three coding 
dimensions during the protracted exposure to the original red stimulus. 
That original red stimulus produced an initial coding vector of 
<50,95,50>, but during protracted fixation, that initial vector slowly inches 
back to something like a vector or <50,55,50>, thanks to the accumulated 
minus-40% fatigue in its middle AG/R element. 
Accordingly, when the opponent cells in the fatigued area are 
suddenly asked to represent an objectively middle-gray stimulus, they can 
only manage to produce a vector of <50,10,50>—the coding triplet for an 
obvious middle green—instead of the <50,50,50> they would normally 
produce. For the AG/R cells in the affected circular area are, temporarily, 
too tired to respond normally. They produce a coding vector with a much-
reduced middle component, an abnormal vector that represents green, not 
gray.89
 
  
These predictions about colored after images are within the normal range of human color 
vision inside of the Munsell color spindle. But the H-J network predicts and explains the 
existence also of what Churchland calls “chimerical colors,” colors outside the Munsell 
color spindle but within the opponent cell activation cube. 
But…what about all that unused space in the several upper and lower 
corners of the opponent cell activation cube? What would be the 
significance of a possible activation triplet outside the classical color 
spindle, a triplet somewhere in that fairly considerable volume of unused 
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opponent-cell activation space.… [Y]ou might ask after the 
phenomenological significance of such an extraspindle activation vector.90
 
   
Regarding such questions, the H-J network: 
yields some novel and unappreciated predictions, and some novel and 
unappreciated explanations, concerning the qualitative characters of a 
considerable variety of color sensations possible for human experience, 
color sensations that normal people have almost certainly never had 
before, color sensations whose accurate descriptions in ordinary language 
appear semantically ill-formed or even self-contradictory.91
 
 
 These chimerical colors are not the objective colors of real objects, but anomalous 
color representations within the cubical-cell activation space and can be produced by 
selective fatigue/potentiation by prolonged fixation on a suitable color stimulus.92
What are the philosophical implications of all of this? This account of color vision 
shows that the qualitative character of subjective experience is indeed not beyond the 
predictive or explanatory power of physical theory, and that there are good reasons to 
identify color qualia with neural coding vectors. The Munsell color solid neatly maps 
onto the H-J network’s opponent cell activation cube, and as noted by Churchland, it is 
precisely such global isomorphisms that lead one to posit intertheoretic identities. 
   
Here, as in those other cases from our scientific history, the principle 
intellectual motive for embracing the systematic color qualia/coding-
vector identities proposed is simply the extent and quality of the predictive 
and explanatory unity that the relevant reduction provides.93
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Further, the chimerical colors predicted and explained by the H-J net provide 
excess empirical content and thus another motive for embracing the identity of color 
qualia and coding vectors. 
If these predictions are correct, they provide an additional motive for 
embracing the proposed reduction of color qualia to coding vectors. For it 
was no part of the motives—for the H-J net’s original proposal—that these 
particular experimental predictions be a part of the explanatory target. 
They were unanticipated, and they are faintly paradoxical on their face.  
They thus provide some “excess empirical content” beyond the original 
explanatory target, namely, our familiar experiences of the mundane 
colors of external objects.   
Such excess empirical contents are familiar from the history of 
science.  In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the assumption that 
light was identical to electromagnetic waves entailed that there should be 
such a thing as invisible light (an apparent contradiction, note well)…. The 
parallel assumption, that human color representations or color qualia are 
identical with opponent cell-cell coding triplets in a neuronal instantiation 
of the H-J network, yields a similarly implausible prediction. There should 
exist color-qualia outside the qualitative range of the classical color 
spindle, qualia whose perfectly accurate descriptions violate our normal 
semantic expectations. The H-J theory further suggests how to produce 
such chimerical qualia—through opponent-cell fatigue/potentiation—so 
that we may test those unexpected predictions against our own 
experience.94
 
 
Naturalistic Anti-Reductionism: Functionalism and 
 
the Autonomy of Psychology 
 
Dualist arguments are the most far-reaching of anti-reductionist arguments in the 
philosophy of mind. Here the very possibility of vertical integration between phenomenal 
consciousness, scientific psychology, and neuroscience is ruled out, because 
consciousness cannot be explained in physical or functional terms because consciousness 
just isn’t physical. However, anti-reductionist arguments are also popular among 
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physicalist philosophers of mind. These claims have important implications because they 
maintain that neuroscientific work will ultimately tell us nothing interesting about the 
mind. 
Functionalism, Multiple Realizability, and the Autonomy of Psychology 
Functionalists like Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor argued that mental states are 
properly characterized by their abstract causal role linking sensory inputs, mental states, 
and behavioral outputs, not by the “stuff” that realizes a particular mental state. Putnam 
and Fodor argued that different physical states could realize the same mental state: this is 
the doctrine of multiple realizability. Mental states are not type identical to specific brain 
states but rather token identical to any number of physical realizers. Functionalists saw 
the type identity envisioned in identity theory as overly ambitious. Identity theory, 
Putnam wrote: 
…becomes still more ambitious when we realize that the brain-state 
theorist is not just saying that pain is a brain state; he is, of course, 
concerned to maintain that every psychological state is a brain state. Thus 
if we can find even one psychological predicate which can clearly be 
applied to both a mammal and an octopus (say “hungry”), but whose 
physical-chemical “correlate” is different in the two cases, the brain-state 
theory has collapsed. It seems to me overwhelmingly probable that we can 
do this.95
 
 
Jerry Fodor appealed to multiple realizability arguments to show the failure of 
psycho-neural reduction and establish the autonomy of psychology from lower-level 
disciplines like neuroscience: 
                                                          
95Hilary Putnam, "The Nature of Mental States," in Mind and Cognition: A Reader, ed. William 
Lycan (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 53. 
 
 
 
 
61 
If it turns out that the functional decomposition of the nervous system 
corresponds precisely to its neurological (anatomical, biochemical, 
physical) decomposition, then there are only epistemological reasons for 
studying the former instead of the latter. But suppose that there is no such 
correspondence? Suppose the functional organization of the nervous 
system cross-cuts its neurological organization. Then the existence of 
psychology depends not on the fact that neurons are so depressingly small, 
but rather on the fact that neurology does not posit the kinds that 
psychology requires.96
 
 
Functionalist multiple realizability arguments thus cast doubt on the project of 
establishing reflective equilibrium between common sense psychology/phenomenal 
consciousness, scientific psychology, and neuroscience. There may be reflective 
equilibrium between common sense psychology and scientific psychology, but there will 
not be any sort of reflective equilibrium between scientific psychology and neuroscience. 
Productive research on mind will necessarily occur at levels higher than neuroscience.  
Neuroscience might well provide some interesting engineering details about how mind is 
implemented in homo sapiens, but neuroscience can no more explain the mind than 
physics can explain monetary exchange.97
Multiple Realizability Critiqued 
 The moral of the functionalist account of 
multiple realizability is the autonomy of psychology from lower-level neuroscience.   
Like the dualist arguments considered above, multiple realizability arguments 
seem to have a certain plausibility. However, when one dips into actual scientific 
practice, the claims of multiple realizability are counter-indicated. Scientific reductions 
and identities are contextual and domain-specific. When one fails to take into account 
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considerations of context and domain specificity, multiple realizability is in fact rampant 
throughout physical science. Consider, for example, the classic textbook identification of 
temperature with mean molecular kinetic energy. This claim, however, only applies to 
temperature in a gas.   
Temperature in a solid, however, is identical to mean maximal kinetic 
energy, since the molecules of a solid are bound in lattice structures and 
hence restricted to a range of vibratory motions. Temperature in a plasma 
is something else entirely, since the molecular constituents of a plasma 
have been ripped apart. Even a vacuum can have a (“blackbody”) 
temperature, though it contains no molecular constituents. Temperature of 
classical thermodynamics is multiply realized microphysically in a variety 
of distinct physical states. Yet this is a “textbook” intertheoretic reduction 
and cross-theory identification. The reductions and identifications are 
specific to the domain of the physical state.98
 
  
When one attends to such contextual factors, one sees, in fact, how little multiple 
realizability occurs at the interface of psychology and neuroscience. As John Bickle 
observes: 
If radical multiple realizability really obtained among species in the actual 
world, contemporary neuroscientific experimental techniques built upon 
this assumption [of the continuity of underlying neural mechanisms within 
and across species] should bear little fruit. Why study the macaque visual 
system to investigate human visual processing, for example, if we can’t 
safely assume some continuity across species? Why should positron 
emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) reveal common areas of high metabolic activity during 
psychological task performance, both across and within individual 
humans—how down to a millimeter of spatial resolution? Standard 
neuroscientific experimental procedures and even clinical diagnostic tools 
would be hopelessly naïve in the face of significant multiple realizability.  
But these procedures do work (and are not hopelessly naïve).99
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William Bechtel and Jennifer Mundale have recently developed this “argument 
from neurosciences success” in some detail. Bechtel and Mundale bring a wealth of 
neuroscientific examples to bear on the issue and help pinpoint with some precision what 
goes wrong with multiple realizability arguments. Bechtel and Mundale consider 
neuroanatomical and neurophysiological approaches to brain mapping and also consider 
the role of neuroscience in the decomposition of the visual processing system.   
Since the late 1800’s neuroscientists have been engaged in the project of mapping 
different areas of the brain. Korbinian Brodmann used anatomical tools to map the brain 
in the early part of the 20th century, resulting in the famous Brodmann maps of the brain 
still used today. Advances in cell staining techniques enabled Brodmann to recognize 
different types of neurons in the cortex and to discover that the cortex consisted of six 
different layers of neurons.100 Significantly, Brodmann did his work comparatively. In 
defending his claim regarding six different layers in the cortex, Brodmann reports on 
preparations made from fifty-five different species.101
Psychological criteria have also been central to brain mapping. Such 
psychological mapping is in fact older than neuroanatomical mapping, having its roots in 
the work of Franz Josef Gall. Here the research strategy focuses on deficits in 
psychological capacities that follow damage to particular parts of the brain. Language is 
 His goal in identifying different 
regions of the brain was due to the fact that he thought such anatomical differences would 
also be functionally significant.   
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perhaps the best known example, due to the pioneering work of Paul Broca and Karl 
Wernicke. Since this pioneering work lesion studies have become legion. But such lesion 
studies would not be successful if multiple realizibility was true. As Bechtel and Mundale 
observe, “it is important to note that in interpreting these deficits, researchers implicitly 
reject multiple realization among human brains and assume that damage to a brain area in 
anyone will result in a deficit to a particular cognitive function that is performed by that 
area in undamaged brains.”102
Neuroscience has also proved successful in guiding the cognitive decomposition 
of visual processing in humans. As Bechtel and Mundale note, “if the taxonomies of 
brain states and psychological states were as independent of each other as the multiple 
realizability argument suggests, brain decomposition would be a poor guide for 
psychological decomposition;” however, understanding of psychological function is 
being fostered precisely by such an appeal to the brain and its organization.”
 Such work has also expanded to include stimulation 
studies and imaging studies. 
103
 Bechtel and Mundale not only point to the lack of examples of multiple 
realizability at the psychology-neuroscience interface, they also pinpoint the intuitive 
appeal of multiple realizability arguments. The key issue involves contextuality.  
“Whenever one asks whether two items are the same or different, the question makes 
little sense unless one asks about sameness or difference with respect to some other 
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consideration.”104
[O]ne diagnosis of what has made the multiple realizability claim as 
plausible as it has been is that researchers have employed different grains 
of analysis in identifying psychological states and brain states, using a 
coarse grain to identify psychological states and a fine grain to 
differentiate brain states. Having invoked different grains, it is relatively 
easy to make a case a case for multiple realization. But if the grain size is 
kept constant, then the claim that psychological states are in fact multiply 
realized looks far less plausible.
 Particularly significant in terms of the psychology-neuroscience 
interface are issues concerning what Bechtel and Mundale call “grain size.” Multiple 
realizability arguments are flawed because they equivocate on the issue of grain size, 
differentiating psychological states in a coarse-grained manner while differentiating 
neurological states in a fine-grained manner. As Bechtel and Mundale write: 
105
 
 
It is precisely this issue at stake in Putnam’s famous example of the multiple realizability 
of hunger in humans and octopi: 
A human’s psychological state and that of an octopus might well be 
counted as the same insofar as they are associated with some general 
feature (such as food-seeking behavior in the case of hunger). But with 
respect to other considerations, a human psychological state may be 
considered different from that of an octopus, even if we limit the scope to 
mere behavior. Food-seeking behavior for the octopus is different from 
food-seeking behavior in the human if one is concerned about such things 
as how one seeks the food, what foods are sought, under what conditions, 
etc. This much seems simple and apparent, but the assertion that what we 
broadly call “hunger” is the same psychological state when instanced in 
human and octopi has apparently been widely and easily accepted without 
specifying the context for judging sameness.106
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Vertical Integration: Beyond Reductive and Non-Reductive Physicalism 
 
We have looked at several attempts to block the project of vertical integration 
between common sense psychology/ phenomenal consciousness, scientific psychology, 
and neuroscience. All attempts to deny that neuroscience in principle cannot offer an 
explanation of the conscious self has been denied. The project of vertical integration 
remains viable, but what sort of vertical integration is imaged? With anti-reductionist 
arguments blocked, does the alternative proposal for vertical integration have to be 
necessarily a reductive one? Are higher levels in the explanatory hierarchy destined to be 
lopped off by a matured neuroscience? This section answers no. Much of the debate 
between “emergentism and reductionism” or “reductive and non-reductive physicalism” 
rests upon a false dichotomy. As William Wimsatt observes: 
An opposition between reduction and emergence forces people to take 
sides along an axis missing some of the most revealing cuts on the issue.  
One can be a reductionist and an emergentist too, with a proper 
understanding of these notions. Misunderstandings engender opposition to 
reductionism, and make emergence unnecessarily mysterious.107
 
 
This section explores how one can move beyond the “reduction vs. autonomy” 
discussions that have dominated so much of contemporary philosophy of mind. 
The Co-Evolution of Psychology and Neuroscience: 
 
Reduction and Elimination 
 
Because they reject the thesis of the principled autonomy of psychology from 
lower-level neuroscience, neurophilosophers and philosophers of neuroscience typically 
                                                          
107William Wimsatt, "Emergence as Non-Aggregativity and the Biases of Reductionisms," in Re-
Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings: Piecewise Approximations to Reality (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2007), 274. 
 
 
 
 
67 
advocate a co-evolutionary research program between psychology and neuroscience; 
however, they differ sharply in their understanding of what co-evolution entails and what 
the outcome of that co-evolution is.108 Robert McCauley has helpfully pointed out three 
ways in which co-evolution can be understood.109 According to McCauley, psychology 
and neuroscience can be understood to co-evolve in a reductive (co-evolutionm), 
eliminative (co-evolutions), or pluralist (co-evolutionp) manner.110
Co-evolution is frequently understood in either a reductive or eliminative manner.   
Advocates of both reduction and elimination understand the selection pressures in the co-
evolution of psychology and neuroscience to be exerted almost exclusively in a bottom-
up manner. The theories differ on the question of whether the reduction of psychology to 
neuroscience will be a smooth or bumpy one. The logical positivist notions of 
explanation and reduction used by early identity theorists envisioned scientific 
development in terms of smooth mapping of one higher-level scientific theory onto 
another lower level theory, as illustrated, for example, in the reduction of 
thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. This is primarily the understanding of co-
evolution at work in co-evolutionm. 
  
However, other reductions are not so smooth. Some reductions eliminate rather 
than smoothly reduce the phenomenon in question. Rather than a smooth one-to-one 
mapping, theory change in science often involves the displacement of one theory by the 
                                                          
108For an early articulation of co-evolution see Patricia Churchland, Neurophilosophy. 
 
109Robert McCauley, "Explanatory Pluralism and the Co-Evolution of Theories in Science," in 
Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader, ed. Pete Mandik William Bechtel, Jennifer Mundale, Robert 
Stufflebean (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). 
 
110Ibid., 437-441. 
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other. Ptolemaic astronomy did not map neatly onto Copernican astronomy; rather the 
concepts of Ptolemaic astronomy were eliminated within Copernican theory. Phlogiston 
did not map neatly onto the theory of combustion; rather the concept “phlogiston” was 
eliminated by its successor theory. Looking at what they saw as the rather dismal 
explanatory success of common sense or folk psychology, the Churchlands argued that 
the mind-brain relationship was best understood in terms of elimination rather than 
reduction: 
As the eliminative materialists see it, the one-to-one match-ups will not be 
found, and our common-sense psychological framework will not enjoy an 
intertheoretic reduction, because our common-sense psychological 
framework is a false and radically misleading conception of the causes of 
human behavior and the nature of cognitive activity. On this view, folk 
psychology is not just an incomplete representation of our inner natures; it 
is an outright misrepresentation of our internal states and activities. 
Consequently, we cannot expect a truly adequate neuroscientific account 
of our inner lives to provide theoretical categories that match up nicely 
with the categories of our common-sense framework. Accordingly, we 
must expect that the older framework will simply be eliminated, rather 
than be reduced, by a matured neuroscience.111
 
     
Where the functionalists argued that psychology was autonomous from the 
neurosciences, the Churchlands’ position envisioned the elimination of common-sense 
and scientific psychology by a matured neuroscience. The eliminativist model 
understands the evolution of psychology and neuroscience based on the model of 
eliminative reductions that occur in scientific revolutions, hence co-evolutions. 
Beyond Autonomy and Reduction 
 Importantly McCauley suggests that neither co-evolutionm nor co-evolutions are 
the most adequate accounts of the co-evolution that occurs at the interface between 
                                                          
111Paul M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness, 43. 
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psychology and neuroscience. In contrast to these accounts, McCauley defends a 
pluralistic account of co-evolution, co-evolutionp.  McCauley’s work is part of a broader 
naturalistic movement in the philosophy of science. Naturalistic philosophy of science 
attends to models at work in actual scientific practice, rather than imposing “one-size-
fits-all” models on the whole of science. With this naturalistic turn, philosophy of science 
becomes the philosophy of a particular science, in this case psychology, biology, and 
neuroscience. Contemporary philosophers of biology, psychology, and neuroscience have 
called into question the adequacy of deductive-nomological models of explanation and 
reduction in these sciences, developing instead notions of mechanistic explanation and 
explanatory pluralism. Significantly, mechanistic and pluralistic models of explanation 
call into question the entire “autonomy vs. reduction” framework in which so much of the 
debate in the philosophy of mind has been cast. As William Bechtel observes: 
There are other serious issues raised by the use of the reduction model as 
way of relating disciplines…Within this framework the focal questions 
have been whether or not psychological theories can be derived from 
neuroscientific ones. If so, psychological theories lose their autonomy.  
Accordingly, those arguing for the special status of psychology or other 
higher-level sciences have argued that such derivations are not 
possible…However…most neuroscience explanations do not take the 
form of D-N explanations in which phenomena are derived from laws, but 
rather are models of mechanisms. This casts a different light on the issue 
of reduction. Models of mechanisms are inherently reductionist: each 
proposed mechanism is designed to show how a phenomenon ascribed to a 
system is due to its constituent parts and their interaction. On the other 
hand, reduction no longer threatens the autonomy of the higher-level 
science: the higher level characterizes the interaction of processes, the 
lower level accounts for the performance of individual processes.112
 
 
                                                          
112William Bechtel, “Philosophy Meets the Neurosciences,” 17. 
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Wimsatt, Bechtel, and McCauley along with Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden 
and Carl Craver have developed accounts of mechanistic explanation that allow for 
substantial rapprochement between functionalism and identity theory without endorsing 
either autonomy or reduction. Mechanistic explanation is inherently multi-level and 
pluralistic. In an understanding of mechanistic explanation proposed by Carl Craver, an 
ideally complete mechanistic explanation of a system describes that system in three ways: 
as isolated, as situated, and as constituted.113 At the isolated (0-level), the system itself is 
described at its characteristic level. Situated (+1-level) and constituted (-1-level) 
descriptions operate above and below the isolated level. At the situated (+1-level) the 
system is situated in the context of some other systems. At the constituted (-1-level) the 
system is decomposed into its constitutive parts.114
The mechanistic model is not a “reductionist” style of explanation.  In this 
respect it agrees with functionalism. Although mechanism permits 
multiple levels of causal-mechanical explanation, it is not 
“antireductionist” either, because that view still clings to the autonomy 
thesis. Classical “reductionist” inward- and downward-looking 
explanations emphasize the constitutive part of mechanistic integrations 
and neglect contextual explanation. In contrast, functional analysis 
emphasizes outward- and upward-looking contextual explanation and 
neglects constitutive explanation. Both, therefore, are incomplete from the 
point of view of mechanism.
 As Thomas Polger notes, this model 
is neither inherently reductionist nor anti-reductionist: 
115
 
 
                                                          
113Carl Craver, "Role Functions, Mechanisms, and Hierarchy," Philosophy of Science 68, no. 1 
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Explanatory Pluralism and Co-Evolution 
The explanatory pluralism inherent in mechanistic explanation suggests another 
way the co-evolution of psychology and neuroscience might be understood. This is a 
pluralistic understanding of co-evolution that McCauley calls co-evolutionp. Co-
evolutionp is closely linked with the reductive account of co-evolution (co-evolutionm) but 
differs from it in important ways. Co-evolutionm understands the overwhelming majority 
of the selection pressures in the co-evolution of psychology and neuroscience to be 
exerted from the bottom up. While the upper-level theory may contribute in the process 
of discovery, providing an initial vocabulary and problems for research, sooner or later it 
must conform to the lower-level theory’s explanation. In co-evolutionp by contrast,  
theoretical proposals and the research they spawn at the higher level do 
not merely contribute to the process of discovery at the lower level. The 
upper level science provides a body of evidence against which the science 
at the lower level can evaluate competing models. This evidence is 
particularly useful, precisely because it frequently arises independently of 
the formulation of the specific lower-level models to whose assessment it 
contributes.”116
 
 
 McCauley is particularly concerned to mount a critique of the eliminative 
understanding of co-evolution, co-evolutions. Here he draws upon an important 
distinction, initially made by Wimsatt, between interlevel and intralevel contexts.117
                                                          
116McCauley, 448-449. 
 
Eliminative reductions like those seen in scientific revolutions occur almost exclusively 
at an intralevel context rather than an interlevel context.   
 
117See William Wimsatt, "Reductionism, Levels of Organization, and the Mind-Body Problem," in 
Consciousness and the Brain, ed. G. Maxwell G. Globus, and I. Savodnik (New York: Plenum Press, 
1976). 
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The sorts of unequivocal eliminations of theories and ontologies that co-
evolution countenances arise in intralevel contexts involving considerable 
incommensurability. These contexts concern changes within a particular 
science over time. They include the classic cases that philosophers group 
under the rubric of “scientific revolutions” – impetus, phlogiston, caloric 
fluid, and the like. Within a particular level of analysis, some newly 
proposed theory proves superior to its immediate predecessor with which 
it is substantially discontinuous. When the scientific community opts for 
this new theory, most traces of its predecessor rapidly disappear. Since 
they offer incompatible accounts of many of the same phenomena, the 
new theory explains the old theory away.118
 
 
However, the psychology-neuroscience interface is an interlevel context, and 
eliminations are exceedingly rare between levels. 
Incommensurability in interlevel contexts neither requires the elimination 
of theories on principled grounds nor results in such eliminations in fact 
…[T]he history  of science and especially the history of late nineteenth- 
and twentieth century science offer no examples of large-scale interlevel 
theory elimination (particularly of the wholesale variety standard 
eliminativism and co-evolutions, envision) once the upper-level science 
achieves sufficient historical momentum to enjoy the accoutrements of 
other recognized sciences (such as characteristic research techniques and 
instruments, journals, university departments, professional societies, and 
funding agencies). The reason is simple enough.  Mature sciences are 
largely defined by their theories and, more generally, by their research 
traditions; hence, elimination of an upper-level theory by a lower-level 
theory may risk the elimination of the upper-level scientific enterprise!119
 
 
This section has argued that one can embrace a neurophilosophical account of identity 
theory without eliminating higher-level sciences, but how exactly does identity theory 
function in the context of mechanistic explanation and explanatory pluralism?   
                                                          
118McCauley, 441. 
 
119Ibid., 443-444. 
 
 
 
73 
Identity Theory and Explanation 
A key question facing an identity theorist is the question of why one should posit 
identities rather than mere correlations.  In dualist accounts, it is claimed that logical 
supervenience is necessary for reductive explanation and identification.  Logical 
supervenience is determined on the basis of being able to conceptually analyze a 
phenomenon in physical and functional terms. Without such a necessary connection, the 
dualist critique claims that one can only assert correlations rather than identities. We have 
seen however, that there are ample reasons to question the explanatory criteria employed 
by dualists, but more needs to be said on the issue of “correlation’ vs. “identity.”   
There is a great deal of ambiguity with the notion of “correlation” and a “neural 
correlate of consciousness.” This point is made well by Ilya Farber: 
First off, it’s important to realize that there’s something misleading about 
the “correlate” part of “neural correlate of consciousness.” The term 
naturally focuses attention on correlational sources of evidence for NCC’s, 
such as the widely-cited experiments in which Nikos Logothetis found 
single cells whose activity covaried with monkeys’ behaviorally reported 
percepts.  To treat the theories themselves as having this structure, 
however, is to mistake a noun for a verb. An NCC is a correlate, a thing 
which corresponds to consciousness; moment-to-moment psychophysical 
correlation is just one of many elements in this correspondence. All of the 
major NCC theories in fact draw multiple parallels, based on functional 
anatomy and pathology, on inter-species comparisons, and on interactions 
between the hypothesized NCC and other neural mechanisms which 
underlie related phenomena such as memory, dreaming, and emotion. The 
relation which these theories establish between the neural and phenomenal 
aspects of consciousness is thus something much richer and more complex 
than mere correlation; it is a type of isomorphism, a multidimensional 
mapping between entities, structures and dynamics in the twin domains of 
mind and brain…The goal of the NCC project is not to produce a causal 
model on which consciousness stands apart as a product of the brain, but 
rather to find the patterns of consciousness within the structure and 
dynamics of the brain. The methodology for pursuing this goal has already 
been charted out by researchers studying memory and perception: in 
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roughest outline, it involves functionally decomposing the cognitive 
process in question, functionally and physically decomposing the brain, 
and trying to find matching patterns amidst the bits on each side. This 
process is fundamentally analogical rather than correlational, and the 
relation that it attempts to establish is not one of causal interaction but one 
of identity.120
 
 
Bechtel and McCauley have developed a scientifically informed heuristic account 
of identity theory much in line with Farber’s comments.121 Bechtel and McCauley, in a 
manner very similar to Churchland, understand identity claims not so much as fixed 
metaphysical conclusions but as heuristics guiding scientific inquiry. Significantly, the 
notion of heuristic identity theory provides a powerful response to the correlation 
objection beloved by dualists. Hypothetical identities are not only conclusions of 
research; they also function as the premises of such research, as heuristics guiding 
scientific discovery. Essentially, heuristic identities guide scientific discovery through the 
converse of Leibniz’s law—instead of the identity of indiscernables, emphasis is on the 
indiscernability of identicals in guiding subsequent research.122
                                                          
120Ilya Farber, "How a Neural Correlate Can Function as an Explanation of Consciousness," 
Journal of Consciousness Studies 12, no. 4-5 (2005): 85. 
 What this means 
precisely is that what is learned about an entity or process under one description must 
apply to it under its other descriptions. Note that if the connection is a mere correlation, 
there would be no reason to expect such discoveries. 
 
121William Bechtel, "Mechanism and Phenomenal Experience: The Heuristic Identity Theory," 
(1993).  Retrieved from: http://mechanism.ucsd.edu/~bill/research/mercier/3rdlecture.pdf (accessed 
12/10/08); William Bechtel, and McCauley, Robert "Heuristic Identity Theory (or Back to the Future): The 
Mind-Body Problem against the Background of Research Strategies in Cognitive Neuroscience," 
Proceedings of the 21st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (1999); William Bechtel, and 
Robert McCauley, "Explanatory Pluralism and the Heuristic Identity Theory," Theory Psychology 11, no. 6 
(2001). 
 
122Bechtel, "Heuristic Identity Theory (or Back to the Future): The Mind-Body Problem against 
the Background of Research Strategies in Cognitive Neuroscience." 
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Consider, for example, genes and chromosomes. Cytologists in the early twentieth 
century identified chromosomes as paired structures in the cell nucleus, while the 
rediscovery of Mendel suggested paired factors accounting for heredity. As Bechtel 
notes, at the time there were only three similarities known to apply both to chromosomes 
and genes. There were other factors known just of genes or just of chromosomes. Hence, 
under heuristic identity theory the factors known to be true of genes were inferred to be 
true of chromosomes and vice versa.123
For Bechtel, the importance of the heuristic perspective is the recognition that 
what gives credibility to the identity claim is the productivity of the claim in bringing two 
phenomena together. Identity theory does impose stringent demands—the application of 
Leibniz’s law. Applied to issues of consciousness and neuroscience, phenomenal 
experience guides discovery of neural mechanisms and neural mechanisms guide 
discovery about phenomenal experience. 
   
The importance of the heuristic perspective is the recognition that what 
gives credibility to the identity claim is not… the correlations advanced at 
a given time, but the productivity of the claim in discovering new 
phenomenon that would only be expected on the basis of the identity. But 
that does not mean that the identity claim does not impose a tough 
demand.  It does, but it is a demand not on evidence at a time but on the 
development of evidence in the course of research. What one should be 
seeking now is a promising identity claim between phenomenal 
experience and brain processes, one that points to future productive 
research. After advancing the identity claim, the demands imposed by 
Leibniz’s law apply. Future research must fill out the mapping by showing 
that everything known or learned about phenomenal experience maps onto 
neural processes, and vice versa. If the research is productive, then the 
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identity claim will have proven its worth and the charge of mere 
correlation will lose plausibility.124
 
 
Note that this is precisely the sort of process that occurs in Paul Churchland’s 
“Chimerical Colors,” where neuroscientific data is used to make predictions regarding 
color qualia. Churchland’s remarks about the basis of identifying opponent-cell coding 
triplets and human visual color qualia echo the remarks of Farber, Bechtel, and 
McCauley: 
The reader will note that, despite the nontrivial (but wholly defeasible) 
case laid out earlier, in support of the strict identity of human visual color 
qualia on the one hand and human opponent-cell coding triplets on the 
other; at no point did we establish, or even try to establish, that there is 
any sort of necessary connection between the two. I did not argue, nor 
claim, that the former are ‘logically supervenient, upon the latter (cf. 
Chalmers 1996). I did not argue, nor do I believe, that the identity at issue 
is blessed by any form of metaphysical necessity (cf. Kripke 1972). Nor 
did I suggest that there is any form of ‘lawlike’ or ‘nomological’ 
connection between the two. As I have argued elsewhere, all of these 
diverse modal relations are philosophical extravagances or confusions 
imposed, post facto, on successful cases of historical intertheoretic 
reductions, all of which were achieved without the help of such modal 
relations, and none of which displays any one of them. Here, as in those 
other cases from our scientific history, the principal intellectual motive for 
embracing the systematic color-qualia/coding-vector identities proposed is 
simply the extent and quality of the predictive and explanatory unity that 
the relevant reduction provides.125
 
  
As Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker point out, such“[i]dentities allow a transfer of 
explanatory and causal force not allowed by mere correlations.”126
                                                          
124Ibid. 
  
 
125Churchland, “Chimerical Colors,” 191. 
 
126Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker, "Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap," 
The Philosophical Review 108, no. 1 (1999), 24. 
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Conclusion 
 
 The purpose of this chapter has been to argue that nothing stands in the way of 
bio-psychological explanation of the conscious self in terms of brain processes and that in 
fact psychoneural identity theories provide the most viable solution to the mind-body 
problem. Dualism and functionalism call into question the possibility of the vertical 
integration of phenomenal consciousness, scientific psychology, and neuroscience. This 
chapter has demonstrated that none of these arguments is compelling. However, it has 
also avoided equating identity theory with either reductive or eliminative forms of 
naturalism.   
In light of the overall dissertation project, the point of the chapter was to establish 
that the identification of mind and brain is very well motivated scientifically and 
philosophically. Work of scientists and philosophers at the mind-brain, psychology-
neuroscience interface stands in sharp contrast to the views of the religious dualists 
introduced at the beginning of this chapter. These issues will be revisited in Chapter 
Three, where attempts to integrate Christianity and Buddhism with the contemporary 
mind-sciences will be discussed. But what about the cross-cultural ubiquity of dualism?  
Surely that demands an explanation as well. This issue will form the topic of Chapter 
Two.
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
TOWARD A NATURALISTIC, BIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL 
 
EXPLANATION OF DUALISM 
 
Naturalism and the Ubiquity of Dualism 
 
 The previous chapter argued that dualism is no longer a compelling position in 
light of philosophical and scientific work at the mind-brain interface; however, the 
overwhelming majority of the world’s population holds very robust dualist beliefs.  
People typically understand and experience themselves as separate and distinct from their 
bodies, believe in some sort of afterlife, and in “persons without bodies” (God, gods, 
spirits, ancestors, etc.). These beliefs are intimately linked with a variety of vivid dualist 
experiences in which the soul seems literally separate from the body.   
 How should one make sense of such dualist beliefs and experiences? If the 
arguments of Chapter One have been successful, significant doubt has been cast on the 
ability of dualism to withstand scientific and philosophical scrutiny. The view of the 
human person emerging from contemporary mind science and philosophy of mind differs 
radically from the view of the person entertained by most of humanity and by most of the 
world’s religious traditions. If the arguments of Chapter One have been successful, we 
have every reason to believe that this view of the person is correct and reason to be 
skeptical about dualist claims about the human person, but if dualism is not true, the 
naturalist surely owes an explanation for the cross cultural ubiquity of dualism. This 
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chapter charts the course for a naturalistic explanation of dualism. Drawing upon the 
resources of neurophilosophy, neuroscience, and cognitive-developmental psychology, it 
argues that religious dualism is not true, but is “natural” in the sense that it is an 
outgrowth of our common sense understanding of our selves, other minds, and material 
objects. 
Principled Humanist Objections to a Naturalistic, 
Bio-Psychological Explanation of Dualism 
 Chapter One addressed dualist and functionalist concerns about lower-level bio-
psychological explanation of consciousness. However skepticism about lower-level bio-
psychological explanations extends far beyond issues concerning consciousness in the 
philosophy of mind. Humanists, traditional social scientists, and scholars of religion 
typically favor “culture only” analyses and resist the claim that the sciences have much to 
contribute to the humanities.1
                                                          
1In What Science Offers the Humanities: Integrating Body and Culture, Edward Slingerland cites 
the well-known writer Louis Menand as exemplifying such a stance.  Menand writes of a crisis in the 
humanities, particularly literary studies, yet, he resists any attempt to find “consilience” between the 
sciences and the humanities.  He is “certain that there is at least one thing that just cannot be wrong, that 
the sciences, especially the life sciences, have no place in the study of the human world” (Boyd , 2006, 19 
as cited in Slingerland, 2008, 2). 
 The humanist emphasis on the autonomy of culture and on 
a methodology distinct from the natural sciences is itself rooted in a residual dualism. Of 
course, most scholars in the humanities explicitly reject mind-body dualism. Indeed, it 
would be hard to find a figure more reviled by humanist academics than Rene Descartes. 
Yet, at the same time, many humanists vigorously oppose any attempt to understand 
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human and social reality in biological terms.2
 The crypto-dualist assumptions that pervade the humanities are perhaps most 
evident in Wilhelm Dilthey’s principled distinction between the natural sciences 
(Naturwissenschaften) and the sciences of the free human spirit (Geisteswissenschaften).  
The German makes the principle of distinction between the sciences and the humanities 
explicit. The difference concerns the “objects” of inquiry: inert matter or the free human 
Geist. This radical difference in the objects of inquiry leads Dilthey to conclude that 
Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften are also rooted in radically different 
epistemologies and methodologies. Erklären or reductive scientific explanation is the 
appropriate method of the Naturwissenschaften; however, the realm of the free human 
spirit can only be grasped by Verstehen or empathetic understanding.
 An odd sort of false consciousness thus 
pervades large swathes of humanist academe: dualism is explicitly rejected while 
continuing to function operationally in some of the most basic assumptions of humanist 
and standard social scientific inquiry. 
3
 These dualist assumptions frequently go hand-in-hand with strong versions of 
social constructivism and arguments for the autonomy of culture. The link between 
dualism and social constructivism is perhaps most evident in the writing of the founder of 
modern sociology, Emile Durkheim:  
 
Man is double.  There are two beings in him: an individual being which 
has its foundation in the organism and the circle of whose activities is 
                                                          
2The examples of this “vigorous opposition” are legion.  Steven Pinker provides a number of 
examples in his book, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature.  Opposition to the work of 
E.O. Wilson is probably the most notorious example.   
 
3See Wilhelm Dilthey, Introduction to the Human Sciences: An Attempt to Lay a Foundation for 
the Study of Society and History trans. Ramon J. Batanzos (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1988). 
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therefore strictly limited, and a social being which represents the highest 
reality in the intellectual and moral order that we can know by observation 
– I mean society.4
 
  
Durkheim’s dualist doctrine of the double man leads to a very specific understanding of 
social reality: society is seen as a superorganism inscribing the “blank slate” of the 
human mind.  This understanding of social reality has very important methodological 
implications.  To seek to explain social phenomena by appeal to psychology or biology is 
to miss the boat completely: 
Every time that that a social phenomenon is directly explained by a 
psychological phenomenon, we may be sure that the explanation is 
false….The group thinks, feels, and acts quite differently from the way in 
which members would were they isolated…. If we begin with the 
individual in seeking to explain phenomena, we shall be able to 
understand nothing of what takes place in the group….Individual natures 
are merely the indeterminate material that the social factor molds and 
transforms.  Their contribution consists exclusively in very general 
attitudes, in vague and consequently plastic predispositions.5
 
 
 While Durkheim declared society off limits to lower level sciences, he saw 
religion as a social phenomenon and attempted to understand it accordingly; however, 
one very influential approach to religious studies rejects even Durkheim’s sociological 
model as overly reductive. For scholars in the history and phenomenology of religion, the 
experience of the “sacred” is sui generis, and thus off limits to even higher level sciences 
like sociology. As Mircea Eliade writes: 
A religious phenomenon will only be recognized as such if it is grasped at 
its own level, that is to say, if it is studied as something religious. To try to 
grasp the essence of such a phenomenon by means of physiology, 
                                                          
4Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans., Joseph Swain (New York: Free 
Press, 1915/1966), 29. 
 
5Emile Durkheim, The Rules of the Sociological Method (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1895/1962), 
110. 
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sociology, economics, linguistics, art, or any other study is false; it misses 
the one unique and irreducible element in it – the element of the sacred.6
 
  
 Hermeneutical distinctions between Geisteswissenschaften and 
Naturwissenschaften, coupled with social constructivist arguments about the autonomy of 
society have led not merely to a focus on interpretation over vertical explanation, but to 
principled exclusion of vertical explanation in the humanities and social sciences.  
Attempts at vertical integration are almost inevitably branded as reductionist. As Edward 
Slingerland writes: 
The degree to which the mind versus body – and therefore understanding 
versus explanation – split has become entrenched in the modern university 
is reflected by the fact that, in the humanities, “reductionistic” has come to 
function as an immediately recognizable term of dismissive abuse: a claim 
that the understanding Geist has crossed the line and inappropriately 
slipped from Verstehen to Erklären, treating its subject as an object. 
People do seem fundamentally different to us than objects, which is why 
this understanding versus explanation distinction is able to gain a foothold 
in our minds. However, the conviction that the human can never be 
explained – that human-level phenomena can never be reduced to lower-
level causal forces – takes this intuition a step further. The result is that the 
field of human inquiry has proudly wrapped itself in an impenetrable shell 
of verstehen and violently resists any attempt by the natural sciences to 
breach this boundary.7
 
  
 The arguments and discussion in Chapter One provide an important point of 
departure in addressing these humanist concerns. The arguments of Chapter One give us 
good reason to be skeptical of dualist claims and thus of strong distinctions between 
Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften. There simply is no Geist that exists 
independently of Natur. The arguments of Chapter One also called into question strong 
                                                          
6Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, trans., Rosemary Sheed (Cleveland and New 
York: World, 1968), xiii. 
 
7Edward Slingerland, What Science Teaches the Humanities: The Integration of Body and Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 4. 
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versions of the “autonomy of psychology” thesis. This gives us cause for suspicion 
concerning other types of autonomy arguments. As Slingerland’s quote points out, 
autonomy arguments in the humanities and social sciences are frequently driven by a fear 
of reductionism. However, as Chapter One also pointed out, autonomy vs. reduction is a 
false dichotomy. The fear is that the natural sciences will somehow displace the 
humanities and even higher-level sciences. But such a notion of reductionism is either a 
bogeyman or, at best, highly antiquated. As Robert McCauley has pointed out: 
The assumptions of antiquated conceptions of cross-scientific relations in 
terms of intertheoretic reduction, which envision the ability of lower level 
theories to displace higher level proposals and their ontologies, have 
haunted [humanists] from afar. Much recent work in the philosophy of 
science would aid considerably in exorcising these demons….Contrary to 
classical reductionism, displacing work at other levels is usually the last 
thing on scientists’ minds! Little, if any, evidence exists in twentieth 
century science of such displacements of theory or ontology arising as the 
result of investigations simultaneously carried on at multiple levels of 
analysis.8
 
   
 That human-level interpretive strategies have much to offer is not being contested.  
What is being contested are claims of principled autonomy and complete independence. 
The discipline of religious studies originated in the West and in the context of Christian 
theology. The focus on particularities emphasized by many contemporary scholars in 
religious studies and the humanities has helped to correct many false assumptions about 
religion, but taken to extremes it creates its own problems. Here language might serve as 
an apt analogy. Language seems like the quintessential example of cultural diversity and 
plurality. But a purely cultural account of language leaves many questions unanswered. 
                                                          
8Robert McCauley, "Overcoming Barriers to a Cognitive Psychology of Religion," Method & 
Theory in the Study of Religion 12, no. 1 (2000): 149. 
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Why are the depth grammars underlying all languages so similar? How can one account 
for the ability of children’s ability to become competent language users given the fact that 
they are exposed to it in a piecemeal manner? In the case of language this is all old 
history. Noam Chomsky and other cognitive linguists revolutionized the study of 
language in focusing on commonalities underlying the seemingly wild diversity of 
languages. The cognitive linguists were not calling into question the academic study of 
language and literature; they were asking a different kind of question. The burgeoning 
discipline of cognitive science of religion asks similar questions of religion. As cognitive 
anthropologist Scott Atran points out, there are many questions that have been left largely 
unanswered in the contemporary academic study of religion:  
Why do agent concepts predominate in religion? 
Why are supernatural-agent concepts culturally universal? 
Why are some supernatural-agent concepts inherently better candidates for 
cultural selection than others? 
Why is it necessary, and how is it possible, to validate belief in 
supernatural agents that are logically and factually inscrutable? 
How is it possible to prevent people from deciding that the existing moral 
order is simply wrong or arbitrary and from defecting from the social 
consensus through denial, dismissal or deception?9
 
 
Atran’s questions are closely linked to issues concerning dualism that this chapter is 
concerned to address, specifically the ubiquity of dualism in wildly diverse religious 
belief systems. The project is not so much to understand specific dualist beliefs, as to 
understand the “depth grammar” of dualism underlying religious particularities. 
                                                          
9Scott Atran, In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 7. 
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Natural Sources of the Dualist Self: Toward a Bio-Psychological 
Explanation of Religious Dualism 
 Principled objections to bio-psychological explanations of religion have been 
addressed, but many questions are still left unanswered. Even if one agrees that bio-
psychological explanation of religion is possible, there is no agreed upon explanatory 
framework or anything remotely close to it. The most developed attempts at bio-
psychological explanation of religion have come from neuroscience, cognitive-
developmental psychology, and evolutionary biology, but there has been very little cross-
fertilization between these approaches. All three of these approaches are relevant to the 
explanation of religious phenomena, but until very recently, issues concerning the 
conscious self and issues concerning dualism have not been a central concern in bio-
psychological explanations of religion. Brain scans of religious experience are not the 
only or even the most important way the mind sciences can contribute to the bio-
psychological explanation of religion. A bio-psychological account of the self and a bio-
psychological account of dualism are equally important.  In fact, discussions of scientific 
accounts of religious experience are apt to be mired in confusion if these foundational 
questions concerning the self and dualism are not addressed. The following sections offer 
a bio-psychological account of the natural sources of the dualist self. Its fundamental 
argument is that dualism emerges as a natural by-product of human beings’ common 
sense understanding of their selves (folk phenomenology) and other selves (folk 
psychology).   
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Toward a Bio-Psychological Explanation of Religious Dualism: 
Insights from Neuroscience and Neurophilosophy 
 A central premise of this dissertation is that souls do not exist, nor do strongly 
emergent selves. We can be realists of a sort about phenomenal experience and the 
phenomenal self, but there is nothing mysterious about this. The self is not something 
independent of the brain, or something miraculously squirted out by the brain. The self is 
merely a vastly complex representational structure within the human brain and 
experienced “from the inside” as it were. In this sense, Francis Crick is absolutely right 
that we are “nothing but a pack of neurons,”10
 This section explores how the conscious self can be explained in a vertically 
integrated manner and uses this information to shed light on the ubiquity of dualism. This 
bio-psychological account of the self bolsters the arguments in favor of the naturalistic, 
vertical explanation of the conscious self offered in Chapter One. In that chapter, it was 
argued that principled objections to a naturalistic account of the conscious self were not 
compelling, and argued that the hard problem of consciousness is best seen as a real but 
empirically tractable problem. Chapter One showed that the hard problem was 
empirically tractable; this section shows how the hard problem is empirically tractable. 
Actual scientific, bio-psychological research programs and theories of consciousness 
have been, and continue to be, developed (and very well funded) despite the nay-saying 
 and this hypothesis is indeed astonishing 
when seen in light of dualist and emergentist theories of mind that understand 
consciousness as a further fact or an added extra. 
                                                          
10Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1994), 3. 
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arguments of dualists, and naturalism becomes compelling not so much as a refutation of 
dualism but because of its constructive potential in generating testable, progressive 
research programs and because of the explanatory success of such programs. The proof of 
naturalism is in the pudding, so to speak. However, a bio-psychological account puts one 
in a position not only to defend naturalism but to explain dualism. As such, the 
implications of such an account extend far beyond neuroscience, cognitive science, and 
the philosophy of mind. Because of the ubiquity of immaterial mind concepts (i.e., 
“persons without bodies”) within religious traditions, such an account is surely germane 
to theology, philosophy of religion, and religious studies more generally. 
 While scientific accounts of consciousness have exploded in recent years, this 
section focuses particularly on the work of Antonio Damasio and Thomas Metzinger.  
Damasio and Metzinger’s work is significant for a number of reasons. First, both thinkers 
take the hard problem of consciousness seriously, while seeking an empirical solution to 
it. Second, both thinkers are concerned with the issue of the conscious self and not merely 
with the issue of consciousness. Third, the work of these thinkers shares a number of 
important and striking similarities, particularly the emphasis on the conscious self as a 
complex representational phenomenon. Finally, Metzinger’s work sheds a great deal of 
light on the ubiquity of dualism and the explanation of that ubiquity. This section first 
explores how Damasio and Metzinger understand and pose the problem of the conscious 
self. It then turns to Damasio’s representationalist account of the origins and evolution of 
the self and to Thomas Metzinger’s representational account of the conscious self as a 
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transparent phenomenal self-model (PSM). Finally, it is shown how these 
representational accounts of the self help to explain the ubiquity of dualism.    
Defining the Problem of the Conscious Self 
Two temptations are almost impossible to avoid in terms of the hard problem: 
making the hard problem an impossible mystery or turning the hard problem into an easy 
problem. Dualists and mysterians are guilty of the first mistake; deflationist materialists 
are guilty of the second. Explaining the conscious self is not intractable, but its difficulty 
should not be underestimated either. Antonio Damasio and Thomas Metzinger are both 
thinkers who take the hard problem seriously while aiming for an empirical solution to it. 
The hard problem is the problem of how objective brains give rise to subjective 
experience. The hard problem is typically posed as a problem concerning consciousness, 
but it is important to note that the problem of the conscious self is implied in the 
definition of the hard problem. The problem is not just how objective brains give rise to 
experience but how they give rise to subjective experience. Consciousness and the 
conscious self are thus both parts of the hard problem. Metzinger captures these 
important distinctions well: 
What is it that makes consciousness such a special target phenomenon?   
In conscious experience a reality is present. But what does it mean to say 
that, for all beings enjoying conscious experience, necessarily a world 
appears?  It means at least three different things: In conscious experience 
there is a world, there is a self, and there is a relation between both—
because in an interesting sense this world appears to the experiencing self.  
We therefore distinguish three different aspects of our original question.  
The first set of questions is about what it means that a reality appears.  
The second set is about how it can be that this reality appears to someone, 
to a subject of experience. The third set is about how this subject becomes 
the center of its own world, how it transforms the appearance of a reality 
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into a truly subjective phenomenon by tying it to an individual first-person 
perspective.11
 
   
As Damasio more colloquially puts it, there are thus at least two problems implied 
in the hard problem: “the problem of how the movie-in-the-brain is generated, and the 
problem of how the brain also generates the sense that there is an owner and observer for 
that movie.”12
An Evolutionary Account of the Conscious Self: Antonio Damasio 
   
 
One source of mischief with the mind-body problem is that in philosophical 
discussions it is almost always approached in a synchronic manner, i.e., how do objective 
brains create subjective experiences right now? The diachronic question of how 
something like a conscious self could emerge in an evolutionary context is seldom 
addressed, but viewing the conscious self in a diachronic, evolutionary manner goes a 
long way in making the synchronic problem much less mysterious. It is significant to 
note that viewing biological phenomena in an exclusively synchronic manner creates 
similar befuddlement.  Viewed synchronically it is nearly impossible to see how anything 
other than ex nihilo intelligent design could generate the complex design of organisms.  
Diachronic, gradational thinking introduced in nineteenth century geology and biology 
culminating in the work of Darwin changed all of this. Explaining consciousness and 
explaining the apparent design of organisms are not the same thing, but there are 
significant analogies, and a diachronic approach to the mind-body problem may prove as 
                                                          
11Thomas Metzinger, Being No One : The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2003), 15. 
 
12Antonio R. Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of 
Consciousness, 1st ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999), 11. 
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fruitful for the explanation of consciousness as it was for the explanation of the apparent 
intelligent design of organisms. 
One thing a diachronic, evolutionary approach draws attention to is the centrality 
of body and environment/world in thinking about the conscious self. The hard problem 
cannot be solved by approaching it exclusively in a synchronic manner, and it also cannot 
be solved by thinking of mind and brain in an isolated and atomistic manner.  It is easy to 
think of the mind performing abstract operations that seem disconnected with the life of 
an organism, and it is possible to view the brain in an atomistic “brain-in-the-vat” fashion 
apart from the needs to the rest of the body, but it is precisely the mind-brain’s 
connection with the entire organism and with the external environment that explains its 
evolutionary origins and helps to dissolve the hard problem. When the mind-brain 
problem is approached in a diachronic, evolutionary manner, as the mind-brain-body-
world problem, one begins not with minds and brains but rather with simple single-celled 
organisms (bodies) in an external environment (world). Damasio’s work draws particular 
attention to the long natural history of the self. Even at the very rudimentary level of 
single-celled organisms, the boundary that defines the organism marks off its internal 
environment (“the internal milieu”) from an external environment. 
Life is carried out inside a boundary that defines a body. Life and the life 
urge exist inside a boundary, the selectively permeable wall that separates 
the internal environment with the external environment. The idea of 
organism revolves around the existence of that boundary.… Life needs a 
boundary.  I believe that minds and consciousness, when they eventually 
appeared in evolution, were first and foremost about life and the life urge 
within a boundary.13
 
 
                                                          
13Ibid., 137. 
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It was the French biologist Claude Bernard who first noted an organism’s need to 
maintain a consistent “internal milieu” in an environment that is in constant flux. The 
British biologist W.B. Cannon amplified Bernard’s work, coining the term homeostasis: 
“the coordinated physiological reactions which maintain most of the steady states of the 
body…and which are so peculiar to the living organism.”14
The specifications for survival that I am describing here include: a 
boundary; an internal structure; a dispositional arrangement for the 
regulation of internal states that subsumes a mandate to maintain life; a 
narrow range of variability of internal states so that those states are 
relatively stable. Now consider these specifications. Am I describing just a 
list of specifications for the survival of a simple living organism, or could 
it be that I am also describing some of the biological antecedents of the 
sense of self – the sense of a single, bounded, living organism bent on 
maintaining stability to maintain its life? I would say that I might be 
describing either. It is intriguing to think that the constancy of the internal 
milieu is essential to maintain life and that it might be a blueprint and 
anchor for what will eventually become a self in the mind.
 Even the simplest single-
celled organisms possess an “internal milieu” that must be kept constant in light of a 
constantly changing environment. It is precisely here that rudiments of the mind-brain 
can thus be found. Damasio argues that the “internal milieu” of an organism is thus the 
precursor to more robust notions of self:   
15
 
 
 Nervous systems greatly enhance these capacities for coordinating the inside of an 
organism with its external environment. This first occurs entirely unconsciously through 
the function of what Damasio calls the proto-self: 
I have come to conclude that the organism, as represented inside its own 
brain, is a likely biological forerunner for what eventually becomes the 
elusive sense of self. The deep roots for the self, including the elaborate 
                                                          
14Ibid., 138. 
 
15Ibid., 136. 
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self which encompasses identity and personhood, are to be found in the 
ensemble of brain devices which continuously and nonconsciously 
maintain the body state within the narrow range and relative stability 
required for survival. These devices continually represent, nonconsciously, 
the state of the living body, along its many dimensions. I call the state of 
activity within the ensemble of such devices the proto-self, the 
nonconscious forerunner for the levels of self which appear in our minds 
as the conscious protagonists of consciousness: core self and 
autobiographical self.16
 
 
What becomes clear from this discussion of internal milieu and proto-self is that 
the organism needs to “know” its own needs, be aware of threats to its internal milieu, 
and engage in coordinated movement in response to an external environment that is 
continually changing. As Damasio puts it, “body-minded minds help save the body.”17     
“Survival depends on finding and incorporating sources of energy and on preventing all 
sorts of situations which threaten the integrity of living tissue.”18
If actions are at the root of survival and if their power is tied to the 
availability of guiding images, it follows that a device capable of 
maximizing the effective manipulation of images in the service of the 
interests of a particular organism would have given enormous advantages 
to the organisms that possessed the device and would probably have 
prevailed in evolution. Consciousness is precisely such a device.  The 
pathbreaking novelty provided by consciousness was the possibility of 
connecting the inner sanctum of life regulation with the processing of 
images.
 This requires a complex 
coordination of action and image. A device that facilitates this complex coordination 
would have conferred enormous advantage to an organism possessing it: 
19
 
   
                                                          
16Ibid., 22. 
 
17Ibid., 143. 
 
18Ibid., 23. 
 
19Ibid., 24. 
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 How exactly does consciousness and the conscious self emerge from the 
nonconscious proto-self? According to Damasio, consciousness/ the conscious self 
emerges as the organism is affected by an object. Importantly, for Damasio, this is 
necessarily a second-order activity. The state of the organism is constantly being mapped 
by the proto-self; any object the organism interacts with is also mapped within the 
sensory and motor structures of the brain.20 These sensorimotor representations cause 
changes to the representations pertaining to the organism, i.e., the proto-self. 
Consciousness and the conscious self emerge as these changes are re-represented in 
higher-order maps representing the relationship between organism and object.21 
Consciousness is a form of higher-order representation:  “The first basis for the conscious 
you is a feeling which arises in the re-representation of the nonconscious proto-self in the 
process of being modified.”22 This form of consciousness is what Damasio calls “core 
consciousness”:  “a simple, biological phenomenon, it has one single level of 
organization; it is stable across the lifetime of the organism; it is not exclusively human; 
and it is not dependent on conventional memory, working memory, reasoning, or 
language.”23
Looking back, with the license of metaphor, one might say that the swift, 
second-order nonverbal account narrates a story: that of the organism 
  Importantly, a core self emerges in this second-order process of organism 
being affected by an object:  
                                                          
20Ibid., 169. 
 
21Ibid. 
 
22Ibid., 172. 
 
23Ibid., 16.  
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caught in the act of representing its own changing state as it goes about 
representing something else. But the astonishing fact is that the knowable 
entity of the catcher has just been created in the narrative of the catching 
process.24
 
 
The sense of self that emerges from core consciousness Damasio calls the core self, “a 
transient entity, ceaselessly recreated for each and every object with which the brain 
interacts.”25  This form of consciousness and conscious selfhood is created in pulses, in 
the constant interaction of organism and object. Core consciousness and the core self 
emerge in the process of the proto-self being modified by interaction with the external 
environment. Core consciousness and the core self in turn generate extended 
consciousness and the autobiographical self. This is a robust sense of self; the self Daniel 
Dennett has called “the center of narrative gravity.”26 Most simply, it is an “an organized 
record of past experiences of an individual organism.”27
The emergence of consciousness and the conscious self is of clear evolutionary 
significance. As Damasio understands it, consciousness introduces a new means of 
maintaining the internal milieu of an organism and thus preserving homeostasis.
  
28
                                                          
24Ibid., 170. 
 It does 
this not by replacing the functions of the proto-self that can be performed with great 
efficiency in an unconscious manner, but by helping the organism respond more 
efficiently to changes in the external environment.   
 
25Ibid., 17. 
 
26Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991), 412-430. 
 
27Damasio. 
 
28Ibid., 303. 
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Creatures with consciousness have some advantages over those that do not 
have consciousness. They can establish a link between the world of 
automatic regulation (the world of basic homeostasis that is interwoven 
with the proto-self) and the world of imagination (the world in which 
images of different modalities can be combined to produce novel images 
of situations that have not yet happened). The world of imaginary 
creations—the world of planning, the world of formulation of scenarios 
and prediction of outcomes—is linked to the world of the proto-self. The 
sense of self links forethought, on the one hand, to preexisting automation, 
on the other. 
Consciousness is not the sole means of generating adequate 
responses to an environment and thus achieving homeostasis.  
Consciousness is just the latest and most sophisticated means of doing so, 
and it performs its function by making way for the creation of novel 
responses in the sort of environment which an organism has not been 
designed to match, in terms of automated responses.29
 
 
 Damasio helps us see how a complex phenomenon like the conscious self is 
related to more fundamental issues concerning the relationship between organisms in 
particular environments. Such an approach goes a long way toward demystifying the 
conscious self. It also becomes clear that the notion of representation does a great deal of 
conceptual work in Damasio’s account.  
Natural Sources of Religious Dualism I: Selves as Transparent 
Phenomenal Self Models: Thomas Metzinger 
Metzinger also offers a representationalist analysis of consciousness with many of 
the same emphases as Damasio.  In Metzinger’s analysis, the self emerges as a 
phenomenal self model (PSM) is placed inside of a phenomenal world model: 
First, our brains generate a world-simulation, so perfect that we do not 
recognize it as an image in our minds. Then, they generate an inner image 
of ourselves as a whole. This image includes not only our body and our 
psychological states but also our relationship to the past and the future, as 
well as to other conscious beings. The internal image of the person-as-a 
                                                          
29Ibid., 304. 
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whole is the phenomenal Ego, the “I” or “self” as it appears in conscious 
experience…. The phenomenal Ego is not some mysterious thing or little 
man inside the head but the content of an inner image—namely, the 
conscious self-model, or PSM. By placing the self-model within the world 
model, a center is created. It is the origins of what philosophers often call 
the first-person perspective.30
 
 
Damasio and Metzinger both highlight how something like a first-person 
perspective might emerge. The first-person perspective is a crucial aspect of 
consciousness phenomenology, but it is not the only one. Our conscious experience does 
not seem to have a character of a representational model and certainly does not seem very 
brainy: on the contrary, we seem to be outside of our brains and in direct contact with 
reality. Metzinger, in particular, draws attention to this aspect of our conscious 
experience, what he calls the transparency of phenomenal self model (PSM). The notion 
of the transparency that Metzinger is drawing upon was originally introduced by G.E. 
Moore: 
… the fact that when we refer to introspection and try to discover what the 
sensation of blue is, it is very easy to suppose that we have before us only 
single term. The term “blue” is easy enough to distinguish, but the other 
element which I have called “consciousness”—that which a sensation of 
blue has in common with a sensation of green—is extremely difficult to 
fix…And in general, that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact 
seems to escape us; it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent—
we look through it and see nothing but the blue; we may be convinced that 
there is something, but what it is no philosopher, I think, has yet clearly 
recognized.31
  
    
                                                          
30Thomas Metzinger, The Ego Tunnel : The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self (New 
York: Basic Books, 2009), 7. 
 
31G.E. Moore, “The Refutation of Idealism,” Mind 12 (1903), 446 as quoted in Metzinger, Being 
No One : The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity, 163. 
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When something is transparent, one does not see it but sees through it, “we do not 
see the window but only the bird flying by;” we are not aware of the medium through 
which information reaches us.32  It is precisely transparency—the fact that we never see 
the self model but only see through it—that turns a system model into a self-model. 
“[T]he transparency of representational structures is the decisive criterion for turning a 
model into an appearance, into an apparent reality.”33
Nobody ever was or had a self.  All that ever existed were conscious self-
models that could not be recognized as models. The phenomenal self is 
not a thing, but a process—and the subjective experience of being 
someone emerges if a conscious information-processing system operates 
under a transparent self-model….[T]he conscious self-model of human 
beings is the best invention Mother Nature has made. It is a wonderfully 
efficient two-way window that allows an organism to conceive of itself as 
a whole, and thereby causally interact with its inner and outer environment 
in an entirely new, integrated, and intelligent manner. Consciousness, the 
phenomenal self, and the first-person perspective are fascinating 
representational phenomena that have a long evolutionary history, a 
history which eventually led to the formation of complex societies and a 
cultural embedding of conscious experience itself.
 In Metzinger’s self-model theory of 
subjectivity, the self is understood as a representational model, a phenomenal self-model 
(PSM), that is not recognized as a model.    
34
 
 
The phenomenology of transparency is phenomenology of immediacy, of 
apparently direct perception, due to the fact that the representational character of the 
contents of conscious experience is itself not accessible to conscious experience.35
                                                          
32Metzinger, Being No One: The Self Model Theory of Subjectivity, 170. 
  
“Inaccessible to conscious experience is the simple fact that this is taking place within a 
 
33Ibid., 169. 
 
34Ibid., 1. 
 
35Ibid., 169. 
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medium.”36 The transparency of the conscious self makes perfect sense in an 
evolutionary perspective. The transparency of representation allows for what seems to be 
immediate contact with reality, the sense that “I am present in a world outside my brain 
and in immediate contact with reality.” For instance, I see an animal.  “I” and “the 
animal” are complex representational structures in my brain, but we do not need to know 
this. It does not help us in “flagging the dangerous present”37
  The phenomenology of transparent representation gives us the sense of being 
outside our brains and in immediate contact with the world. It is important to realize that 
what makes good sense from a pragmatic evolutionary standpoint does not necessarily 
make sense from a scientific-philosophical point of view. It’s difficult to estimate the 
number of errors that result from a failure to recognize this. It’s an easy slide from a 
pragmatic-evolutionary folk phenomenology to folk metaphysics. There, the transparency 
 at all. In fact, it would 
spectacularly hinder our ability to do so. It is easy to see the massive selective advantages 
transparency would allow. Transparency allows for efficient action in the present (e.g., 
escaping an attacking animal). Note too, that the baseline “zero-world” model provided 
by the transparency of consciousness becomes essential as human beings develop more 
sophisticated off-line meta-representational capacities such as conscious planning, 
thinking, and deliberating. Such conscious deliberation and planning are only intelligible 
against a baseline reality provided by the transparent self model. Transparency allows for 
the introduction of a reality/representation, appearance/reality distinction.     
                                                          
36Ibid., 169-170. 
 
37The psychologist Richard Gregory uses this term to indicate what he considers to be one of the 
major evolutionary functions of consciousness. 
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of consciousness and the conscious self makes us naïve realists about the external world 
and dualists about the self (dualism might be thought of as naïve realism about the 
internal world). We conclude that we must really be outside of our brains and in 
immediate contact with the world. But understanding ourselves as literally outside of our 
brains and in immediate contact with the world makes no sense scientifically. How can 
the self interact with the world without violating conservation laws? How can a non-
physical self emerge in the process of evolution? Here it is clear that phenomenology is 
not ontology, we are not really outside our brains, and we are not really in immediate 
contact with reality—dualism and naïve realism are elaborate cognitive illusions, virtual 
realities. The Finnish neuroscientist Annti Revonsuo puts this well:    
[M]other nature…clothed us, that is, the phenomenological level of 
organization, with a built-in “out-of-brain” experience. But, remember, we 
are not really out of our brains in our experiences—how could we if all the 
required neural machinery sits tightly there…. No, we are only virtually 
out of the brain and in the external world. In fact, we did not invent VR 
[Virtual Reality] at all—evolution invented it for us millions of years ago.  
We have merely invented one fresh way to use, with the help of computer 
technology, the natural VR machine in our brain.38
 
 
The virtual reality metaphor is a great heuristic tool for thinking about the hard 
problem in an empirically tractable manner, but it also has limitations. In artificial virtual 
reality, there is still a conscious self experiencing the virtual reality, but Metzinger and 
Revonsuo are not advocating a homuncular metaphor of consciousness: the conscious 
self is itself part of the virtual reality. Metzinger uses the image of a “total flight 
simulator” to illustrate this point: 
                                                          
38Annti Revonsuo, "Consciousness, Dreams, and Virtual Realities," Philosophical Psychology 8 
(1995): 14. 
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The brain is like a total flight simulator, a self-modeling airplane that, 
rather than being flown by a pilot, generates a complex internal image of 
itself within its own internal flight simulator. The image is transparent and 
thus cannot be recognized as an image by the system. Operating under the 
condition of a naïve-realistic self-misunderstanding, the system interprets 
the control element in this image as a nonphysical object: the “pilot” is 
born into a virtual reality with no opportunity to discover this fact…. If the 
virtual self functions extremely well, the organism using it is completely 
unaware of its “as if” nature. The self-model activated in the human brain 
has been optimized over millions of years. The process that constructs it is 
fast, reliable, and has a much higher resolution than any of today’s virtual-
reality games. As a result, the virtuality of the phenomenal self-model 
tends to be invisible to the user. But strictly speaking, it is simply the best 
hypothesis the system has about its own current state—presented in a new, 
highly integrated data format.39
 
   
 The transparency of the phenomenal self model and the virtual reality metaphor 
has very significant implications. They provide a way to take phenomenology seriously 
while at the same avoiding dualist intuitions, both the Scylla of deflationist materialism 
and the Charybdis of dualism are avoided. The notion of the transparent phenomenal self 
model allows one to view the self as part of a vertical explanatory hierarchy. As 
Metzinger notes: 
In introducing the working concept of a PSM I claim that it constitutes a 
distinct theoretical entity. That is, I claim that it is not only something that 
can meaningfully be described on a number of different levels of 
description mirroring each other in a heuristically fruitful manner but that 
it is something that can be found by suitable empirical research program. 
And it can be found on every level of description.40
 
 
How can we understand this? What is commonly referred to as “the self” is identical to a 
phenomenal self-model (PSM). As such, the PSM, can be viewed from a first person and 
third person perspective and at various explanatory levels found in scientific psychology 
                                                          
39Metzinger, The Ego Tunnel : The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self, 108. 
 
40Metzinger, Being No One : The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity, 303. 
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and neuroscience (i.e., representational, functional, neurological). When viewed from a 
first person phenomenological perspective, the self model is not experienced as a model 
due to the transparent nature of the self model. It is thus a great temptation to view the 
phenomenological level as entirely apart from this explanatory hierarchy (as in robust 
versions of dualism) or as an additional, autonomous vertical level in the explanatory 
hierarchy, as something over-and-above the descriptive levels found in scientific 
psychology and neuroscience (as in property dualism and emergentism). The 
phenomenological level is not something “over-and-above” the representational level. 
The phenomenal self is the content of the transparent PSM and the transparent PSM can 
be identified with some global neural correlate of consciousness. The first person-third 
person shift is a horizontal relation and not a vertical one: subjective physical facts and 
objective physical facts are the same thing viewed from different perspectives, from “the 
inside” and “the outside” as it were.   
 But the significance of the notion of a transparent self-model extends beyond the 
scientific and philosophical study of consciousness. The phenomenal self-model is not 
recognized as a model. As a result all of our experience seems to be “out-of-brain” 
experience, thus providing a potent source of dualist intuitions. However, the brain is 
capable of generating an even more robust sense of dualism. The brain can generate the 
sense of not only being outside our brain but being outside our body. Research on how 
the brain represents the body not only provides empirical support for the notion of the 
self as a virtual, representational model, it also helps to explain another very important 
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source of dualist intuitions—out-of-body experiences (OBEs). Research on bodily 
representation and specifically on OBEs forms the topic of the next section. 
Natural Sources of Religious Dualism II:  
Thomas Metzinger and Olaf Blanke on Out-of-Body-Experiences 
 OBEs are a well-reported cross-cultural phenomenon and occur in about 10 
percent of the general population. For those undergoing these vivid experiences dualist 
intuitions are almost inevitable. As Metzinger writes: 
For anyone who actually has had that type of experiences it is almost 
impossible not to become an ontological dualist afterwards. In all their 
realism, cognitive clarity, and general coherence, these phenomenal 
experiences almost inevitably lead the experiencing subject to conclude 
that conscious experience can, as a matter of fact, take place 
independently of the brain and the body: what is phenomenologically 
possible in such a clear and vivid manner must also be metaphysically 
possible or actually the case.41
 
   
Much neuroscientific light has been shed on issues of bodily self-representation in recent 
years, and, as Metzinger and the Swiss neuroscientist Olaf Blanke have shown, progress 
can be made by viewing OBEs in such a context. 
 The previous section was at pains to point out that the self is not a “thing” but a 
pragmatic model—the brain’s best guess about the organism’s status in relation to the 
present external environment. This pragmatic, virtual character of the self has been 
documented in a number of experiments on bodily representation. Representing one’s 
body is no small thing. The sense of one’s body that one has at every instant requires the 
interpretation of inputs from various sensory modalities in order to integrate and bind all 
                                                          
41Thomas Metzinger, "Out-of-Body Experiences as the Origin of the Concept of A "Soul"," Mind 
& Matter 3, no. 1 (2005): 78. 
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of this information together. Understanding how everything “comes together” to create 
the apparent cohesiveness and unity of conscious experience is one of the most 
significant problems in neuroscience, the so-called “binding problem.” The binding 
problem is not, as yet, completely understood, but the failure to bind information and the 
various multi-sensory conflicts and illusions generated by the failure of sensory 
integration in the brain are increasingly subject to empirical investigation. As Metzinger 
and Blanke have shown, far from being mystical, occult phenomena, OBEs can be 
fruitfully viewed in such a context.   
 In clinical literature, OBEs are classified as a type of autoscopic illusion.42
                                                          
42Christine Mohr and Olaf Blanke, "The Demystification of Autoscopic Phenomena: Experimental 
Propositions," Current Psychiatry Reports 7, no. 7 (2005). 
 
Autoscopic illusions all involve seeing a duplicate of one’s own body. Metzinger has 
helpfully placed discussion of these complex whole-body illusions alongside body part 
illusions. Vivid examples of the pragmatic nature of self-modeling and bodily 
representation – i.e., its virtual character – can be seen in research on body part 
attribution and location. In an experiment by University of Pittsburgh psychiatrists, 
Matthew Botvinick and Jonathan Cohen, healthy experimental subjects experienced an 
artificial rubber hand as their own hand; this has come to be known as the rubber hand 
illusion (RHI). In this experiment, one’s own hand is hidden from view and one observes 
a fake rubber hand in front of them. Both the hidden real hand and the seen fake hand are 
then stroked with a probe. Because visual information typically overrides other sensory 
modalities, observation of the stroking of the fake hand causes people to attribute the fake 
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hand to their own bodies (“to feel like it is my hand”). Sensations of having a full blown 
“virtual” arm—a connection from the shoulder to the fake hand have also been reported 
in other RHI experiments, along with a “proprioceptive drift”—a mislocalization of one’s 
hand toward the fake hand.43
Phantom limbs are another closely related phenomenon. In such cases, patients 
have the “persistent and unmistakable impression” that a lost limb is still part of their 
body. In certain cases, the phantom limb is paralyzed, creating the impression that the 
absent limb cannot be moved. Working with a patient, Philip, with a paralyzed phantom 
limb, V.S. Ramachandran and his colleagues provided another striking example of the 
dynamic and pragmatic nature of self-modeling, underscoring the degree to which the 
self-model depends on perceptual and contextual information.
   
44
Philip rotated his body, shifting his shoulder, to “insert” his lifeless 
phantom into the box.  Then he put his right hand on the other side of the 
 Ramachandran created a 
“virtual reality box” by placing a mirror inside a cardboard box open at the top with two 
holes cut in the front of the box to either side of the mirror. Philip was instructed to place 
his real arm and his paralyzed phantom limb into the box. He was then told to observe the 
reflection of his real hand in the mirror. The mirror image of his right hand was used to 
create the visual illusion that he actually did have two hands. Next, he was asked to make 
symmetrical movements with both his real arm and his paralyzed phantom arm. 
Ramachandran describes the experiment in the following manner: 
                                                          
43Bigna Lenggenhager, Tej Tadi, Thomas Metzinger, and Olaf Blanke, "Video Ergo Sum: 
Manipulating Bodily Self Consciousness," Science 317, no. 5841 (2007). 
 
44V.S. Ramachandran and S. Blakeslee, Phantoms in the Brain (New York: William Morrow, 
1998), 37ff. 
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mirror and attempted to make synchronous movements.  As he gazed into 
the mirror, he gasped and the cried out, “Oh, my God! Oh my God, 
doctor!  This is unbelievable.  It’s mind-boggling.”  He was jumping up 
and down like a kid.  “My left arm is plugged in again.  It’s as if I’m in the 
past.  All these memories from years ago are flooding back into my mind.  
I can move my arm again.  I can feel my elbow moving, my wrist moving.  
It’s all moving again.   
After he calmed down a little I said, “Okay Philip, now close your 
eyes.” “Oh, my,” he said clearly disappointed.  “It’s frozen again.  I feel 
my right hand moving, but there’s no movement in the phantom.” “Open 
your eyes” “Oh, yes.  Now it’s moving again.”45
 
 
 Rubber hand illusions and phantom limbs both concern representation and 
modeling of body parts, but what about the body as a whole and the sense of the self 
related to the body as a whole? Could this also be manipulated experimentally? In other 
words, could one create a rubber-hand illusion of one’s entire body? Because the self is 
typically localized in the body, such an experiment would affect not only bodily 
attribution and location but self attribution and location as well—it would create the 
experience of being outside the physical boundaries of one’s actual body, an out-of-body 
experience. Metzinger and Blanke designed such an experiment with Bigna 
Lenggenheger and Tej Tedi. “When I first experienced the rubber-hand illusion, I 
immediately thought it would be important to see whether this would also work with a 
whole rubber body or an image of yourself. Could one create a full-body analog of the 
rubber-hand illusion? Could the entire self be transposed to a location outside the 
body?”46
                                                          
45Ibid., 41. 
 In the rubber hand illusion, bodily self representation was manipulated 
(specifically the sense of “mineness” or ownership of one’s body parts); the phenomenal 
 
46Metzinger, The Ego Tunnel : The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self, 5. 
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self per se was not manipulated. In their “Video Ergo Sum” experiments, Lenggenhager, 
Tedi, Metzinger, and Blanke sought to manipulate attribution and localization of the 
entire body and to study the effects of such manipulations on one’s sense of self. In other 
words, the experiment sought to induce an out-of-body experience.   
 Participants were placed two meters in front of a video camera and fitted with a 
three-dimensional head mounted display, allowing them to view their backs in three-
dimensional space. Metzinger described his own experience of wearing the head mounted 
display as viewing a 3-D version of Rene Magritte’s La Reproduction Interdite.47 
Participants’ backs were then stroked with a stick. Lenggenhager et al. varied the 
experimental conditions in several important ways. A time lag was introduced allowing 
for a discrepancy between seen and felt stroking. The virtual body was also varied. In the 
first trial, the participants viewed their virtual own body through the head-mounted 
display. In other trials, the camera angle focused on a mannequin and on a wood slab. 
Thus, participants viewed a virtual fake body and an object through the head-mounted 
display. Under synchronous conditions and with their virtual own body or virtual fake 
body, participants often felt as though the virtual body was their own body, actually 
identifying with it and “jumping into” it.48
While I was looking at my own back as seen in the head-mounted display, 
Bigna Lenggenhager was stroking my back, while the camera was 
recording this action. As I watched my own back being stroked, I 
immediately had an awkward feeling: I felt subtly drawn toward my 
 Metzinger describes his own experience in the 
following manner: 
                                                          
47Ibid., 98. 
 
48Lenggenhager, "Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating Bodily Self Consciousness." 
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virtual body in front of me, and I tried to “slip into” it. This is as far as 
things went.49
  
 
 Immediately after the stroking, participants were blindfolded, displaced and asked 
to return to their initial position. Participants showed a drift toward the virtual body in the 
synchronous condition with both the virtual own body and virtual fake body. The 
difference was weaker and no longer significant with the wooden slab. Lengennhager et 
al. describe the significance of the experiment: 
With the use of virtual reality and multi-sensory conflict, we induced an 
illusion that makes it possible to quantify selfhood by manipulating 
attribution and localization of the entire body. Our results show that 
humans systematically experience a virtual body as if it were their own 
when visually presented in the anterior extrapersonal space and stroked 
synchronously. This finding was corroborated by the participants’ 
mislocalization of their own bodies to a position outside their bodies, 
showing that self-attribution and localization of the entire body rely, at 
least partly, on similar visual-somatosensory integrative mechanisms to 
those of body parts.50
 
  
 While such experiments do not exactly duplicate OBEs, they are of tremendous 
significance because they show that the sense of self in relation to one’s own body can be 
manipulated under experimental conditions. Dualism is not a mysterious and intractable 
phenomenon but can be placed under the microscope, as it were, and what is being 
studied is not a soul but a phenomenal self-model. In the Video Ergo Sum experiments, 
persons or selves do not actually leave their own body and slip into the virtual body—all 
of this is the result of complex representational dynamics in the human brain. These 
experiments create something very similar to an OBE by creating multi-sensory conflict 
                                                          
49Metzinger, The Ego Tunnel : The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self, 99-100. 
 
50Lenggenhager, "Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating Bodily Self Consciousness," 1098. 
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in a “top-down” manner. Such experiences can also be examined from the “bottom-up” 
as well. 
 As noted above, OBEs are part of a range of phenomena known as autoscopic 
illusions. Other types of autoscopic phenomena include: autoscopic hallucinations, 
feeling-of-a-presence, and heautoscopy.51 In autoscopic illusions, patients see their own 
body but they don’t identify with it and don’t have the feeling that they are “in” this 
illusory body. The feeling-of-presence is not a visual illusion but an illusion where the 
second illusory body is only felt. Heautoscopy is particularly fascinating. In these 
illusions the sense of self tends to alternate between two bodies or to be located between 
them. (The Video Ergo Sum experiments generated something very similar to a 
heautoscopic illusion).52 Blanke defines OBEs in terms of three fundamental 
characteristics: (1) Disembodiment: the feeling of being outside one’s physical body; (2) 
Parasomatic Perspective: the presence of an elevated visio-spatial perspective; (3) 
Autoscopy: The seeing of one’s own body from the elevated perspective.53
 Phantom limb phenomena, the rubber hand illusion, and the Video Ergo Sum 
experiments highlight the pragmatic, virtual character of self-modeling and bodily 
representation. Under conditions involving multisensory conflict people readily attribute 
fake body parts to themselves and identify with both a virtual own body and a virtual fake 
body, attributing and localizing the self outside the boundaries of their actual physical 
   
                                                          
51Blanke, "The Demystification of Autoscopic Phenomena: Experimental Propositions." 
 
52Lenggenhager, "Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating Bodily Self Consciousness." 
 
53Olaf Blanke and Shahar Arzy, "The Out-of-Body Experience: Disturbed Self-Processing at the 
Temporo- Parietal Junction," Neuroscientist 11, no. 16 (2005): 16. 
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bodies. Blanke uses the framework of multisensory conflict to study full-blown OBEs in 
a neurological context. His research into OBEs was launched when, seeking to locate the 
seizure site for an epileptic patient, he stimulated an OBE at the right angular gyrus.54
 Recall the three defining characteristics of OBE described by Blanke: (1) 
disembodiment, (2) parasomatic perspective, and (3) autoscopy. Blanke argues that a 
two-fold disintegration is necessary to create an OBE. First, multisensory conflict and 
disintegration—the failure to bind proprioceptive, tactile, and visual sensations-- is 
necessary to create the autoscopic aspect of the OBE—seeing one’s own body outside its 
own physical boundaries. This sort of conflict was precisely what was induced in the 
rubber hand illusion experiments and the Video Ergo Sum experiments. Importantly, 
Blanke notes that a second form of conflict—vestibular conflict—is necessary to generate 
the sensations of disembodiment and parasomatic perspective. This conflict involves the 
relationship between external visual space and one’s internal frame of reference created 
by vestibular information. “If the spatial frame of reference created by our sense of 
 An 
initial stimulation of 2.0-3.0 microamps resulted in the patient reporting that she was 
either sinking in the bed or falling from a height. When Blanke increased the stimulation 
above 3.0, the patient reported seeing herself lying in bed from above, seeing only her 
arms and legs. Blanke then had the patient focus on her arms and legs at 4.0-5.0 mA.  She 
reported her legs and arms becoming shorter. The patient’s limbs were bent at a 90 
degree angle. When stimulated, the patient felt that her arms and legs were moving 
toward her face and tried to avoid them.   
                                                          
54Olaf Blanke, Theodor Landis, Laurent Spinelli, and Margitta Seeck, "Out-of-Body Experience 
and Autoscopy of Neurological Origin," Brain 127, no. 2 (2004). 
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balance and the one created by vision come apart, the result could be the conscious 
experience of seeing one’s body in a position that does not coincide with its felt 
position.”55  Graviceptive and otholithic illusions resulting from vestibular disintegration 
have also been investigated scientifically. Such graviceptive-otholithic illusions 
frequently occur as responses to microgravity in space missions and on parabolic 
flights.56
 Research by Blanke has localized the neural correlate of OBEs at the temporal-
parietal junction (TPJ).  When healthy subjects were asked to imagine their bodies in the 
position of an OBE, the TPJ activated in less than half a second.
 Significantly, altered perspective is one common manifestation.   Inversion 
illusions, for example, involve 180 degree inversions of visual spatial perspective relative 
to extra personal space; persons experience themselves as if their bodies were inverted 
180 degrees. Blanke argues that an analogous type of vestibular disintegration—along 
with multisensory disintegration—is necessary for OBE. 
57 When that same region 
is inhibited by transcranial magnetic stimulation, healthy subjects cannot imagine 
themselves in the position of an OBE.58
                                                          
55Blanke, "The Out-of-Body Experience: Disturbed Self-Processing at the Temporo-Parietal 
Junction," 20. 
 Importantly, other studies have highlighted the 
central role of the TPJ in multisensory processing, vestibular processing, and higher-level 
self processing: exactly the conditions Blanke points to as necessary for OBEs. TPJ along 
with cortical areas along the intraparietal sulcus have been associated with integrating 
 
56Ibid., 21. 
 
57Blanke, "Out-of-Body Experience and Autoscopy of Neurological Origin." 
 
58Ibid. 
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tactile, proprioceptive, and visual information. Further, core regions of the human 
vestibular cortex are situated at the TPJ, including the posterior insula, where brain 
damage is associated with graviceptive illusions. TPJ is also involved with perception 
and representation of the body. Finally, TPJ is also associated with higher-level self 
processing including egocentric visio-spatial perspective, agency, and the self-other 
distinction. “These data suggest an interaction between lower-level vestibular and 
multisensory processing and higher-level self processing such as egocentric visio-spatial 
perspective taking, agency, and self-location.”59
 Empirical research on OBEs provides support for the virtual character of the 
phenomenal self model and sheds a great deal of explanatory light on the origins of 
dualism. Such research casts significant doubt on the claim that OBEs provide direct 
empirical confirmation of dualism. On the contrary, phenomena like OBEs make perfect 
sense in light of the understanding of the conscious self developed in the previous 
section. 
 
This section provided a naturalistic sketch of the self and showed how the 
conscious self can be explained in a bio-psychological vertically integrated manner. In 
doing so, it has also shed significant light on how the brain can create the sense of being 
outside of the brain (ordinary out-of-brain experience) and even outside of one’s physical 
body (extraordinary out-of-body experience). The virtual experiences of being outside 
one’s brain and outside one’s physical body are two powerful sources of dualist 
                                                          
59Blanke, "The Out-of-Body Experience: Disturbed Self-Processing at the Temporo-Parietal 
Junction," 21. 
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intuitions.  Higher-level cognitive science has also shed a great deal of light on dualism. 
It is to this research that we now turn. 
Toward a Bio-Psychological Explanation of Dualism: 
Insights from Cognitive Science 
 Chapter One and the preceding section were concerned to establish consciousness 
and the conscious self as real but entirely natural phenomena, capable of being explained 
at the levels of scientific psychology and neuroscience. However, it is quite easy to think 
that the phenomenal self is something “over-and-above” the brain and the rest of the 
physical body. The transparency of the conscious self—the fact that all of our experience 
appears to be “out-of-brain” experience—helps to explain the intuition that selves are 
distinct from bodies. Folk phenomenology is one powerful source of dualist intuitions, 
but it is not the only one. In the course of their evolutionary history, human beings have 
not only developed an elaborate common-sense sense of self; they have also developed 
an elaborate common-sense knowledge of the other objects and “subjects” encountered in 
the world. Understanding this common-sense knowledge also contributes much to the 
explanation of dualism and other aspects of human religiosity. This section explains how. 
Human beings possess complex and often implicit knowledge of material objects 
(folk physics), living things (folk biology), and other human minds (folk psychology).  
Cognitive-developmental psychology has uncovered a massive amount of information 
about these various inference systems, and in recent years, these findings have been 
applied fruitfully to the study of religion, leading to the emergence of the discipline 
known as the cognitive science of religion.  
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This section examines naturalistic explanations of dualism and theism from the 
vantage point of cognitive-developmental psychology. It begins with an overview of the 
findings of cognitive science on folk physics, folk biology, and folk psychology. It then 
applies these findings to questions concerning religious dualism.    
Introducing Cognitive Science 
 In the previous section, the complex conscious autobiographical self that modern 
human beings possess was rooted in an evolutionary history involving the interaction 
between organism with an “internal milieu” and constantly changing external 
environment. That environment is filled with physical objects, living things, other 
animals, and most importantly, other human beings. Just as the complex sense of self 
possessed by modern human beings can be rooted in the fairly rudimentary notion of an 
“internal milieu,” so too, many forms of human knowledge about physical, biological, 
and social worlds can be understood to emerge primarily as adaptive skills acquired by 
organisms in particular evolutionary contexts.    
To understand how this is the case, it is important to draw a crucial distinction 
between implicit and explicit knowledge. Knowledge is typically thought of in terms of 
explicitly held beliefs acquired through learning and education and conscious reasoning 
and deliberation. Many, in fact, have held the position that all knowledge is of this sort; 
indeed this is the foundation of the “blank slate” understanding of human nature 
discussed above. The cognitive revolution in psychology changed all of this by proposing 
that knowledge and beliefs can be implicit as well as explicit. Questions concerning the 
acquisition of language led to the demise of a behaviorist psychology focused on explicit 
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learning and ushered in the cognitive revolution in psychology. Noam Chomsky’s 
groundbreaking work in linguistics in the 1950’s called the most fundamental 
assumptions of behaviorism into question. Chomsky called attention to underlying 
similarities in the grammars of languages and to children’s ability to learn language 
rapidly despite being exposed to it in a very piecemeal manner (“the poverty of the 
stimulus”). Chomsky argued that human beings possessed an inborn “language 
acquisition device” that guides very young children toward an effortless mastery of their 
native language and its grammatical rules.  
Chomsky’s pioneering research led to an explosion of work in the cognitive 
sciences. Fundamental to much of this work is the notion that human beings possess 
innate and implicit forms of knowledge that interact in various ways with explicit 
learning channels. We can effortlessly construct grammatically correct sentences in our 
native language without knowing any explicit rules of grammar. Explicit knowledge 
comes later with former education. Cognitive scientists have extended this fundamental 
insight well beyond the specific issue of language. As Justin Barrett puts it,  
[c]ognitive scientists…have concluded that the adult human mind has a 
large number of devices that are used for different problems and on 
different occasions…Most of these mental tools operate automatically, 
without any conscious awareness.  They efficiently and rapidly solve lots 
of problems without concentration or angst, much in the same way that 
computer programs solve problems in a swift, effortless fashion.60
  
  
This insight is often expressed in terms of the notion of “domain-specificity”: the 
notion that the human mind-brain employs different specialized inference systems in 
                                                          
60Justin L. Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 
2004), 3. 
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response to objects in different conceptual categories. Contemporary cognitive science 
draws heavily on evolutionary theory and understands such inference systems to be in 
place as responses to problems recurrent in human environments for hundreds of 
thousands of years. Pascal Boyer provides a convenient summary of some of these 
essential principles: 
• Perception and understanding of surroundings require inferences and   
guesses about different aspects of objects around us. 
• The mind is composed of specialized systems that produce inferences 
about these different aspects. 
• Objects in different “ontological categories” activate different sets of 
these specialized systems. 
• Each inference system is itself composed of even more specialized 
neural structures. 
• Inference systems make us attend to particular cues in environments 
and produce specific inferences from these cues. 
• Skeletal versions of the principles direct knowledge acquisition from 
infancy. 
• All concepts develop as skills, which is why discussions of innateness 
are often meaningless 
• What principles you have depends on what species you are: which is 
why evolution is relevant to mental architecture.61
 
 
Inference systems leave no trace in the fossil record; evidence for their existence comes 
primarily from cognitive-developmental psychology: especially the study of very young 
children.  Such studies are significant because they provide the best control for linguistic 
and cultural influences and thus provide an empirical means of adjudicating what were 
once entirely philosophical claims about the human person. As Edward Slingerland 
observes: 
                                                          
61Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained : The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought (New York: 
Basic Books, 2001), 106,126. 
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If assumptions or abilities can be clearly demonstrated in infants or 
prelinguistic children, we can be fairly confident that we have eliminated 
the influence of language and – at least in the case of infants – culture.  
Obviously, the linguistic and cultural assumptions of the experimenters are 
still relevant, but the fact that… child development results…have been 
replicated across a wide spectrum of cultures increases our confidence that 
we are observing species wide cognitive defaults.62
 
 
One cannot talk to babies and babies cannot perform complex behavioral tasks, 
yet there is a way to effectively study their mental life. As developmental psychologist 
Paul Bloom notes: 
Babies may have little control over their bodies, but they can willingly 
move their heads and eyes. And what a baby looks at can tell you 
something about how it sees the world. This is because babies are like 
adults in some regards. If they see the same thing over and over again, 
they get bored and look away. If they see something new or unexpected, 
they look longer. Thus, analyzing looking time can tell us what babies 
think of as being ‘the same thing’ and what they see as being ‘new or 
unexpected.’63
 
 
Following such a methodology, studies in cognitive-developmental psychology have 
documented three especially important inference systems. These include common sense 
knowledge of material objects or folk physics, common sense knowledge of the living 
world or folk biology, and common sense knowledge of other minds or “folk 
psychology.”  
In terms of common sense knowledge of physical objects or folk physics, 
extensive studies have documented that key assumptions about the behavior of such 
objects are in place long before children have extensive interaction with the material 
                                                          
62Slingerland, 120-121. 
 
63Paul Bloom, Descartes' Baby : How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us 
Human (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 8-9. 
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world. Elizabeth Spelke observes that both adults and infants assume that physical 
objects will operate according to four fundamental principles: 
1. Cohesion: Objects are connected masses of stuff that move as a whole.  
If you want to know where the boundaries of an object are, an easy test 
is to grab some portion of stuff and pull—what comes with what you 
are pulling belongs to the same object; what remains does not. 
2. Solidity: Objects are not easily permeable by other objects; if you tap 
at an object with your finger, your finger does not penetrate. 
3. Continuity: Objects move in continuous paths; they travel through 
space without gaps. An object would violate this rule if it disappeared 
from one location and reappeared in another. 
4. Contact: Objects move through contact. A ball on a pool table is not 
going to move unless something contacts it; it will not run from the 
cue or come when it is called. The exceptions to this rule are animate 
creatures, like people and dogs, and certain complex artifacts like 
robots and cars.64
 
 
Human beings distinguish living and non-living things from an early age and 
attribute a unique set of properties to living things. Studies by Frank Keil, Scott Atran 
and others have documented that common sense knowledge of animals is driven by a 
kind of essentialism; animals are understood to have some internal property that is 
characteristic of the species and that cannot be removed.65
 
 Essences are linked to 
“insides” rather than to external appearances. Such essentialism is also closely linked 
with teleology, the notion that living things “possess properties that have purposes.” In 
terms of the understanding of religion, by far the most important form of common sense 
knowledge is folk psychology, especially agency detection and theory of mind. 
                                                          
64Ibid., 6. See E.Spelke, "Initial Knowledge: Six Suggestions," Cognition 50  (1994). 
 
65See Frank Keil, Concepts, Kinds, and Cognitive Development (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1989). 
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Folk Psychology: Agency Detection and Theory of Mind 
 
 Agency Detection 
 
Common sense knowledge of the basic principles governing physical objects is 
clearly important for survival. Even more important, however, is knowledge of agents, 
especially other human beings. It is not difficult to see why this is the case from an 
evolutionary perspective. Objects, in the sense used here, are inert physical things like 
rocks, sticks, plants, and artifacts. If they respond to the world at all, it is in a purely 
mechanical fashion.66
As noted above, agency detection depends on both speed and accuracy, but, in 
terms of accuracy, confusing an agent for an object (e.g., a snake for a coiled rope) and 
confusing an object for an agent (e.g., a coiled rope for a snake) do not involve equal 
payoffs. As long as one can rapidly readjust, the cost of “false positives” such as 
confusing or interpreting object as an agent is minimal.
 Agents, on the other hand, are beings like animals and other human 
beings capable of independently initiating action. Because of this agents call for special 
attention. From an evolutionary perspective and in terms of our implicit knowledge, 
agents are the things that matter most in an environment. Human beings must rapidly and 
accurately distinguish between objects and agents in the environment. Agency detection 
—the ability to distinguish between agents and objects in an environment—is thus a 
crucial aspect of folk psychology.   
67
                                                          
66Todd Tremlin, Minds and Gods: The Cognitive Foundations of Religion (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 70. 
 As anthropologist Stewart 
Guthrie has pointed out, agency detection is an implicit form of Pascal’s Wager: from an 
 
67Boyer, 145. 
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evolutionary perspective, “betting” on agents over objects is a wise choice.68 False alarms 
with agency are evolutionarily advantageous. This becomes the default interpretative 
strategy of the agency detection device. “When in doubt about whether something is an 
agent, assume that it is. It’s better to have a fast device that occasionally gets it wrong 
than a slow device that is always accurate.”69
One thing crucial to keep in mind in terms of agency detection is that traits that 
evolved for one purpose can be used for another purpose. As Paul Bloom notes, “a mind 
that has evolved to respond with sexual arousal in situations with actual people (adaptive) 
can respond the same way to pornographic movies (nonadaptive); a preference for sweet 
fruit (adaptive) can drive one to gorge on candy (nonadaptive).”
 
70 It is important to note 
that this distinction between adaptive and non-adaptive purposes applies to the cognitive 
realm as well. Cognitive anthropologists Dan Sperber and Scott Atran distinguish 
between what they call a cognitive function’s “proper domain” and “actual domain.” The 
proper domain of an agency detection device (ADD) involves “stimuli that track 
behaviors of agents including human beings… identifying animate beings as agents with 
goals and internal motivations, would allow our ancestors to anticipate goal directed 
actions of predators, prey, friends, and foe and profit from this in ways that enhanced 
hominid survival and reproductive success.”71
                                                          
68See Stewart Guthrie, Faces in the Clouds: A New Theory of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993). 
 The actual domain of ADD involves any 
 
69Tremlin, 70. 
 
70Bloom, 33. 
 
71Atran, 60. 
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information in the organism’s environment that satisfies the module’s input conditions—
whether or not the information is functionally relevant to ancestral task demands.72
 The “promiscuous” nature of human agency detection has been demonstrated in a 
number of psychological experiments. In the 1940s, F. Heider and S. Simmel presented a 
movie in which geometrical figures move in certain ways. People instinctively described 
the figures as if they were specific people with goals and desires.
    
73 Atran points to a 
number of experiments where mental states were inferred from “poor and fragmentary 
triggering experiences” including: interruptible movement toward a goal,74 self-
propulsion,75 coordinated motion between subjects,76 pointing,77 eye gaze,78 facial 
expression,79 and interactive gesture and signaling.80
 
   
 
                                                          
72Ibid. 
 
73F. Heider and S. Simmel, "An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior," American Journal of 
Psychology 57, no. 2 (1944). 
 
74G. Csibra, G. Gergely, S. Biro, O. Koos, and M. Brockbank, "Goal Attribution without Agency 
Cues: The Perception of "Pure Reason" In Infancy," Cognition 72, no. 3 (1999). 
 
75D. Premack, "The Infant's Theory of Self-Propelled Objects," Cognition 36  (1990). 
 
76D. and A. Premack, "Origins of Social Competence," in The Cognitive Neurosciences, ed. 
Michael Gazzaniga (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995). 
 
77A. Leslie, "The Theory of Mind Impairment in Autism," in Natural Theories of Mind, ed. A. 
Whiten (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991). 
 
78Simon Baron-Cohen, Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1995). 
 
79M. Tomasello, R. Strosberg, and N. Akhtar, "Eighteen-Month-Old Children Learn Words in 
Non-Ostensive Contexts," Journal of Child Language 23 (1996). 
 
80S. Johnson, V. Slaughter, and S. Carey, "Whose Gaze Will Infants Follow?," Developmental 
Science 1(1998). 
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Theory of Mind 
 
 Agency detection merely distinguishes between agents and objects in the 
environment. The actual attribution of complex mental states like propositional attitudes 
such as belief and desire require a much more elaborate system of social cognition, one 
that is—at least in most respects—unique to human beings. These more complex 
inferences concerning other minds are referred to as mentalizing, mind reading, and 
theory of mind.81
Mentalizing may be the root of our elaborate social nature.  Would there 
be language and discourse without mentalizing?  Would the exquisitely 
coordinated enterprises of cultural life, the structures of love, politics, and 
games, be what they are without participants attending to the mental states 
of others?  Would there be a human sense of morality without an 
understanding of what others experience, of what their lives are or might 
be like?  The notion that mentalizing anchors the fabric of social life partly 
accounts for the profusion of interest in the subject
 While there are many social species, such elaborate mind reading is 
uniquely human and indeed at the very foundation of human culture. As Alvin Goldman 
observes: 
82
 
 
 The development of social cognition and specifically theory of mind follows a 
developmental trajectory that has been the subject of intensive research for the past thirty 
years.83
                                                          
81The scientific study of mentalizing was launched largely as a result of David Premack and Guy 
Woodruff’s important 1978 paper, “Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind.”  
 Such findings are intimately connected with findings concerning agency 
detection discussed in the previous section. Very young babies have important 
expectations concerning faces and hands. Andrew Meltzoff famously demonstrated that 
  
82Alvin I. Goldman, Simulating Minds : The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of 
Mindreading, Philosophy of Mind (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
 
83Examples of this developmental trajectory are from Bloom (2004). 
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infants can already respond to the cues of an experimenter a mere forty minutes from 
birth.84
 Young babies have expectations associated not only with faces but also with 
hands. In one experiment, psychologists presented babies with a display containing two 
different objects; a hand then reaches for one of the objects. The location of the objects is 
then switched. Babies expect that the hand should switch locations, too; however, babies 
do not have this expectation for sticks.
 If the experimenter sticks out his or her tongue, the infant will respond in a 
similar fashion, an impressive fact given the fact that infants have never seen their 
tongues in a mirror but already know that this is the part of their body that corresponds to 
that of the experimenter.   
85
 The gold standard for theory of mind is generally considered to be the ability to 
attribute false belief.
 Significant inferences concerning self and other 
minds begin to surface between the first and second years of life.   
86
                                                          
84A.N. Meltozff and M.K. Moore, "Imitations of Facial and Manual Gestures by Human 
Neonates," Science 198 (1977). 
 The attribution of false belief is tested in a number of 
experimental tasks. Perhaps the most well known task is the so-called “Sally-Ann Task.” 
The scenario for the test is as follows: Sally and Ann are together in a room that contains 
a basket and a box. Sally places her marble inside a basket and leaves the room. While 
she is gone, naughty Ann moves her marble to the box. Sally returns. Where will Sally 
look for the marble?  Three-year-olds fail at this task, saying that she will look in the box. 
 
85Bloom, 15; A.L. Woodward, "Infants Selectively Encode the Goal Object of an Actors Reach," 
Cognition 69 (1998). 
 
86This suggestion concerning the significance of false belief in testing theory of mind was made 
independently by the philosophers Daniel Dennett, Jonathan Bennett, and Gilbert Harman in response to 
Premack and Woodruff’s article, “Does a Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?” 
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Four- and five-year-olds pass the test with much greater frequency, reflecting an ability to 
distinguish between mental representations and reality. This developmental pattern 
continues. The Sally-Ann task tests what has been called first-order theory of mind 
(involving second-order reasoning): “I think she thinks X.” What has been called second-
order theory of mind (involving third-order reasoning): “I think she thinks that I/he/she 
think(s) X,” emerges significantly later, around age seven.87
 The question of how such mentalizing occurs has been the topic of intense debate 
in contemporary cognitive-developmental psychology and philosophy of psychology.  
Theory of mind is frequently used as a synonym for mind reading or mentalizing, but 
theory of mind is itself actually a scientific theory about how mindreading occurs.  
Advocates of this approach argue that mindreading is accomplished primarily by 
theorizing; hence, it is referred to as the theory theory of mindreading. Others argue that 
mindreading is primarily accomplished by putting oneself in another’s shoes, thereby 
simulating the mental states of others. This approach is known as the simulation theory of 
mindreading. 
 
Some of the best evidence for theory of mind and insight into its operation comes 
from studying its absence. It is possible for theory of mind to be highly impaired or not to 
exist at all. A person can have an intact common sense understanding of the world of 
objects with little or no understanding of the social world. Many psychologists and 
neuroscientists understand autism as a form of “mindblindness.”88
                                                          
87See Jesse M. Bering, and  Becky D. Parker, "Children's Attributions of Intentions to an Invisible 
Agent," Developmental Psychology 42, no. 2 (2006). 
 Human beings 
 
88Most importantly Baron-Cohen. 
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typically have the opposite problem of autistics. Human social intelligence overshoots in 
a number of ways, and this is precisely where theory of mind research becomes relevant 
to religion.   
Folk Knowledge and Religious Belief: 
 
Introducing Cognitive Science of Religion 
  
How does religion fit into the explanatory framework of cognitive-developmental 
psychology? Cognitive scientists typically avoid the claim that religious beliefs are 
directly adaptive. They typically understand religion as a by-product of other directly 
adaptive inference systems: folk physics, folk biology, and folk psychology. But the 
question of how exactly religion is a by-product is the subject of significant debate in the 
cognitive science of religion.   
One particular sort of byproduct explanation draws on a strand of cognitive 
anthropology known as cultural epidemiology. As the name implies, cultural 
epidemiologists are concerned with isolating factors that make certain cultural concepts 
contagious and easy to transmit. According to this sort of explanation, religious concepts 
are best understood as minimally counterintuitive concepts. Such concepts are primarily 
cultural creations that exploit key aspects of our cognitive architecture in two important 
ways. First, human beings have certain intuitive expectations concerning the concepts 
OBJECT, ANIMAL, and PERSON based on their folk physical, folk biological, and folk 
psychological inference systems. Minimally counterintuitive concepts become minimally 
counterintuitive by violating exactly one ontological expectation (e.g., Soul/Ghost/Spirit 
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= PERSON + Counterintuitive Physical Properties).89 This makes such concepts 
memorable.  Research on memory has documented that such minimally counterintuitive 
concepts are more readily recalled than maximally counterintuitive concepts or intuitive 
concepts.90
In this version of by-product explanation, religious beliefs are seen primarily as 
explicit cultural creations that draw upon the implicit expectations associated with our 
folk physical, folk biological, and folk psychological inference systems. There is much 
explanatory potential in the notion of minimally counterintuitive concepts, but such an 
approach leaves important questions unanswered. This is particularly true in terms of the 
question of dualism. The framework of “minimally counterintuitive concepts” helps 
explain the transmission of religious concepts, but can it really explain how such 
concepts originated in the first place? Why do dualist religious concepts—e.g., God 
concepts, afterlife beliefs—show up cross culturally?   
  Secondly, while minimally counterintuitive, such concepts can still run on 
the inference system associated with the concept. Thus in this account, we will reason 
about souls/spirits/ghosts in the same way we reason about ordinary persons, barring the 
counterintuitive properties.     
 In recent years another trajectory has emerged in the cognitive science of religion 
that understands certain aspects of religious beliefs as the direct by-product of our 
inference systems, especially folk psychology. In the minimally counter-intuitive 
                                                          
89For discussions of minimally counterintuitive concepts see Atran, In God's We Trust: The 
Evolutionary Landscape of Religion; Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God; Boyer, Religion 
Explained. 
 
90A. Norenzayan and S. Atran, "Cognitive and Emotional Processes in the Cultural Transmission 
of Natural and Nonnatural Beliefs," in The Psychological Foundations of Culture, ed. M. Schaller and C. 
Crandall(Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 2002). 
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understanding, religious beliefs are explicit beliefs that run on implicit inference systems 
such as folk psychology. In this other trajectory, certain foundational aspects of religious 
beliefs are themselves seen as forms of implicit belief/knowledge, that then interact with 
explicit beliefs and knowledge. This line of research has especially focused on the 
tendency to view both the biological and non-biological natural world as designed for a 
purpose and on the tendency for human beings to think in a dualist fashion and believe in 
the continuity of certain psychological functions after death.   
Natural Sources of Religious Dualism III:  
Paul Bloom and Jesse Bering on Folk Psychology and Dualism 
 Until recently, the topic of dualism per se has not figured prominently in 
discussions in the cognitive science of religion. But dualism is central to religion in at 
least two ways: (1) most religions hold dualist or idealist beliefs about human nature and 
its destiny after death, (2) other religious concepts are also premised on a mind-body 
dualism, i.e., God, gods, and spirits are also typically understood as “persons without 
bodies.” Dualism must be at least plausible in order to get religious beliefs off the 
ground. Dualism is essential not only for explaining soul beliefs but for explaining God 
beliefs as well.   
Recent research by the developmental psychologists Paul Bloom and Jesse Bering 
has drawn attention to the role that our cognitive systems play in the production of 
common-sense dualism (a “folk psychology of souls”) and the role of that dualism in the 
production of religious belief. Their research suggests that dualism of a fairly robust sort 
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may in fact be the cognitive default of homo sapiens. This implicit dualism then interacts 
in various ways with different learning channels (e.g., science, religion).   
Thus far we have seen that human beings have a number of distinct cognitive 
systems for navigating physical, biological, and psychological worlds. That these systems 
are separate and distinct was illustrated by conditions like autism where folk physics 
exists independently of a robust folk psychology. Paul Bloom argues that the fact that we 
have two separate cognitive systems for understanding objects and understanding minds 
leads us to see minds/souls and bodies as also separate and distinct.91 As Bloom notes, 
both of these systems are biological adaptations in the human brain working in a cold-
bloodedly rational way to help people anticipate and understand physical and social 
reality. They are like two different computer programs running within the brain 
performing different tasks. Because we have two distinct cognitive systems and because 
they have incommensurable outputs, dualism emerges as an evolutionary by-product or 
accident.92
The previous section showed that that the ability to differentiate agents and 
objects is in place quite early developmentally. There is some evidence that very young 
 We think of human beings as having mind/souls and having bodies.  As in the 
case of folk phenomenology, ideas about folk physics and folk psychology easily lead to 
folk ontology: souls are seen as really distinct from bodies. Folk physics and folk 
psychology are cognitive systems located in the human brain, but we don’t think of them 
that way, we think in terms of bodies and souls.   
                                                          
91Paul Bloom, "Is God an Accident?," The Atlantic Monthly (2005); Paul Bloom, "Religion Is 
Natural," Developmental Science 10, no. 1 (2007). 
 
92Bloom, "Is God an Accident?" 
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infants do not recognize human beings as physical objects at all, and that recognizing 
human beings as partly physical beings may in fact be a developmental accomplishment. 
They may be “superdualists” or idealists. In a study of five-month-olds, Bloom and his 
colleagues Valerie Kuhlmeier and Karen Wynn investigated whether infants apply folk 
physical principles like cohesion, solidity, and continuity to human beings: “do infants 
recognize that, in some cases, the principles they readily apply to inanimate objects also 
apply to humans?”93
It is possible that the dissociation between objects and humans found in 
the present study forms the complement to the distinction between human 
and inanimate objects in terms of social, goal-directed behavior. Together, 
this double dissociation suggests that young infants may have different 
modes of construal for humans versus inanimate objects: humans are 
construed in terms of social and intentional actions, while inanimate 
objects are interpreted via a system sensitive to object physics….The 
existence of this human/inanimate distinction, and the differential 
 Kuhlmeier, Bloom, and Wynn focused specifically on the principle 
of continuity, drawing on research by Elizabeth Spelke and her colleagues demonstrating 
that infants expect continuity with inanimate objects. Infants express surprise when an 
object disappears behind a barrier and then seems to reemerges from behind a non-
adjacent barrier. Kuhlmeier, Bloom, and Wynn performed an experiment that tested 
continuity expectations regarding persons rather than objects. Significantly, they 
discovered that the principle of continuity was not applied to persons; infants were not 
surprised when a human being seemed to violate the law of continuous motion. 
Reflecting on these different expectations concerning objects and persons, Kuhlmeier, 
Bloom, and Wynn write:   
                                                          
93Valerie A. Kuhlmeier, Paul Bloom, and Karen Wynn, "Do 5-Month-Old Infants See Humans as 
Material Objects?," Cognition (2004): 95.   
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application of principles to each, may help infants to define these areas of 
knowledge early in development. The appreciation that these construals 
overlap—that in certain regards, people are just objects—may be a 
developmental accomplishment.94
 
     
 Independent work by developmental psychologists Jesse Bering and Paul Harris 
has opened up interesting lines of research pertaining specifically to dualism and afterlife 
beliefs. The experiments by Bering, Harris and their colleagues all involved scenarios 
involving the death of an agent. Participants were then asked a series of questions 
regarding the continuity of various mental states and biological functions after death. As 
Harris notes, such studies have direct bearing on the question of dualism: 
If children think of the person as an indivisible whole, then whether we 
ask them about bodily processes (e.g. the functions of the eyes or the 
brain) or about concomitant mental processes (e.g. the functioning of sight 
or the mind) they should give consistent replies—claiming either that 
bodily and mental processes have stopped or that both types of process 
continue.  On the other hand, if children are susceptible to dualist 
thinking—to construe mental processes as separate from, and independent 
of bodily processes—then they would likely offer a different pattern of 
replies in the two cases, claiming, for example, that bodily processes no 
longer function whereas mental processes continue.95
 
 
Work by Bering and his collaborators and independent work by Paul Harris and his 
collaborators show that children are much more likely to understand psychological 
functioning continuing at death than biological functioning. This was even true in cases 
where a certain bio-psychological function (e.g., vision) was broken into biological (eyes) 
and psychological (seeing) components. Bering and Bjorklund found that children are 
                                                          
94Ibid., 8. 
 
95Paul L. Harris, and Marta Gimenez, "Children's Acceptance of Conflicting Testimony: The Case 
of Death," Journal of Cognition and Culture 5, no. 1-2 (2005): 7-8 
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much more likely to see the mental process continue than the biological process.96 Harris 
and Marta Gimenez discovered a similar differentiation of mind and body with Catholic 
children in Spain, and Harris and Rita Astuti found a similar pattern working with Vezo 
children in rural Madagascar.97
How far are our conclusions and interpretations consistent with other 
research on afterlife beliefs and their development?  A robust finding, both 
in Study 1 and in the earlier report of Harris and Gimenez (2005), was that 
participants are more likely to acknowledge the continued functioning of 
mental as compared to bodily processes after death.  Bering and his 
colleagues…reported a similar differentiation between mind and body.  
Across several experiments, participants were more likely to assert the 
continued functioning of mental (e.g. feeling desires or emotions) as 
compared to biological (e.g. brain functioning) or psychobiological 
processes (e.g. feeling sick).
 Paul Harris describes the significance of these joint 
findings: 
98
 
 
 The Bering and Harris groups agree that both children and adults are dualists; 
however, there is substantial disagreement between the groups concerning the 
explanation of this dualism. At stake is the issue of how common sense psychological 
and biological knowledge relate to one another and to various learning channels 
(religious, scientific, etc.) during development. Harris and his colleagues are principally 
concerned with how children reason about death in secular and religious contexts and 
favor an explanation of afterlife beliefs that is primarily cultural. Their approach draws 
on Pascal Boyer’s notion that religious beliefs typically involve minimally 
                                                          
96Bering, "The Natural Emergence of Reasoning About the Afterlife as a Developmental 
Regularity." 
 
97Rita Astuti, and Paul Harris, "Understanding Mortality and Life of the Ancestors in Rural 
Madagascar," Cognitive Science 32 (2008). 
 
98Ibid., 736. 
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counterintuitive concepts. Astuti and Harris make the case that a consolidated 
understanding of biological death may in fact contribute to the acquisition of afterlife 
beliefs, precisely because of their counterintuitive nature.99
This counter-intuitive concept explanation is likely part of the story, especially 
where explicit afterlife beliefs are concerned, but a number of questions can be raised 
about this explanatory strategy. First, this explanation states that children (and adults) 
acquire afterlife beliefs through culture. Children and adults are prone to acquire such 
concepts precisely because they violated biological expectations concerning death. The 
minimally-counter intuitive nature of afterlife concepts makes them especially “catchy.” 
This may be a plausible account of how explicit afterlife beliefs are acquired, but it 
leaves unexplained the question of why dualist afterlife beliefs show up within every 
human culture. It does not explain the etiology of afterlife concepts and beliefs 
themselves. How does the notion of a “person without a body” or an immaterial mind 
concept get there in the first place? As Bering notes: 
   
[T]he question remains why individuals the world over represent the 
minds of those who have died to be active at all, since tacit biological 
knowledge of death and agency might just as easily have resulted in the 
complete absence of the concepts ghost, spirit, or afterlife…While cultural 
epidemiologists might presuppose that it is precisely this intuitive 
knowledge of death renders the child susceptible to afterlife concepts… 
this does not solve the very real problem of why specific counterintuitive 
concepts such as those dealing with the afterlife would spontaneously 
happen to appear in nearly all societies to begin with.100
 
 
                                                          
99Ibid. 
 
100Jesse M. Bering, "Intuitive Conceptions of Dead Agents' Minds: The Natural Foundations of 
Afterlife Beliefs as Phenomenological Boundary," Journal of Cognition and Culture 2, no. 4 (2002): 268-
269. 
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Research by Bering sheds some interesting empirical light on these questions, 
suggesting that implicit knowledge may be at work in the formation of afterlife beliefs.  
Bering’s work trades on the distinction between explicit and implicit cognition 
introduced earlier. He is not claiming that explicit beliefs like “the soul goes to heaven 
when you die” are innate, but rather that our innate social cognition biases us toward 
certain kinds of afterlife belief which then interact with various learning channels. 
[I]s it possible that the general idea of an afterlife is not so much 
implanted in people’s heads by way of “exposure” to counterintuitive 
tales, as it is already present, already firmly entrenched in representational 
structures endemic to human cognition, and only then conceptually 
enriched through cultural channels? Can we not scarcely help but believe 
in some form of psychological continuity with the dead?101
 
 
Bering investigates this claim in several experiments. In “Intuitive Conceptions of Dead 
Agents’ Minds: The Natural Foundations of Afterlife Beliefs as Phenomenological 
Boundary,” Bering investigates whether people’s reasoning about the minds of dead 
agents is isomorphic with their explicit beliefs about the afterlife and whether afterlife 
beliefs resemble the minimally counterintuitive template suggested by Pascal Boyer. 
 In Religion Explained, Boyer treats dead agents’ minds as a specific form of 
minimally counterintuitive concept. For Boyer, a religious concept, as minimally 
counterintuitive, “preserves all the relevant default inferences except the ones that are 
explicitly barred by the counterintuitive element.”102
                                                          
101Ibid., 269. 
 He illustrates this with the concept 
of ghost or spirit: 
 
102Boyer, 73. 
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A good illustration is the familiar concept of ghost or spirit. This is found 
more or less the world over, not just in Gothic novels and Victorian 
séances. The concept is that of a PERSON who has counterintuitive 
physical properties. Unlike other persons, ghosts can go through solid 
objects like walls. But notice that apart from this ability, ghosts follow 
very strictly the ordinary intuitive concept of PERSON. Imagine a ghost 
suddenly materializes in your home as you are having dinner. Startled by 
this sudden appearance, you drop your spoon in your plate of soup. In a 
situation like that, your mind creates a whole lot of assumptions of which 
you are not necessarily conscious. For instance, you assume that the ghost 
saw you were having dinner, so she now knows you were eating. Also, the 
ghost probably heard the sound of your spoon landing in the soup and can 
now remember that you dropped it. You assume that the ghost knows you 
are here, since she can see you. It would be unsettling but not too 
surprising if the ghost asked you whether you were enjoying your dinner. 
It would be very weird if she asked you why you never had dinner at home 
or why you never had soup. In other words, you assume that this ghost has 
a mind. All of the italicized verbs above describe the sort of thing a mind 
does: it perceives actual events in the world and forms beliefs on the basis 
of those perceptions.103
 
 
Do people actually represent the minds of dead agents in the manner suggested by 
Boyer? Do they represent minds of dead agents simply according to their explicit beliefs 
about the afterlife? Bering argues against these approaches. “The postulate that ghost is a 
cultural invention may be misguided in that it overlooks the possibility that not only the 
spontaneous inference system triggered by it, but also the very concept itself, has natural 
foundations in the human mind.”104
                                                          
103Ibid., 73-74. 
 This more nativist line of reasoning is not the absurd 
notion that people come ready equipped with the notion that the soul returns to heaven 
when they die. It is rather the notion that such explicit conceptions of the afterlife 
piggyback on more implicit conceptions of afterlife.   
 
104Bering, 269. 
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 Bering argues that these more implicit notions of afterlife are generated largely 
through the operation of theory of mind. This is Bering’s simulation constraint 
hypothesis. As discussed earlier, there is debate among developmental psychologists on 
how mentalizing or mind reading takes place. One account holds that mind reading takes 
places largely through simulation, or putting oneself in the shoes of another person, 
imagining what it is like to be in their particular mental state. According to this account, 
passing false belief tasks involves the children’s ability to put themselves in the shoes of 
another person whose knowledge is different from their own. Simulation thus depends on 
our own conscious experience of “knowing what it is like” to be in certain mental states.  
 Crucial to Bering’s argument is the observation that death places impossible 
constraints on such simulation. We cannot imagine what it is “like” to be dead because 
this involves consciously representing a final state of unconsciousness. Further, 
simulation is not uniform across all mental states. There are some states that it is easier-
to-imagine-the-absence-of (EIA states) than others, difficult-to-imagine-the-absence-of-
states (DIA states). The absence of certain mental states appears readily in our conscious 
experience. We know what it is like not to be hungry or not to see or hear, because such 
mental states are readily switched on and off in our conscious experience. It is much 
more difficult to simulate the absence of thinking or emotion. Based on the fact that it is 
impossible to consciously simulate death (i.e., to consciously simulate permanent non-
consciousness) and that some mental states are easier to imagine the absence of than 
others, Bering hypothesizes that there will be a tendency to project DIA states onto dead 
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agents’ minds. Because we cannot simulate what it is like to be dead, we often attribute 
states that are difficult to imagine being without to dead agents.   
 Bering argues there are factors other than simulation constraints at work in the 
generation of implicit afterlife beliefs. The genesis of afterlife beliefs can also be 
understood through a theory theory approach to mindreading. The essential point is that 
whether one relies on simulation or not, reasoning about dead agents’ minds is a difficult 
task because individuals simply cannot use the same explanatory frame used in the 
regular social domain. According to theory theory, one’s theory of mind is developed by 
testing and refining hypotheses based on the behavior of others. Dead agents’ minds 
present obstacles here as well, because their behavior provides limited information about 
underlying mental states. As Bering notes, the absence of action does not necessarily 
imply the absence of mental states. Young children, for example, tend to attribute mental 
states to agents in a dreamless sleep.105
 Along with these explanations based on simulation and theory approaches to 
mindreading, Bering suggests that another aspect of our social cognition may be 
responsible for the genesis of afterlife beliefs: the off-line character of much of our social 
reasoning.
   
106
                                                          
105Bering, "The Folk Psychology of Souls," 455. 
 Human beings engage in social reasoning not only when others are actually 
present, but in their absence as well. This leads us to assume that the individuals with 
whom we have relationships are engaged in actions even when we cannot directly 
observe them. This extends not only to living agents but to dead agents as well.    
 
106Ibid., 455-465. 
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  Additionally, certain mental states involving external sensory organs seem to us 
more directly connected to biological functioning than, say, thinking or desiring. Such 
perceptual and psychobiological states seem much less ephemeral than thought and 
emotion, which seem to have no obvious connecting to physicality. Since such states 
seem more intimately connected with our biology and physicality, they are more prone to 
become integrated into our folk biological knowledge that death is the end of the 
organism. Mental states with no directly observable connection to our biology/physicality 
will be less prone to such integration.  
 Is this DIA/EIA distinction in fact evident in people’s reasoning about the 
afterlife?  As Bering notes: 
In order for the simulationist model of the “intuitiveness” of belief in life 
after death to be borne out, several hypotheses must be supported. First, if 
indeed DIA states are more resistant to discontinuity reasoning because 
this requires that explicit biological knowledge must deliberately “turn 
off” the default simulation system, then all individuals, no matter their 
professed beliefs on the fate of personal consciousness after death, should 
be more likely to say that DIA states continue after death than they are 
EIA states, where biological knowledge can effectively co-opt the default 
system….In addition, it could be argued on the basis of the predictions 
made by the simulation model that discontinuity response latencies should 
be, in general, longer for DIA than for EIA states, since the former would 
require that reflexive simulation attempts be overwritten by explicit 
biological theorizing to arrive at such responses, reasoning about death in 
full scientific fashion, while the latter employs default simulations.107
 
   
On the other hand, Bering notes that if a “culture only” explanation of afterlife 
beliefs is correct, no differentiation should show up between DIA/EIA in people with 
                                                          
107Bering, "Intuitive Conceptions of Dead Agents' Minds: The Natural Foundations of Afterlife 
Beliefs as Phenomenological Boundary," 274. 
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differing afterlife beliefs.108 People’s understanding of the afterlife will reflect their 
explicitly learned beliefs. For example, an extinctivist will say that all processes stop at 
death. A reincarnationist will say that all processes continue. An immortalist who 
understands the soul to leave the body at death, will understand it in a manner similar to 
Boyerian spirit concepts, as possessing the same mental properties it did before death.109
Bering tested this hypothesis on undergraduate students. The students were 
presented with a story about an individual meeting an unexpected death. Participants 
were then asked questions about the individual in the story and instructed to answer the 
questions seriously. They were also told that there was no right or wrong answer; the 
experimenter was only interested in their opinion.
   
110 All questions were prefaced with 
“Now that he/she is dead…”  Interviews contained questions dealing with the following 
categories: BIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOBIOLOGICAL (Is he still hungry?), 
PERCEPTUAL (Can he see the paramedic trying to resuscitate him?), EPISTEMIC (Is 
he still thinking about his wife?), EMOTIONAL (Is he still angry with his wife?), 
DESIRE (Does he want to be alive?).111
At the very end of the interview (so as not to bias responses), participants were 
asked to classify their explicit afterlife beliefs according to five categories:  
 
Extinctivist: Personal consciousness ceases entirely at death. 
Agnostic: Uncertain as to what becomes of personal consciousness after death. 
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Immortalist: Personal consciousness survives the death of the body and exists  
                       forever. 
Reincarnationist: Personal consciousness is reincarnated into a new body after  
                               death. 
Eclectic: Combination of immortalist and reincarnation classifications. 
Other: Personal consciousness survives the death of the body but uncertain what  
             happens after this.112
 
 
The findings of the experiment support Bering’s hypothesis that factors other than 
explicit knowledge are at work in the formation of afterlife beliefs. All groups of 
participants stated that biological and biopsychological functions ended with death; all 
groups also showed a significant drop in discontinuity responses for the emotional, 
desire, and epistemic categories. The major difference in response patterns occurs 
between agnostics, extinctivists, and all other groups. Agnostics and extinctivists had 
significantly higher discontinuity responses in the emotional, desire, and epistemic 
categories. Significantly, however, these discontinuity responses in those categories were 
not at ceiling. The four other groups produced very high discontinuity responses for 
biological and psychobiological categories; the rate of discontinuity responses dropped 
significantly for the perceptual category, and approached floor levels for the emotion, 
desire, and epistemic categories.   
Such findings are significant because they suggest that dead agent’s minds are 
represented in a manner different from the minimally counterintuitive concept model 
(Spirit = Invisible Person) suggested by Pascal Boyer. As Bering observes: 
In terms of the cognitive underpinnings of religion, contrary to previous 
accounts (cf. Boyer, 2001), most afterlife believers do not represent ghosts 
or spirits simply as invisible human beings, but rather as invisible human 
beings with a narrower range of subjective experience than living agents – 
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experience that is delimited by the inactivation of specific psychological 
systems at death.113
 
  
 The pattern of response offered by reincarnationists and extinctivists also supports 
the hypothesis that more is at work in reasoning about dead agent’s minds than explicit 
beliefs about the afterlife. 
[A]lthough they were the lowest of all, one would have expected the 
reincarnationists to have provided an even lower percentage of 
discontinuity responses for the biological and psychobiological questions 
than they did (83% and 90% respectively), only if to support their stated 
explicit beliefs that “personal consciousness” becomes reincarnated into 
another physical body at some point after death. Likewise, given their 
adamancy on the questionnaires that personal consciousness is 
exhaustively terminated at death, it is somewhat surprising that the 
extinctivists were not at ceiling with discontinuity responses for the DIA 
mental states (i.e., emotional, desire, and epistemic states; 68%, 68%, and 
64% respectively), and in fact were significantly less likely to state that 
epistemic states discontinued after death than they were the two EIA 
states. Theoretically, if explicit (i.e., learned or adopted) beliefs were the 
whole story, reincarnationists should have been at absolute floor for all of 
the questions posed to them, and extinctivists at absolute ceiling.114
 
 
The simulation constraint hypothesis is also borne out in measurements of response 
latencies for the various questions types. Participants required more time to state that DIA 
states did not continue after death than they did for EIA states. 
Bering and his colleagues have also have explored afterlife beliefs in children. If a 
purely cultural account is true, then the youngest children should exhibit the lowest 
number of continuity responses and continuity responses should increase with age. If 
other factors are involved, as the simulation constraint hypothesis suggests, belief in the 
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continuity of mental states should actually decrease with age. In experiments with 
American school children, Bering and David Bjorklund tested two hypotheses: 
[I]f all that were influencing people’s afterlife judgments were mainstream 
cultural beliefs, with increasing age, children should be more likely to 
make attributions of psychological continuation following death because 
of their increasing exposure to cultural norms. 
Our first hypothesis was therefore that people’s judgments about 
the continuity of psychological processes following death should actually 
decrease with increasing age, despite the background of cultural influence 
to the contrary…. 
Our second hypothesis was that these judgments about the 
continuity of psychological processes following death would also vary as a 
function of the nature of the mechanisms under question.115
 
 
Bering and Bjorklund presented students with a narrative in which a mouse is 
eaten by an alligator. The children were then asked a number of questions concerning the 
continuity of the various states introduced earlier: BIOLOGICAL, 
PSYCHOBIOLOGICAL, PERCEPTUAL, EPISTEMIC, EMOTIONAL, DESIRE. In 
experiments with children in the United States and with Catholic and secularly schooled 
children in Spain, Bering and Bjorklund found the same developmental trajectory: 
psychological continuity responses were, in fact, highest for the youngest children and 
decreased with age (Figure 8).116
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 This provides evidence that factors other than explicit 
religious indoctrination are responsible for afterlife beliefs. Bering argues that such a 
decrease is the result of increased biological knowledge and its relationship to 
psychological states. 
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The findings show that older children and adults were, overall, more likely 
to state that both biological imperatives and psychological states ceased at 
death and were more likely to report that particular categories of 
psychological states (i.e. psychobiological and perceptual states) ended at 
death than that other did (i.e. emotional, desire, and epistemic states). In 
contrast the youngest children in the sample, although acknowledging that 
biological imperatives no longer applied to the dead agent, failed to 
distinguish between the different categories of psychological states and 
were just as likely to report that one type of state (e.g. psychobiological) 
continued after death as that another one did (e.g. epistemic). The finding 
may be explained by the implicit nature of the youngest children’s 
knowledge about the biology of death; only after this knowledge has 
become conceptually enriched and made explicit can it be applied when 
reasoning about the psychological states of dead agents. However, even 
when explicit knowledge is in place, reasoning that certain types of 
psychological states (i.e. emotional, desire, and epistemic states) become 
extinguished at death appears difficult. Discontinuity reasoning for these 
types of mental states encounters resistance.117
 
  
As discussed above, Bering offers several explanations of this resistance: 
simulation constrains, the off-line nature of social reasoning, and the ephemeral nature of 
these states. Interestingly, such a pattern was found in both religious and secularly 
schooled children in Spain. The Catholic students had higher levels of continuity 
responses, but followed the same developmental trajectory: the youngest students offered 
the greatest number of continuity responses. In terms of the higher overall continuity 
responses, Bering argues that explicit religious education might in fact reinforce the 
default cognitive stance in the face of explicit biological knowledge. It is in 
understanding the interaction between implicit afterlife beliefs and explicit afterlife 
beliefs acquired through religious indoctrination that the notion of minimally 
counterintuitive concepts becomes helpful. Bering hypothesizes that explicit afterlife 
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beliefs might becomes especially salient precisely because they violate biological 
expectations about death.  
One of the roles served by religious instruction concerning ‘life after 
death’ may be to conceptually enrich a default stance that involves 
attributing mental states to dead agents.  Although the present study did 
not directly test for this, religious pedagogy on the topic of the afterlife 
might serve to quarantine biologically relevant information such that this 
information is not used for theoretical applications concerning the fate of 
agents’ minds after death.  It is important to clarify that we are not arguing 
that biological knowledge among religiously schooled children is more 
impoverished than that of their secularly schooled peers, but only that 
these children may encounter a greater degree of conflict, and hence 
separation between biological verities and their religious beliefs.  As such, 
biological reasoning about the psychological status of dead agents may be 
set aside in favour of explicit religious ideas that defy naturalistic 
principles and that are regularly communicated to these children by adult 
authority figures… Indeed, it may be precisely this disparity between 
biological facts and religious ideas that contributes to the memorability of 
the latter, fostering their cultural transmission to children…This was 
supported by the present data in that, at every age, there were fewer 
Catholic school students who could be classified as consistent cessation 
theorists than there were secular school students who had such a response 
profile.118
  
 
 The cognitive science of dualism is significant not only in shedding light on the 
dualist view of human nature and the afterlife beliefs that many religions share. Such 
dualism is also important in understanding the origin of God concepts and God beliefs. 
God is understood very much on the model of an immaterial person. Without an initial 
sense that minds and bodies are distinct, belief in God would be fundamentally 
unintelligible. As Paul Bloom writes: 
Most significantly for religion, dualism makes it possible to imagine souls 
without bodies. Christianity and Judaism, for instance, involve a God who 
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created the universe, performs miracles, and listens to prayers. He is 
omnipotent and omniscient, possessing infinite kindness, justice, and 
mercy. But he does not, in any literal sense, have a body.119
 
  
But factors other than dualism are involved in the production of God concepts and 
beliefs, most importantly the over-attribution of agency and design and the tendency to 
view events as symbolic communications. 
Natural Sources of Religious Dualism IV: From Dualism to Theism: 
Over Attribution of Agency and Design 
Over Attribution of Agency 
 
It is not difficult to see the implications of agency detection for the study of 
religion. As Justin Barrett notes, agency detection contributes to the formation of 
religious concepts in a number of different ways. It can both contribute to the origin of 
religious beliefs and reinforce and encourage religious beliefs already held.  
Sometimes HADD’s [Hypersensitive Agency Detection Device] tendency 
to attach agency to objects contributes to the formation of religious 
concepts. The most straightforward manner is in identifying some 
ambiguous thing, such as a wispy form as an intentional agent—a ghost.  
With the assistance of face detectors and other tools sensitive to human 
forms, occasionally people see what appear to be humanlike figures 
…Whether the sighting is an illusion or not, if the right information is fed 
to these mental tools, the outcome is a nonreflective belief in a ghost or 
spirit. Without sufficient reflective defenses, this nonreflective belief will 
become a reflective one.120
 
 
However, agency need not be directly attributed to an object. A known object may be 
manipulated or controlled by an intentional agent acting “behind the scenes”: 
                                                          
119Bloom, "Religion is Natural," 149. 
 
120Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God?, 33. 
 
  
144 
HADD’s tendency to find agency in objects contributes to the formation 
of religious concepts in a second manner. Often the objects that HADD 
registers as being agents are known objects. Unlike in the case of spirits, 
HADD may suggest that known nonagents are exhibiting agency. A storm 
cloud might have destroyed one and only one home in a village with hail 
and lightening. Under some conditions, HADD might register the cloud as 
an agent acting purposefully. But a cloud is not an agent… [T]hough 
HADD may have detected an object behaving like an agent, a more salient 
candidate may be attributed responsibility for the action in question. For 
instance, if villagers believe a certain god controls the weather, the storm 
cloud’s apparent agency might be directed by that god against the 
reprobate individual. In these cases, HADD encourages belief in already 
known superhuman agents.121
 
 
Over Attribution of Design 
 
 We are examining the origins of immaterial mind concepts like God and the soul 
and belief in these concepts. One major source of intuitions about the existence of God—
i.e., a divine mind—is design, the sense that the universe as a whole and the organisms in 
it were designed for a purpose. Design arguments are the most commonly cited 
justification for belief in God.122
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 Proposals to teach the so-called “Intelligent Design 
Theory” as part of the biological curriculum in public high schools generated a national 
debate over a century after Darwin. Anthropic “fine tuning” arguments remain popular 
among some very sophisticated thinkers. Important work by the cognitive-developmental 
psychologist Deborah Kelemen indicates that the tendency toward “promiscuous 
teleology” may in fact the cognitive default, a by-product of over-zealous social 
cognition. Theory of mind is naturally extended not only to human beings but to the 
artifacts that human beings create. Research by Kelemen indicates that theory of mind 
 
122See Michael Shermer, How We Believe: Science, Skepticism, and the Search for God (New 
York: Henry Holt, 2000). 
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extends well beyond the world of human beings and their artifacts; it extends to the 
biological and non-biological natural world as well. Kelemen’s research has documented 
children’s tendency to understand objects as existing for a purpose, a bias which she dubs 
“promiscuous teleology.”123 Kelemen’s work along with the independent research of M. 
Evans has also documented children’s tendency to view natural phenomena as 
intentionally created by a non-human agent.124
 Research on teleological reasoning originally occurred in the context of 
discussions of common sense or folk biology. In that context, “studies have discovered 
that children’s reasoning about living things is constrained by teleological assumptions 
from a very early age.”
   
125
[W]hen asked to identify unanswerable questions, American 4- and 5-
year-olds differ from adults by finding the question “what’s this for?” 
appropriate not only to artifacts and body parts, but also to whole living 
things like lions (“to go in the zoo”) and nonliving natural kinds like 
clouds (“for raining”)…. 
 Kelemen’s work is significant in finding that children apply 
such teleological reasoning to the non-biological natural world as well.    
These kinds of promiscuous teleological intuitions persist into 
elementary school, particularly in relation to object properties. For 
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instance, when asked to conduct a “science” task” and decide whether 
prehistoric rocks were pointy because of a physical process (e.g., “bits of 
stuff piled up for a long period of time”) or because they performed a 
function, American 7- and 8-year-olds, unlike adults, preferred 
teleological explanations whether they invoked “self-survival” functions 
(e.g. “so that animals wouldn’t sit on them and smash them”) or “artifact” 
functions (e.g. so that animals could scratch on them when they got itchy”) 
(Kelemen, 1999c).126
 
  
 Where do such teleological explanations come from? A culture-only explanation 
suggests itself. American children are teleologists because American culture is saturated 
with theism and theism of a very creationist sort. Kelemen argues against this 
explanation. The bias toward teleological reasoning in American children has been 
replicated in the much more secular context of Great Britain.127 More significantly, 
independent work by M. Evans found that children from both fundamentalist and non-
fundamentalist homes show a bias toward “creationist” accounts of how species 
originate.128 Kelemen argues that such teleological and creationist reasoning may be the 
by-product of our over-active social cognition: “Perhaps children’s generalized 
attributions of purpose are, essentially, side effects of a socially intelligent mind and is, 
therefore, oriented toward  explanations characterizing nature as an intentionally 
designed artifact—an orientation given further support by the artifact-saturated context of 
human cultures.129
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 This “intuitive theism” or “theism as by-product” thesis—that children make 
sense of the natural world in terms of a “somebody who designed them for a purpose” 
depends on several prerequisites being in place. (1) The capacity to maintain a mental 
representation of such an agent despite its intangibility, (2) the ability to attribute to that 
special agent mental states distinguishing it from more commonplace agents, (3) the 
ability to attribute design intentions to agents and understand an objects’ purpose as 
deriving from such intentions.130
 In terms of the first prerequisite, children’s tendency to form imaginary 
relationships is indicative of their ability to reason about invisible individuals.
 Kelemen argues that all three prerequisites are in place 
around age five, thus bolstering her case for intuitive theism.   
131 Recent 
research has also highlighted children’s ability to distinguish between God and other 
agents when attributing mental states. Justin Barrett and his colleagues devised an 
experiment to test this, drawing on the shift between three- and five-year olds ability to 
pass false belief tasks.132
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 Barrett and his colleagues used a standard form of the test. 
Children were shown a cracker box and asked what it contained and then allowed to look 
inside the box, seeing that the cracker box actually contained pebbles. The children were 
then asked what would someone (who had not been shown) believe was in the box. They 
were then asked what God would believe. Three-year-olds answered pebbles in both 
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cases: a true response in the case of God and a false response in the case of human 
beings. Interestingly, the older children understood that human beings would have a false 
belief and answer “crackers,” but even with this understanding of false beliefs in place, 
they answered “peebles” for God, showing a distinction between the mental states of God 
(where representation is reality) and human beings (where representation and reality may 
be distinct). These findings suggest that around five-years of age children have the ability 
to distinguish between human beings and God when attributing mental states. Kelemen 
also found evidence for the presence of the third prerequisite—the understanding of 
artifacts and design: 
[A]n underlying developmental pattern does emerge across all of these 
studies.  With some reliability, the findings suggest that beginning 
sometime around the kindergarten period, children adopt a design-based 
teleological view of objects with increasing consistency. In light of this 
work, and earlier described research on children’s reasoning about 
nonnatural agent’s mental states, the proposal that children might be 
intuitive theists becomes increasingly viable.133
 
 
Such findings, of course, have a significance that extends far beyond childhood.  
Kelemen argues that this teleological stance is likely to remain the cognitive default: “If, 
as suggested here, the tendency to think in teleological quasi-artifact terms is a side effect 
of human mental design (and pan-cultural experience with artifacts) rather than 
socialization, it is likely to remain as a default explanatory strategy throughout life, even 
as other explanations are elaborated.”134
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reductionist” terms is a relatively recent development and “contemporary adults are still 
surprisingly bad at it.”135 Studies also indicate that college age students will use 
teleological explanations outside of scientific contexts. Finally, research with 
scientifically uneducated Romanian Gypsy adults has found that they have promiscuous 
teleological intuitions much like scientifically naïve British and American elementary-
school children.136
Second-Order Theory of Mind and Symbolic Communication 
 
We have been examining naturalistic sources of dualism, and it was argued that 
such dualism is relevant not only in understanding soul concepts but in understanding the 
genesis of God concepts as well. However, God concepts are not merely “big soul” 
concepts; other factors alongside dualism contribute to the formation of God concepts.  
Hyperactive agency detection leads us to see “faces in the clouds.” Theory of mind leads 
us to over-attribute purpose and design to the biological and non-biological natural world.  
But surely other notions are important as well. One important distinction between soul 
concepts and God concepts is epistemic. It is a truism that human beings have limited 
knowledge; this is especially true in the social sphere. Human beings seem to enjoy a 
kind of privileged access to their own mental states, whereas the mental states of other 
can only be inferred indirectly (vis-à-vis theory of mind). The limited knowledge of 
human beings stands in contrast to the omniscience characteristic of God concepts and 
other supernatural concepts. A central aspect of this omniscience is the notion that 
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supernatural agents also enjoy privileged access to the mental states of human beings. As 
Jesse Bering and Dominic Johnson write: 
A central component of religious systems are concepts of supernatural 
agents that have privileged access to the self’s mental states. Religious 
scholars would be hard pressed to find a religious system that does not 
have within its ranks some supernatural agent that, among other 
impressive facts, is envisioned as knowing rather than merely inferring 
from behavior the self’s true intention.   
 
Whereas deception is possible with human beings—one can withhold strategic 
information from them—it is not possible with God. God is a “full access strategic 
agent,” as Pascal Boyer puts it.   
 Now, the notion of privileged access goes hand in hand with the idea that God 
symbolically communicates through various positive or negative events. As Bering and 
Johnson write: “Moralizing gods can only find their way into large social groups insofar 
as individuals are capable of envisioning these gods as enforcing their morals through the 
occurrence of positive and negative events. A moralizing god who fails to ‘communicate’ 
with its followers would not be a very effective one.”137
Attributing communicative intent is even more complex than agency detection 
and more complex than design attribution. Jesse Bering has convincingly argued that 
understanding events as symbolic communication requires having second order theory of 
mind in place, i.e., “knowing that God knows that I know/desire/etc. X.” “We argue, it is 
only with the appearance of second-order theory of mind that the child begins to see the 
natural events occurring in his life as meaningful, or more specifically, as symbolic and 
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declarative of an abstract intentional agent’s desire to share social information with 
him.”138
 Bering and his colleague Dorothy Parker tested this developmental claim on 
children aged 3-9. In this experiment, children played a forced choice game, where they 
had to guess which of two boxes contained a hidden ball. The children were to guess the 
location of the ball by placing their hand on the top of the box they believed contained 
the ball. The children were informed that an invisible agent (Princess Alice) would help 
them play by “telling them, somehow, when they chose the wrong box.”
 
139 An 
experimenter would trigger an unexpected event (lights flashing on and off or a picture 
falling from the wall) and children’s response to the event was coded. Only the oldest 
children reported declarative agentive responses—an unexpected event intentionally 
caused by an agent to communicate symbolic intent.140 Middle aged children saw the 
unexpected events as caused by Princess Alice without communicative intent. The 
youngest children offered purely physical explanations.141
Bering’s research indicates that the cognitive capacities that play a role in 
generating various religious representations like soul and God concepts develop at 
different stages. With intuitive dualism and afterlife beliefs this occurs quite early. This 
intuitive dualism likely plays an important role in the construction of God and spirit 
concepts, as both concepts involve the notion of “a person/mind without a body.”  
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However, God and spirit concepts are more than simply persons without bodies; they are 
persons without bodies who both create and/or communicate. Entertaining such notions 
involves the capacity to see the natural world and items in the natural world as created for 
a purpose, and seeing certain events as symbolic communications. These features likely 
emerge at a somewhat later developmental stage as by-products of first and second order 
theory of mind. 
Conclusion 
 The goal of this chapter was to provide a naturalistic explanation of the cross-
cultural ubiquity of dualism. Such an explanation is part of the burden of proof for 
naturalists; they have to show not only that dualism is false; they also have to provide a 
compelling explanation of dualism. This chapter was an exercise in such explanation. It 
provided naturalistic explanations of dualism both on the levels of neuroscience and 
cognitive science.   
In terms of neuroscience, it was shown that one major source of dualist intuitions 
concerns our folk phenomenology: this folk phenomenology generates both “out-of-
brain” and “out-of-body” experiences. Such experiences are real and vivid enough, but 
can be explained in entirely naturalistic terms in light of the notions of a transparent 
phenomenal self model and bodily self-representation. In terms of cognitive science, it 
was shown that dualism emerges as an evolutionary by-product of other directly adaptive 
inference systems: folk physics, folk biology, and folk psychology. Dualism emerges as a 
consequence of the fact that we have two different inference systems for reasoning about 
social reality and reasoning about physical reality and from the fact that some mental 
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states are easier to imagine being without than other mental states. The fact that dualism 
comes so naturally to human beings also contributes to the genesis of other supernatural 
concepts like god concepts. Here dualism couples with another by-product of human 
cognition, the tendency to over-attribute agency and design. The promiscuous nature of 
agency detection and theory of mind lead us to see “faces in the clouds,” to see biological 
and non biological natural world as designed for a purpose, and to see events as symbolic 
communications.   
The purpose of Chapters One and Chapter Two was to examine the implications 
of contemporary neuroscience, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind for our 
understanding of ourselves and our understanding of religion. Its fundamental argument 
is that the biggest implication of the contemporary science and philosophy of the mind-
brain is that it calls into question mind-body dualism: the notion that a self can exist 
without a body, that there can in fact be Swinburnian “persons without bodies.” Chapter 
One was largely concerned with arguing for the truth of this position. However, 
contemporary neuroscience and cognitive science not only call into question mind-body 
dualism, they also have begun to offer compelling explanations as to why we almost 
inevitably think in dualist categories. Chapter Two argued that contemporary mind 
science is in fact well positioned to explain the natural sources of the dualist self. Having 
made this argument, the dissertation will address the implications of these for religion. 
This is the focus of Chapter Three.
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 BIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION AND THE TRUTH OF RELIGIOUS  
 
DUALISM 
 
Recap: Why Mind-Brain Science Matters for the Study of Religion 
 This dissertation began with the claim that scientific and philosophical work on 
consciousness and the conscious self is essential for the academic study of religion, 
particularly aspects of the academic study of religion involving the intersection of 
religion and science. Many religious traditions are rooted in strong forms of mind-body 
dualism, where consciousness and the conscious self are seen as distinct from brains and 
bodies, and capable of existing independently of them. Religious dualism is typically a 
two-fold dualism. Not only are human beings understood in a dualist manner, but all of 
reality is seen as grounded in some sort of immaterial mind or consciousness.   
Chapters One and Two investigated the truth of such dualist claims about human 
persons and also explored how such dualist beliefs (including dualist religious beliefs) are 
generated. This chapter turns more explicitly to matters of religion. In particular, it is 
concerned to address the following question. Given the demise of dualism as a doctrine 
about human persons and the explanatory power of a naturalistic account of dualism, is 
any form of religious dualism a viable intellectual option today? This chapter argues that 
religious dualism is no longer a viable option. One seeking to integrate the claims of 
religion and science should thus look elsewhere.  
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The overall argument structure of the dissertation might be diagramed as follows:   
RELIGIONCONSCIOUSNESS/CONSCIOUS SELF MIND SCIENCE 
     Christianity                         “THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM”   
       Buddhism                           “BRAIN-CONSCIOUSNESS PROBLEM”  
 (Dualism vs. Naturalism)                                         
                               
Chapters One and Two focused primarily on human minds, specifically, the 
impact of the mind sciences on the contemporary mind-body problem or the problem of 
consciousness.   
CONSCIOUSNESS/CONSCIOUS SELF MIND SCIENCE 
                                   “THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM”          
           “BRAIN-CONSCIOUSNESS PROBEM “       
                                             (Dualism vs. Naturalism)                                         
                               
Chapters One and Two argued that contemporary mind science calls into question 
dualist claims about consciousness while simultaneously explaining their origin in human 
thought.  Chapter One presented the debate between dualism and naturalism as a debate 
about the adequacy of bio-psychological explanation of consciousness, and argued that 
principled dualist and mysterian objections to a scientific, bio-psychological explanation 
of consciousness are simply not compelling. Such claims are rooted in inadequate 
deductive criteria of explanation and reduction, and, as such, fail to appreciate the 
resources a naturalistic, bio-psychological framework has for taking the subjectivity of 
consciousness seriously. The mind-body problem, or, more specifically, the brain-
consciousness problem, was resolved in favor of a neurophilosophical, inflationist form 
of naturalism. Chapter Two then argued that the contemporary mind sciences not only 
call dualism into question, they also help explain the genesis of robust dualist intuitions 
in human thought.   
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Chapter One and Chapter Two also corrected methodological misconceptions that 
naturalism is often saddled with. Naturalism does not entail a deflationist reduction of 
phenomena like phenomenal consciousness, nor does it entail a collapsing of all higher-
level disciplines into biology, much less physics. What naturalism does rule out are 
claims about the ontological independence of consciousness and claims about the 
methodological independence of higher level disciplines such as the humanities and 
social sciences. Thus we have addressed the debate between dualism and naturalism 
concerning human minds and in the process corrected some methodological worries 
about naturalism. 
 If these arguments have been successful, there is every reason to be skeptical 
about dualism as a doctrine about human persons. What sort of implications does this 
have for religion? This is the central issue in the current chapter of this dissertation. We 
are now moving from questions about mind science and the mind-body problem to 
explicitly address matters of religion. 
RELIGIONCONSCIOUSNESS/CONSCIOUS SELF MIND SCIENCE 
                             Ch. 3                  “THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM”       Ch. 1-2      
                                                          “BRAIN-CONSCIOUSNESS PROBLEM”                                                                                                                 
 
Religious dualism was introduced in the beginning of the first chapter. Chapters 
One and Two then offered a philosophical and scientific critique and explanation of 
dualism. The truth of dualism as a philosophical thesis about consciousness was called 
into question in Chapter One, and Chapter Two offered a naturalistic explanation of the 
ubiquity of mind-dualism. This Chapter explicitly explores the implications of the 
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conclusions of Chapter One and Chapter Two for religious dualist claims with the 
Christian and Buddhist traditions.   
In the first section, I establish the intimate link between dualism and theism 
through an analysis of classical theism. I argue that classical theists are right that the 
rejection of dualism has some fairly significant theological fallout, but they are wrong in 
thinking that substance dualism can be saved as a doctrine about human persons. 
Classical dualists rely on a priori philosophical arguments that were shown to be 
unsuccessful, and their work fails to make any significant contact with actual work in the 
mind sciences. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to an analysis of attempts to 
integrate religion and the mind sciences.   
Many Christian theologians interested in “religion and science” deny dualism as a 
doctrine about human persons while seeking to preserve a dualist doctrine of God. I 
consider what is perhaps the most sophisticated version of this position—Philip Clayton’s 
synthesis of emergentism and theism. Claims about immaterial minds and consciousness 
surface not only in the dialogue between Christianity and science but in the Buddhist- 
mind science dialogue as well. I conclude the chapter with a consideration B. Alan 
Wallace’s attempt to integrate Buddhism and mind science through his “contemplative 
science” project. 
Dualism and Classical Theism 
There are very significant links between dualism and theistic belief. The aim of 
this section is to make this link explicit. Theistic religious traditions frequently endorse a 
dualist understanding of human nature. In particular, within Christian theism, a dualist 
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understanding of human nature certainly figures prominently. This is perhaps most 
apparent in matters of eschatology and afterlife beliefs. Contemporary theologians like to 
remind people that Christian teaching involves resurrection of the body rather than 
immortality of the soul, but this is surely a false dichotomy.1
In general, I think the Christian understanding of the afterlife is best 
served by assuming a dualist view of human nature.  It is widely believed 
in the Christian tradition that persons exist after the destruction of their 
body and that, at the resurrection, they will receive either a new 
embodiment or an embodiment that is constituted by their reconfigured, 
transformed earlier body.  The personal life between death and 
resurrection is often thought of as either disembodied or as some 
intermediary embodiment…These scenarios all assume some form of 
dualism, for if materialism is true and the person is her body, then the 
annihilation of the body entails the annihilation of the person.
 Perhaps the majority of the 
ecumenical Christian tradition has held a view that combines the notions of the 
immortality of the soul and resurrection of the body. As Charles Taliaferro notes: 
2
 
 
John Cooper is forthright about the consequences of a rejection of dualism for this aspect 
of Christian belief: 
Many in the academic community have taken a clear position on the body-
soul question which they continue to assert with conviction. And if what 
they are saying is true, then two disturbing conclusions immediately 
follow. First, a doctrine affirmed by most of the Christian Church from the 
beginning is false. A second consequence is more personal and 
existential—what millions of Christians believe will happen to them when 
they die is also a delusion…If souls are not the sort of thing which can be 
broken loose from bodies, then we do not actually exist between death and 
                                                          
1The contrast between immortality of the soul and resurrection of the body was first made explicit 
by the German biblical scholar, Oscar Cullman in his 1956 article, “Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection 
of the Dead.”  Since then, a number of scholars have called into question the sharp distinction between 
Greco-Roman and Hebraic thought found in Cullman’s writings. Nonetheless, such distinctions enjoy a 
great deal of prominence in theological discussions. 
 
2Charles Taliaferro, Consciousness and the Mind of God (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 245. 
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resurrection, either with Christ or somewhere else, either consciously or 
unconsciously.3
 
 
Much more is at stake with the issue of dualism than matters of eschatology.  
There exists an intimate link between dualist notion of human persons and the conception 
of God within classical theism. Theism, in fact, is a form of dualism and also functions as 
the explanation of dualism regarding human persons. Dualism as a doctrine about human 
nature thus has very significant bearing on fundamental issues concerning the nature and 
existence of God. Maurice Schouten describes this link well: 
In classical theism, the (personal) properties we typically ascribe to our 
fellow human beings and to ourselves are projected onto God. Thus, the 
view of God is modeled after the dualist image of humanity. God is seen 
as an incorporeal personlike being with perfectly rational and conscious 
thought who intervenes in the material world on the basis of knowledge, 
and all of this without bodily features. God listens, hears, sees, believes, 
knows, wants, and so forth—but all without ears, eyes, a mouth, or a 
cerebral cortex. And this image comports nicely with the traditional 
picture of ourselves according to which the spiritual part of the human 
agent directs its bodily part and acts out into the material world he or she 
is surrounded by.4
 
 
Theism thus depends on dualism to secure a notion of immaterial personhood, a 
notion of God as a “person without a body.” As Charles Taliaferro puts it, 
In western tradition God is typically conceived of as an immaterial, 
spiritual being. God is a nonphysical, powerful, intentional agent present 
throughout the cosmos without being identical with it or with some 
material object in it…If a materialist view of the cosmos, according to 
which all of reality is fundamentally physical, is correct, then the 
traditional understanding of God is incorrect.5
                                                          
3John Cooper, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism 
Debate (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 1. 
 
 
4Maurice K.D. Schouten, "Theism, Dualism, and the Scientific Image of Humanity," Zygon 36, 
no. 4 (1991), 683. 
 
5Taliaferro, 2. 
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Taliaferro is, of course, aware that God is not a super soul or as he puts it a “super homo 
sapiens,” but he also has the awareness that theism involves making analogical 
predications based on human cognition and that such predications cannot get off the 
ground given a naturalist view of the human person: 
In the great monotheistic religious traditions, God is not, of course, 
depicted with precisely the same attributes as created persons; God is not a 
super homo sapiens. And at important junctures in the development of 
these religions, theists have gone to great lengths to insist that God differs 
from us in that God is eternal; while we are temporal; God is not made up 
of parts, we are; God has no sense organs, we do; God creates galaxies 
from nothing, we only shape things that already exist; God is without 
origin and incorruptible, we are neither. In the central conviction that God 
exists necessarily, while we exist only contingently it might appear that 
the God of classical theism resembles abstract propositions like “7+5=12” 
which are necessarily true far more than God resembles us. But God is 
also believed to know about the world, to be an all-good agent, to reshape 
things which already exist, to love the cosmos. Theists will diverge on 
how to understand these features as ascribed to God, but it is evident that 
these ascriptions make up central items in the folk-psychological 
framework that is under attack in much contemporary philosophy. Theists 
refine terms like “intelligence,” “agency,” and “emotions” as applied to 
God, but surely the theistic enterprise requires that we have some 
conceptual handle on our own intelligence, agency, and emotions before 
religious refining can take place. And if…materialism…holds sway, it is 
difficult to see how such theistic refining can even get started.6
 
  
A dualist doctrine of the human person is intimately related not just to questions 
concerning the nature of God but also to questions concerning God’s existence. A dualist 
doctrine of the human person must explain how an immaterial human mind or soul could 
originate and then become conjoined with a particular body. Theism has thus also served 
as the explanation for a dualist notion of human persons; divine consciousness explains 
human consciousness. This finds expression in notions of God as the direct creator of the 
                                                          
6Ibid., 5-6. 
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human soul and in attempts to argue from the fact of human consciousness to the 
existence of God.  
Roman Catholic intellectuals frequently like to point out that Catholicism is 
completely compatible with the theory of evolution. They frequently point with approval 
to Pope John Paul II’s 1996 address to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, “Truth 
Cannot Contradict Truth.” In this address John Paul goes beyond Pope Pius XII’s 
statement of compatibility in his 1950 encyclical Humani Generis, and proclaims that a 
half century of evidence leads to the conclusion that evolution is “more than a 
hypothesis”: 
Today, almost half a century after the publication of the encyclical 
[Humani Generis], new knowledge has led to the recognition of the theory 
of evolution as more than a hypothesis. It is indeed remarkable that this 
theory has been progressively accepted by researchers, following a series 
of discoveries in various fields of knowledge. The convergence, neither 
sought nor fabricated, of the results of work that was conducted 
independently is in itself a significant argument in favor of this theory.7
 
 
But, it is important to note that the former pope is speaking of the evolution of the body.  
The mental life of human beings, i.e. the soul, must be understood as directly created by 
God: 
The Church's magisterium is directly concerned with the question of 
evolution, for it involves the conception of man: Revelation teaches us that 
he was created in the image and likeness of God (cf. Gn 1:27-29). The 
conciliar constitution Gaudium et Spes has magnificently explained this 
doctrine, which is pivotal to Christian thought. It recalled that man is "the 
only creature on earth that God has wanted for its own sake" (No. 24). In 
other terms, the human individual cannot be subordinated as a pure means 
or a pure instrument, either to the species or to society; he has value per 
se. He is a person. With his intellect and his will, he is capable of forming 
                                                          
7John Paul II, "Truth Cannot Contradict Truth," (1996). Retrieved from: 
http://www.newadvent.org/library/docs_jp02tc.htm (accessed 10/10/09). 
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a relationship of communion, solidarity and self-giving with his peers. St. 
Thomas observes that man's likeness to God resides especially in his 
speculative intellect, for his relationship with the object of his knowledge 
resembles God's relationship with what he has created (Summa 
Theologica I-II:3:5, ad 1). But even more, man is called to enter into a 
relationship of knowledge and love with God himself, a relationship which 
will find its complete fulfillment beyond time, in eternity. All the depth 
and grandeur of this vocation are revealed to us in the mystery of the risen 
Christ (cf. Gaudium et Spes, 22). It is by virtue of his spiritual soul that the 
whole person possesses such a dignity even in his body. Pius XII stressed 
this essential point: If the human body takes its origin from pre-existent 
living matter, the spiritual soul is immediately created by God. 
Consequently, theories of evolution which, in accordance with the 
philosophies inspiring them, consider the spirit as emerging from the 
forces of living matter or as a mere epiphenomenon of this matter, are 
incompatible with the truth about man. Nor are they able to ground the 
dignity of the person.8
 
 
As claims about God as creator of the cosmos find expression in cosmological 
arguments, claims about God as the direct creator of the soul find expression in 
arguments from consciousness. Such arguments date back at least to John Locke and 
have recently been revived by Richard Swinburne, Robert Adams, and J.P. Moreland. 
Swinburne, for example, argues that while science cannot explain the relationship 
between the objective brains and subjective selves, theism can: 
But theism can provide an explanation of these things. God, being 
omnipotent, is able to join souls to bodies. He can cause there to be the 
particular brain event-mental event connections which there are. He can 
do this by causing molecules when formed into brains to have powers to 
produce mental events in souls to which they are connected, and the 
liabilities to execute the purposes of such connected souls (new powers 
and liabilities not deriving from the ordinary ones which chemistry 
analyses). And he can make the souls in the first place and choose to 
which brain (and so body), each soul is to be connected when foetal brain 
events require a soul to be connected to the brain.9
                                                          
8Ibid. 
 
 
9Richard Swinburne, Is There a God? (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1996), 90. 
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J.P. Moreland nicely outlines the premises of the “argument from consciousness” 
taken as a straightforward deductive argument: 
(1) Mental events are genuine non-physical mental entities that exist. 
(2) Specific mental event types are regularly correlated with specific 
physical event types. 
(3) There is an explanation for these correlations. 
(4) Personal explanation is different from natural scientific explanation 
(5) The explanation for these correlations is either a personal or natural 
scientific explanation. 
(6) The explanation is not a natural scientific one. 
(7) Therefore, the explanation is a personal one. 
(8) If the explanation is personal, then it is theistic. 
(9) Therefore, explanation is theistic.10
 
 
All of these arguments are premised upon very strong forms of substance dualism, and, as 
such, rest on very strong versions of the Correlation Claim introduced in Chapter One: 
the claim that the relationship of mind and brain can only be understood in terms of 
correlation and not identity. 
All dualists hold the Correlation Claim and thus deny mind-brain identity, but 
body-soul dualists deny even the dependence/supervenience of the human mind/soul on 
the brain (indeed they must in order to claim God as the direct creator of the soul and 
preserve the argument from consciousness). Classical theists who are also substance 
dualists thus hold not only the Correlation Claim but the more robust No Neural 
Correlates Claim for both the soul and for God: Consciousness or the conscious self is 
capable of existing without any neural or physical correlates (e.g., the post-mortem soul, 
God, substrate consciousness).  
                                                          
10J.P. Moreland, Consciousness and the Existence of God (London: Routledge, 2008), 37. 
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In short, classical religious dualists recognize the intimate link between substance 
dualism and theism and recognize how even mild versions of mind-brain dependency/ 
supervenience compromise theism. Philip Clayton, a theologian who rejects substance 
dualism in favor of an emergentist doctrine of the human person, also expresses this 
worry: 
[T]he case for emergent mental causation is not by itself a case for the 
existence of God, divine action, an eternal soul, or life after death; it is not 
directly a theological conclusion at all. Indeed, in some ways it might 
seem to be an anti-theological conclusion, because it understands mental 
phenomena to be “of a piece” with physical phenomena, and because the 
supervenience relationship asserts a dependence of the mental life on its 
physical basis—indeed a high correlation between physical causes and 
mental effects—which is on the surface inconsistent with many parts of 
Christian teaching.11
 
 
What is significant to note is that the arguments of Chapter One called into 
question even mild versions of the correlation claim, as expressed in emergentist and 
property dualist positions. If property dualism is untenable, substance dualism is a fortiori 
untenable. The strongest arguments for property dualism are knowledge arguments and 
modal arguments that attempt to show that conscious mental properties cannot be 
physical properties and that the mind-brain relation can only be understood in terms of 
correlation and not identity. 
  Chapter One considered in some detail knowledge and modal arguments proposed 
by Thomas Nagel, Saul Kripke, Joseph Levine, Frank Jackson, and David Chalmers. The 
flaw of such arguments rests on a failure to understand the incompleteness of our 
                                                          
11Philip Clayton, "Neuroscience, the Person, and God: An Emergentist Account," in Neuroscience 
and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. Nancey Murphy Robert John Russell, Theo C. 
Meyering, Michael A. Arbib (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Publications, 2002), 206. 
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concepts linking consciousness and the brain, a failure to appreciate the resources 
naturalism/physicalism has for accommodating subjectivity, and from inadequate 
deductive criteria of explanation. Chapter One went on to defend an inflationist 
naturalistic account of consciousness in the philosophy of mind, and explanatory 
pluralism and mechanistic explanation in the philosophy of psychology and biology. It 
was then shown how the hard problem of consciousness could be pursued in an 
empirically tractable manner. Chapter Two then offered a fully naturalistic account of 
dualist “intuitions of distinctness.”   
A number of neurological and psychological factors contribute to our dualist 
intuitions. We do not directly sense the brain; certain mental states are more intimately 
connected with the body than others. Brain states are also unique in nature in that they are 
both perspectival and transparent. Brain states are unique in that they can be experienced 
from both a first person and a third person perspective: subjectively and objectively. 
Subjective physical facts are just objective physical facts experienced by a particular 
organism. I can experience the phenomenal level in my brain from a first person and third 
person perspective. Such first person facts do not seem very brainy, due to the 
transparency of consciousness, the fact that “the brain is not about itself”;12
                                                          
12See Todd Feinberg, Altered Egos: How the Brain Creates the Self (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001). 
 it is a form of 
“virtual reality” generated by the brain that seems to take us out of the brain and place us 
in immediate contact with reality. For these reasons, dualist thinking comes fairly easily 
to us, but it ultimately is not true.   
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Is this a definitive disproof of dualism? No, but arguments based on consciousness 
are widely seen as the strongest weapons in the dualist arsenal. But dualist arguments 
about correlation fail to work; moreover dualism fails to cohere well with the physics, 
biology, and neuroscience constraints discussed earlier. Dramatic alterations in conscious 
phenomenology and the phenomenal self can be attributed to specific regions in the brain, 
the dualist owes us an explanation of how the self can be so fundamentally affected by 
minor alterations in the brain and yet remain ontologically independent of it. The 
question of how the conscious self evolved remains a vexed question, but researchers 
assume that consciousness evolved and have offered educated guesses as to its selective 
function. The dualist owes us an answer as to how these approaches are inadequate and 
needs to provide a better constructive alternative. If the soul is directly created by God, 
when exactly did this process occur—with australopithecines? With the appearance of the 
genus homo? When indeed.  
Even more pressing is the question of how dualists might account for mental 
causation without violating conservation laws. Theistic substance dualists—apart from 
occasionalists—also typically want to affirm causal interaction between the mental and 
the physical. It seems obvious that consciousness mental occurrences have physical 
effects in the world, but conservation laws and the principle of the causal closure of the 
physical place great constraints on how one thinks about such causation. Interactionist 
dualism was jettisoned by Descartes’ contemporaries Malebranche and Leibniz precisely 
for this reason, and the most prominent defenders of dualism today also reject 
interactionist dualism. Note that if a version of identity theory like the one defended in 
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Chapter One is true, the problem of mental causation is saved as a species of physical 
causation. Naturalism can fully account for the subjectivity of consciousness and offer 
the most plausible account of mental causation. 
The conclusion of all of this is that body-soul dualism is simply no longer a 
compelling position, but substance dualists are fundamentally correct in noting the 
significant link between dualism and theism. Dualism and theism are so intimately linked 
that it would seem that the collapse of mind-body dualism has rather dire consequences 
for religion, particularly with regard to claims about God as a “person without a body.” 
But might it be possible to reject dualism as a doctrine about human persons while 
defending a dualist doctrine of God?  Such a position has in fact become increasingly 
common, especially with Christian philosophers and theologians concerned with 
engaging the mind sciences and analytic philosophy of mind. Those defending such a 
position are placed in the awkward position of affirming a downward dependence of 
human minds on brain but denying that transcendent mind is downwardly dependent too. 
An awkward position, however, is not an impossible position and the next section 
considers a sophisticated attempt to combine an emergentist doctrine of the human person 
with a dualist doctrine of God. 
Emergentism and Theism: Philip Clayton 
 The previous section discussed the intimate connection between dualism, theism, 
and key Christian beliefs. The point of this section was to note that the demise of dualism 
in the philosophy of mind has fairly significant consequences for Christian theology as 
traditionally conceived. It is not just that one kind of argument for the existence of God 
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has been cut off. Rather, the more disturbing question is raised as to why dualism should 
be pursued at the theological level if it makes no sense at the level of human beings. The 
notion of God as a “person without a body” becomes much less intelligible when body-
soul dualism about human beings collapses, and when one can offer naturalistic accounts 
of the mechanisms that lead human beings to think in dualistic terms. The Christian 
theologian is faced with quite a dilemma. One can either  continue to affirm body-soul 
dualism and traditional afterlife beliefs at the high cost of rejecting a great deal of 
scientific and philosophical evidence, or one can accept the philosophical and scientific 
evidence and reject some of the most foundational truth claims in the Christian tradition.    
Many theologians simply choose to ignore the philosophical challenges posed by 
the mind sciences or minimize the significance of these challenges to theology. Philip 
Clayton is a notable exception. Clayton has extensively engaged issues concerning 
religion and the mind sciences and is well aware of the pressures that the mind sciences 
put on theology. He seeks a middle ground between dualist and physicalist positions 
through the notion of emergence. He then uses this emergentist account of the human 
person to argue for a form of theistic dualism. This section considers Clayton’s approach 
to theology and neuroscience, and then turns to Clayton’s emergentist understanding of 
the human person and his arguments for theological dualism. It is argued that there are 
reasons to be skeptical of Clayton’s attempt at integrating theology and the mind 
sciences, based both on his notion of emergence and his attempt to move from emergence 
to dualist transcendence. 
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Clayton’s Account of the Relationship Between Theology and Neuroscience 
Clayton senses the pressures that the physicalist assumptions of the neurosciences 
put on theology; however, for Clayton, the task of theology is not to critique these 
assumptions or to articulate a proposal for a soul-based neuroscience. The theological 
task rather involves seeing how far one can go in embracing these assumptions without 
denying factors necessary for the viability of religious belief. “[T]he guiding question in 
the dialogue between theology and the neurosciences is, how far can a position go in the 
direction of the physicalist assumptions that are basic to the empirical study of the brain 
without denying (or implicitly rejecting) factors necessary for the viability of religious 
belief?”13
It includes, at least for traditional theologians, not only the existence of at 
least one purely spiritual being—hence the possibility of disembodied 
agency—but also the notions of will and of freedom, which come in both 
finite and infinite flavors.  With will, so understood, comes consciousness: 
Christians conceive God as a conscious agent, an agent enough like human 
agents that the predicate “person” can also be attributed, if only in an 
analogous fashion, to the divine.  On this view, humans and God are also 
moral agents; persons exercise their agency in light of real obligations to 
other persons (indeed, to the world as a whole) and to God.  Finally, these 
agents are social agents.  Religious notions of community emphasize a 
union among humans in light of the divine presence and the covenant 
which makes of us “one.”
 Clayton argues that certain minimal conditions of personhood are necessary if 
a realist version of theism is to remain a viable option:  
14
 
 
Clayton is forthright about the pressures that the mind sciences put on these conditions, 
especially on the notion of disembodied mind or agency: 
                                                          
13Philip Clayton, "Neuroscience, the Person, and God: An Emergentist Account," 184. 
 
14Ibid., 182. 
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Part of the problem is that we are no longer sure what to make of the 
notions of mind or spirit. The metaphysical resources of the Western 
tradition—the conceptual world of ruach, pneuma, spiritus, Geist—are 
difficult to reconcile with the attitude and results of contemporary science.  
One can of course still assert that ‘God is Spirit, infinite and perfect in his 
being and perfections,’ as the Westminster Confession has it, one can 
affirm that humans are made ‘in the image of God’ (imago dei); and one 
can conclude that each human therefore possesses a God-like spirit, as the 
Pope recently reaffirmed in his statement on evolution. But whereas this 
view once accorded nicely with the natural science (natural philosophy) of 
a previous era, it stands in deep tension with the approaches and the results 
of the science of our own.15
 
 
For Clayton, it is the notion of emergence that allows for a critical mediation between 
theology and the neurosciences: 
That is where the emergence argument comes in.  If successful, this 
argument represents a tertium quid between physicalist treatments of 
mind, which leave no place for talk of spirit, and dualist treatments, which 
simply assume (in my view, too easily) the continuing validity and 
usefulness of such language.16
 
 
Clayton’s Account of Emergentism 
 
 In his monograph, Mind and Emergence, Clayton defends an emergentist account 
of the natural world and the human person in particular. He then uses that emergentist 
account of the human person to argue for a theistic dualism. Clayton understands his 
emergentist position as a via media between physicalism and dualism.   
It is widely but falsely held that there are only two major ways to interpret 
the world: in a physicalist or in a dualist fashion.…The evolutionary 
perspective has fatally undercut both sides of the once regnant either/or: 
physicalism, with its tendency to stress the sufficiency of physics, and 
dualism, with its tendency to pull mind out the evolutionary account 
altogether….I argue that emergence is the philosophical position—more 
                                                          
15Clayton, Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness, 185-186. 
 
16Ibid., 186. 
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accurately, the philosophical elaboration of a series of scientific results—
that best expresses the philosophical import of evolutionary theory.17
 
 
This positioning of the issues is important to keep in mind, and Clayton’s treatment tends 
to focus on three positions: 
PHYSICALISM—EMERGENTISM—DUALISM 
A key issue in evaluating Clayton’s work is the meaning of the notion of 
“emergence” and its relationship to terms like “dualism,” “reductionism,” and 
“physicalism.” In analyzing Clayton’s work, it is important to first distinguish between 
three senses of emergence.18
                                                          
17Ibid., 1. 
 I will call these (1) trivial emergence, (2) weak emergence, 
and (3) strong emergence. (1) Trival emergence or non-emergence is essentially the 
notion of aggregativity: systems acquire new causal powers based on an aggregation of 
their parts. For example, a five-pound hunk of iron has different causal powers than a 
single iron atom, but the causal powers of the hunk are aggregative. (2) Weak emergence 
captures the fact that certain systems are not mere aggregates of their parts; 
organizational interactions allow the system to do things that the parts cannot do. Weak 
emergence is essentially the notion of emergence as non-aggregativity. Weak emergence 
can also refer to the fact that certain systems are so complex that their behavior cannot be 
predicted in practice from what is known about the organization of its components. Weak 
emergence in this sense refers to epistemological limitations. In contrast to these notions 
of emergence, the notion of strong emergence or radical property emergence holds that 
 
18My taxonomy is indebted to discussion of emergence in the work of William Wimsatt, Carl 
Craver, Carl Gillett, and Terrence Deacon.  
  
172 
systems give rise to sui generis properties that cannot be explained in terms of their 
component parts plus organization.    
 Given these various understandings of “emergence,” I’m not convinced that 
emergence represents a genuine tertium quid between physicalism and dualism. Strong 
emergence is actually a form of property dualism, while weaker notions of emergence—
emergence as non-aggregativity and epistemological emergence—can be incorporated 
into a physicalist, and even a reductive physicalist framework.  As William Wimsatt has 
observed: 
An opposition between reduction and emergence forces people to take 
sides along an axis missing some of the most revealing cuts of the issue.  
One can be a reductionist and an emergentist too, with a proper 
understanding of these notions.  Misunderstandings engender opposition 
to reductionism and make emergence unnecessarily mysterious.19
 
   
I think Wimsatt is fundamentally right on this issue. It is difficult to overestimate the 
amount of mischief faulty understandings of reductionism have caused in philosophy of 
mind and philosophy of science. The notion of reduction that has perhaps generated the 
most mischief is an understanding indebted to positivist philosophy of science where 
reduction is understood as a logical relationship between theories that bottom out at a 
privileged level of explanation (typically that of microphysics). Two aspects of this 
understanding of reduction are especially important: (1) reliance on deductive criteria of 
explanation, (2) emphasis on the notion that scientific explanations bottom out in a 
privileged set of entities or causal relations. What is significant to note is that 
                                                          
19William Wimsatt, "Emergence as Non-Aggregativity and the Biases of Reductionisms," in Re-
Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings: Piecewise Approximations to Reality (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2007), 274. 
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contemporary philosophers of psychology, neuroscience, and biology have jettisoned 
both Deductive-Nomological models of explanation and fundamentalist20 reductionism in 
favor of mechanistic models emphasizing a plurality of levels of explanation. Advocates 
of mechanistic explanation are only anti-reductionist in the sense that they repudiate the 
notion of reduction as deduction and the privileging of a single level of explanation 
(fundamentalist reduction). As William Wimsatt notes, under a mechanistic model of 
explanation, “A reductive explanation of a behavior or property of a system is one that 
shows it to be mechanistically explicable in terms of the properties of and interactions 
among the parts of the system.”21
[M]ost neuroscience explanations do not take the form of D-N 
explanations in which phenomena are derived from laws, but rather are 
models of mechanisms.  This casts a different light on the issue of 
reduction.  Models of mechanisms are inherently reductionist: each 
proposed mechanism is designed to show how a phenomenon ascribed to a 
system is due to its constituent parts and their interaction.  On the other 
hand, reduction no longer threatens the autonomy of the higher-level 
science: the higher-level characterizes the interaction of processes, the 
lower-level accounts for the performance of individual processes. 
 This entire framework puts the issue of reductionism in 
a very different light.  As William Bechtel observes: 
22
 
 
The notion of “interaction of parts” mentioned both in the quotes by Wimsatt and 
Bechtel is central, for mechanisms are non-aggregates. If one understands emergence as 
non-aggrativity one can embrace a kind of emergence while remaining within a 
                                                          
20By “fundamentalist” reductionism, I mean the doctrine that scientific explanations bottom at 
some privileged level.  I am not equating reductionists with religious fundamentalists, an inane rhetorical 
move favored by a surprising number of theologians working at the intersection of religion and science. 
 
21Wimsatt, 275. 
 
22Pete Mandik William Bechtel, and Jennifer Mundale, "Philosophy Meets the Neurosciences " in 
Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader, ed. Pete Mandik William Bechtel, Jennifer Mundale, Robert 
Stufflebean (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 37. 
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physicalist and reductionist framework. One can also accept a form of epistemological 
emergence. None of these weak forms of emergence removes one at all from a 
physicalist—or even reductive physicalist-- framework. What is ruled out are strong 
versions of property emergence. Philosopher of neuroscience Carl Craver makes these 
distinctions well: 
It is important to keep several different senses of the term `“emergence” 
distinct. Some philosophers and scientists use the term “emergence” to 
describe properties of wholes that are not simple sums of the properties of 
components. Mechanisms are nonaggregates, and so they are emergent in 
this weak sense. Mechanisms require the organization of components in 
cooperative and inhibitory interactions that allow mechanisms to do things 
that the parts themselves cannot do. Other philosophers and scientists use 
the term “emergence” to mean that it is not possible to predict the 
behavior of a mechanism as a whole from what is known about the 
organization of its components. This is sometimes called “epistemic 
emergence” Some mechanisms have so many parts and such reticulate 
organization that our limited cognitive and computational powers prevent 
us from making such predictions. Such mechanisms are so sensitive to 
undetectable variations in input or background conditions that their 
behavior is unpredictable in practice. Behaviors of mechanisms are 
sometimes emergent in this epistemic sense. However, one who insists 
that there is no explanation for a non-relational property of the whole in 
terms of the properties of its component parts-plus-organization advocates 
a spooky form of emergence….The ability of organization to elicit novel 
causal powers (that is, nonaggregative behaviors and properties) is 
unmysterious both in scientific common sense and common sense proper. 
Appeal to strong or spooky emergence, on the other hand, justifiably 
arouses suspicion23
  
 
The kind of emergence advocated by Clayton and fellow theistic emergentists 
William Hasker and Timothy O’Connor is a very robust form of strong emergence.  
Clayton is right to repudiate fundamentalist versions of reductionism and physicalism, 
                                                          
23Carl F. Craver, Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 216-217. 
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but his own work remains essentially crypto-dualist. Clayton clearly repudiates body-soul 
or substance dualism, but the version of emergence he defends is essentially a form of 
property dualism. In fact, it is a very strong form of interactionist property dualism.        
Clayton tends to eschew the term “property dualism” and opts instead for terms like 
“property pluralism” and “emergentist monism”; however, Clayton certainly sounds like 
a property dualist when he states: “The balance that we seek conceives mind as a type of 
property that emerges from the brain, which though different from remains continually 
dependent on its subvenient base (hence the term emergentist supervenience).”24
Clayton wants to argue that strong property emergence is a feature of the cosmos “from 
quantum to consciousness,” and this is precisely why he prefers the term “property 
pluralism” to “property dualism”: 
  
Clearly the position defended here is not a version of substance dualism; 
there has been no suggestion of mental substances intervening in the 
physical order. But is it a variant of property dualism, the view that, even 
if there is only one kind of substance, it has two fundamentally different 
kinds of properties? 
Such a criticism rests on a misunderstanding. I have not portrayed 
a world divided into two distinct types of qualities, but rather a world with 
a vast array of different types of properties. Though there is no 
justification for the “dualism” label, the theory could fairly be called 
property pluralism, since it countenances a wide range of properties 
depending on their position in the complexity hierarchy.25
 
   
Clayton cites a number of natural science examples to make his case for strong 
emergence, but the question can be raised as to whether the numerous examples Clayton 
cites are really examples of strong emergence or merely forms of weak emergence 
                                                          
24Clayton, Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness, 128. 
 
25Clayton, "Neuroscience, the Person, and God: An Emergentist Account," 212. 
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discussed above. There is certainly a danger of equivocation in bringing together a wide 
variety of examples of “emergence” from the natural sciences. Michael Silberstein makes 
this point well: 
Clayton argues from enumerative induction to the conclusion of 
nomological [strong] emergence. Cases from the natural sciences that he 
canvasses include conductivity, chaotic hydrodynamics, Raleigh-Benard 
convection, autocatalysis, self-organization of various sorts such as the 
formation of snowflakes, Belousov-Zhabotinsky reactions, finite cellular 
automata, evolution, neural networks, ant colonies, the quantum Hall 
effect, quantum decoherence, and the Pauli Exclusion Principle. The only 
thing these myriad case studies have in common is that they have all been 
tagged ‘emergent phenomena’ at one point or another in the literature; but 
the important question is what kind of emergence they represent.  
Unfortunately, none of these cases is an obvious example for nomological 
or radical mereological emergence, and that is what Clayton needs to 
contradict causal closure and physicalism.26
 
 
Clayton himself recognizes this ambiguity, but in his treatment of mind he argues that 
this ambiguity disappears:  
In the previous chapter we found that some of the biological cases stand 
on the boundary between weak and strong emergence. I argued that the 
strong interpretation does better justice to biology as a whole, given that 
emergent systems are not just aggregates of microphysical states but cells 
and organisms—the agents that populate the biosphere and that serve as 
individualized objects of study for many biologists. Still, I had that at least 
some of the scientific cases could be read either way. In the case of mental 
phenomena, I will now argue, the ambiguity disappears: one cannot make 
sense of mental causation except from the standpoint of strong emergence. 
If the strong emergence interpretation of mental causes is not correct, one 
should be an epiphenomenalist about mind, that is, one should hold that 
mind has no effect on the world. To the extent that one thinks that 
epiphenomenalism is a conclusion to be avoided, to that extent one has 
reason for endorsing strong emergence.27
  
 
                                                          
26Michael Silberstein, "Emergence, Theology, and the Manifest Image," in The Oxford Handbook 
of Religion and Science ed. Philip Clayton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 791. 
 
27Clayton, Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness, 108. 
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Clayton argues that both consciousness and mental causation demand a strong 
emergentist reading. Interestingly, Clayton’s discussion of consciousness and mental 
causation fails to make contact with actual scientific work on consciousness and agency. 
Clayton briefly cites nine examples of significant research on consciousness and agency, 
but ultimately uses these examples to argue for a version of the Correlation Claim, 
despite the fact that many of the scientists cited by Clayton—Francis Crick, Christoph 
Koch, Gerald Edelman, Giulio Tononi, Bernard Baars, and Wolf Singer—would contest 
the Correlation Claim. “Research into the neural correlates of consciousness—one of the 
most fruitful areas in the study of consciousness today—can offer no more than its name 
promises. At most one will be able to establish a series of correlations between brain 
states and phenomenal experiences as reported by subjects.”28
Chalmers’s own answer to the problem of consciousness…whatever other 
inadequacies it may have—does seek to explain what is different about the 
experiential states that persons have. What he elsewhere calls ‘naturalistic 
dualism’ is the right sort of answer to the hard problem.
 In terms of consciousness, 
Clayton appeals to Frank Jackson and David Chalmers in defending his emergentist 
account of the human mind.   
29
 
 
Elsewhere, Clayton appeals to multiple realizability to argue against a type identity 
understanding of mind: 
The fact of multiple realizability weakens the claim that mental properties 
are really of the same type as physical properties, a ‘type-identity’ theories 
hold. Thus pain is a different type of property than the chemical properties 
of a given neuronal synapse.30
                                                          
28Ibid. 
 
 
29Ibid., 123. 
 
30Ibid., 126. 
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Somewhat incredibly, Clayton merely cites these canonical anti-brain arguments in the 
philosophy of mind and his work makes no contact with the fairly substantial critical 
literature that these arguments have generated. As Chapter One already discussed, 
arguments from consciousness and multiple realizability do not succeed. They are not 
arguments about the current status of science; they are principled arguments against the 
explanatory significance of neuroscience. Chapter One has given us every reason to be 
skeptical of anti-naturalist arguments based on both consciousness and multiple 
realizability.  
 Clayton’s account of mental causation runs into even more serious difficulties.  
Clayton wants to save mental causation and avoid epiphenomenalism. He claims that his 
version of strong emergence is the only alternative that avoids epiphenomenalism. 
Somewhat oddly, Clayton defends the Jackson-Chalmers line on consciousness, but 
Jackson and Chalmers both recognize that their positions entail or come close to a form 
of epiphenomenalism. Jackson’s first article containing the Mary thought experiment is 
significantly entitled “epiphenominal qualia.” Chalmers also is a dualist only about 
qualia, and explicitly rejects interactionist forms of property dualism when he writes: 
“Interactionist dualism requires that physics will turn out to have gaps that can be filled 
by the action of a nonphysical mind. Current evidence suggests that this is unlikely.”31
The view that only strong emergence is the only way one can account for mental 
causation is surely an idiosyncratic view. Indeed, philosophers such as David Papineau 
 
                                                          
31David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 162. 
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and Jaegwon Kim have argued that given the causal closure of the physical—it is 
physicalism that can account for mental causation and jettison epiphenomenalism.  
Epiphenomenalism is a form of dualism not materialism. The naturalist can regard 
consciousness as robustly causal—indeed it would be odd if it were not causal. As David 
Papineau has observed, “If epiphenomenalism were true, then the relation between mind 
and brain would be like nothing else in nature. After all, science recognizes no other 
examples of ‘causal danglers,’ ontologically independent states with causes but no 
effects.”32
Clayton’s Move from Emergentism to Dualist Theism 
 
 
  There are thus deep problems with Clayton’s emergentist account of mind. Even 
more serious difficulties occur as Clayton attempts to move from this emergentist account 
of mind to a dualist version of theism. Clayton attempts to move from emergence to 
transcendent dualism by arguing that there are things that even an emergenist account of 
the human person cannot explain. 
The theistic emergentist…argues that the thought and action of homo 
sapiens (among other phenomena) confront us with certain predicates, 
qualities, and beliefs that are anomalous from the standpoint of natural 
law.  Explaining these qualities and assessing the truth of these beliefs sets 
in motion an explanatory chain that eventually leads outside of natural 
science, and thus beyond the theoretical resources of emergence 
theory….The theistic account concludes to a conscious intentional being 
or force that preceded the evolutionary process and whose creative 
intentions led, however, indirectly, to the emergence of intelligent life.33
 
 
                                                          
32David Papineau, Thinking About Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 23. 
 
33Clayton, Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness, 184. 
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What sorts of phenomena?  In Mind and Emergence, Clayton highlights human 
rationality, the fact that human beings can form true beliefs about the world. “As 
reasoning agents we presuppose a fit between our beliefs and the external world. What 
must we postulate if we are to make sense of this core presupposition of human 
reason?”34
Plantinga’s broader philosophical project involves an additional claim: we 
do not finally have reason to trust the deliverances of our reason unless we 
postulate a self-conscious, rational creator who is benevolently disposed 
towards humanity, that is, one who intends for humans to form true beliefs 
and who creates them and the world such that, at least in most cases, this 
goal will be fulfilled. It is not enough that we postulate that we are 
epistemically ‘at home in the universe,’ as Nagel writes, we must actually 
be at home in the universe. And this will only be the case if the rational fit 
between mind and world was intentionally created.
 Following a line of arguments developed by Alvin Plantinga, Clayton argues 
that theism is able to account for this aspect of human experience: 
35
 
  
Clayton is referring to Plantinga’s “evolutionary argument against naturalism.” The point 
of this argument is that evolutionary theory leads to skepticism regarding our ability to 
form true beliefs and thus undercuts the doctrine of naturalism. Because evolution is 
concerned with survival rather than truth, we cannot be in a position to know whether 
naturalism is true. This skeptical problem does not occur, however, when evolution is 
linked with theism. Plantinga, himself, presents the argument in the following manner: 
Now according to traditional Christian (and Jewish and Muslim) thought, 
we human beings have been created in the image of God.  This means, 
among other things, that God created us with the capacity for achieving 
knowledge—knowledge of our environment by way of perception, of other 
people by way of something like what Thomas Reid called sympathy, of 
the past by memory and testimony, of mathematics and logics by reason, 
                                                          
34Ibid., 177. 
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of morality, of our own mental life, of God himself, and much more. And 
the above evolutionary account of our origins is compatible with the 
theistic view that God has created us in his image. So evolutionary theory 
taken by itself (without the patina of philosophical naturalism that often 
accompanies expositions of it) is not as such in tension with the idea that 
God has created us and our cognitive faculties in such a way that the later 
are reliable, that (as the medieval liked to say), there is an adequation of 
intellect to reality. 
But if naturalism is true, there is no God, and hence no God (or 
anyone else) overseeing our development and orchestrating the course of 
our evolution.  And this leads directly to the question whether it is at all 
likely that our cognitive faculties, given naturalism and given their 
evolutionary origin would have developed in such a way as to be reliable, 
to furnish us with most true beliefs.36
 
   
 Plantinga’s argument offers a critique of naturalism on the basis of evolution and 
also proposes a theistic solution to the problem. Both the critique of naturalism and the 
theistic solution are not compelling. His argument fails to distinguish different kinds of 
cognition generated by evolution and how they may or may not be reliable. In particular, 
in order to undercut naturalism, Plantinga needs to show how scientific beliefs are 
unreliable. This would require a critique of the rudimentary forms of cognition that 
provide the platform for scientific beliefs as well as the actual methods and practices of 
science that refine and hone such beliefs. The naturalist may well be skeptical of the truth 
value of many kinds of human belief; she is committed only to the reliability of a certain 
set of scientific and philosophical beliefs. Further, in terms of the relationship between 
evolution and the formation of true beliefs, Plantinga overlooks the very real ways in 
which survival and truth can be linked. The two notions are not necessarily at 
loggerheads. After all, an organism that failed to represent its environment accurately 
                                                          
36Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 229. 
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would not be expected to be around for long. In discussing the relationship of survival 
and truth in evolution, William Ramsey draws an analogy with camouflage: 
Having a good camouflage is often a key adaptive feature that is favored 
by natural selection. However, since the quality of a given camouflage 
depends, in part, on the environment, a good camouflage does not 
supervene on an organism’s intrinsic physical makeup. This is a fairly 
common case where a non-supervening property (having a good 
camouflage) enhances a creature’s reproductive fitness and, hence, 
becomes a property for which there is considerable selection pressure. The 
irreducibility of a good camouflage in no way undermines its central 
importance to natural selection. 
What all of this suggests is that there is a perfectly plausible way 
for truth to be a property that, although irreducible, is nevertheless favored 
by natural selection. Indeed, since some naturalists characterize beliefs as 
the “maps by which we steer,” a slight modification of our earlier example 
shows us exactly how this would work. Suppose we have ten creatures 
competing for a scarce resource such as food, and suppose that only one of 
these creatures (Bob) possesses accurate beliefs concerning the 
whereabouts of the food.  If all we want is an explanation of Bob’s 
immediate motor behavior, then we need not appeal to the truth or 
falsehood of any of his beliefs. But if we want to know why Bob’s 
behavior proves successful while his cohorts die out, then it clearly does 
matter that his behavior is generated by true beliefs.…Hence, truth and 
reliability are exactly the sort of features for which there can indeed be 
considerable selection pressure.37
 
 
Plantinga overlooks how truth can be adaptively significant and overlooks the difference 
between the claim that some of our beliefs may be unreliable and the claim that all our 
beliefs—including scientific beliefs—are unreliable.   
In fact, there is indeed good evidence that some of our beliefs are unreliable, but 
this creates a problem for the theist and not the naturalist.38
                                                          
37William Ramsey, "Naturalism Defended," in Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's 
Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism, ed. James K. Beilby (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 
18. 
 Claims about physical design 
 
38This evidence comes largely from scientific psychology and concerns everyday beliefs and 
decision making.  Social psychologists like Richard Nisbett, Timothy Wilson, and Daniel Wegner have 
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provide an apt analogy. In such cases, claims about God as an intelligent designer are 
undercut by obvious design flaws in nature. Evolution is a mixed bag, and our evolved 
beliefs are a mixed bag as well. This mixed bag is exactly what one would expect from a 
naturalistic perspective. However, the theist argues that God has designed us to acquire 
true beliefs, surely the prevalence of false beliefs are an embarrassment to the theist not 
to the naturalist. There is also the issue of alternative religious epistemologies. The 
monotheistic solution that Plantinga offers is but one account; why assume that this 
account is the accurate account? Why should one appeal to Plantinga’s Christian account 
of knowledge rather than say a Hindu account or Buddhist account? 
 There are significant issues with Plantinga’s argument; however, even more 
problems occur in Clayton’s appropriation of Plantinga’s argument. In the evolutionary 
argument against naturalism, Plantinga is coy about his own beliefs about evolution and 
simply assumes evolution and theism are compatible. Plantinga, in fact, rejects 
evolutionary theory and also defends a robust version of substance dualism. In other 
places, Plantinga makes it clear that evolution and theism make strange bedfellows. 39
                                                                                                                                                                             
probed the unreliability of our introspective beliefs in numerous empirical studies.  For an overview see, 
Richard Nisbett, and Timothy Wilson "Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental 
Processes," Psychological Review 84 (1977); Daniel M. Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002); Timothy D. Wilson, Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive 
Unconscious (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002).    
 
Because Clayton affirms both evolutionary theory and an emergentist account of mind, 
 
39See Alvin Plantinga, "Advice to Christian Philosophers," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the 
Society of Christian Philosophers 1 October (1984); Alvin Plantinga, "On Christian Scholarship," (1994). 
http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/virtual_library/articles/plantinga_alvin/on_christian_scholarsh
ip.pdf (accessed 7/31/09); Alvin Plantinga, "Materialism and Christian Belief," in Persons: Human and 
Divine, ed. Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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he faces additional challenges that Plantinga is able to avoid. If evolution does have a 
tendency to produce unreliable beliefs, as Plantinga claims, how does God ensure the 
production of true beliefs throughout the evolutionary process? Indeed, why would God 
choose to create in this manner in the first place? Further, given Clayton’s confidence in 
evolutionary-emergentist explanation, what reason do we have for thinking that such a 
framework could not account for our ability to form true beliefs?   
In short, Plantinga’s argument is problematic on its own, but it becomes even 
more problematic given Clayton’s assumptions about evolution and emergence. Strong 
emergentism understands mind as “of a piece” with the natural world, and, this move can 
be understood as undercutting theism as Clayton himself acknowledges. Recall his 
quotation: 
[T]he case for emergent mental causation is not by itself a case for the 
existence of God, divine action, an eternal soul, or life after death; it is not 
directly a theological conclusion at all. Indeed, in some ways it might 
seem to be an anti-theological conclusion, because it understands mental 
phenomena to be “of a piece” with physical phenomena, and because the 
supervenience relationship asserts a dependence of the mental life on its 
physical basis—indeed a high correlation between physical causes and 
mental effects—which is on the surface inconsistent with many parts of 
Christian teaching.40
 
 
Given this, the bar is certainly high for a move to theistic dualism, but, for the reasons 
discussed above, Clayton’s appropriation of Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against 
naturalism is simply not compelling.      
                                                          
40Philip Clayton, "Neuroscience, the Person, and God: An Emergentist Account," 206. 
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Experiential Religious Dualism: B. Alan Wallace 
We have been addressing the implications of the scientific image of persons on 
religion. Discussion thus far has centered on the link between dualism and theism in the 
context of the Christian tradition. Christianity has figured particularly prominently in 
discussions of religion and science, to the point where discussions of “Christianity and 
science” are seen as synonymous with discussions of “religion and science.” Due to its 
radically different ontological vision and its typically pragmatic focus, the dialogue 
between Buddhism and science occurs on terms very different from those that define the 
Christianity and science dialogue.   
Because Christianity has largely set the terms for religion and science discussions 
in the West, Buddhism has proved intriguing for some Western scientists and 
philosophers given its non theistic vision, radically different understanding of the self, 
methods for exploring consciousness, and ethical and transformative concerns.   
Philosopher of mind Owen Flanagan captures this general enthusiasm when he writes: 
But it is worth pausing to reflect on the apparent accident that Buddhism, 
almost alone among the great ethical and metaphysical traditions, holds to 
a picture of persons that is uniquely suited to the way science says we 
ought to see ourselves and our place in the world.41
 
    
Indeed one might get the impression from such a quotation that Buddhism 
amounts to a kind of paleo-naturalism; however, as much as Christianity, Buddhism is 
fueled by a comprehensive soteriological and eschatological vision and this vision 
implies a certain ontology. God and soul do not figure in this ontological vision, but 
                                                          
41Owen Flanagan, The Problem of the Soul: Two Versions of Mind and How to Reconcile Them 
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immaterial consciousness does. As the fourteenth Dalai Lama has written recently in his 
book promoting “the convergence of science and spirituality”: 
There is no reason to believe that the innate mind, the very essential 
luminous nature of awareness has neural correlates, because it is not 
physical, not contingent upon the brain…I feel that on a more subtle level 
of consciousness, brain and mind are two separate entities.42
 
 
 A Buddhist programme for religion and science has been outlined in recent works 
by one of the Dalai Lama’s translators, the American Buddhologist, B. Alan Wallace.  
While Christian theological discussions of religion and science tend to take the doctrinal 
dimension as their starting point, Wallace’s approach centers around the experiential and 
ethical dimensions of religion. But the experiential and ethical dimensions of religion are 
not separate from metaphysical questions about what exists in Wallace’s thought; rather, 
it is precisely through experiential-ethical practices that one discovers the deepest truths 
about the nature of conscious mind. In particular, a notion of immaterial consciousness is 
central in Wallace’s understanding of Buddhism, and Wallace’s Buddhist approach bears 
interesting affinities with classical theistic dualism in its critique of naturalism and its 
conviction that the origin of the psyche cannot be found in the brain.  
In classical theism, immaterial consciousness is discussed in reference to God and 
the soul. Wallace’s thought, true to its Buddhist roots, focuses neither on God nor the 
soul, but does argue that a notion of immaterial consciousness is central to secure key 
Buddhist beliefs: 
While all Buddhist schools refute the existence of an immutable, unitary, 
independent self, this does not mean that there is no continuity of an 
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individual stream of consciousness after death. Indeed, this seems to be 
indispensible if Buddhists are to accept the theory of karma and 
reincarnation taught in the Pali Canon, which also refers to the existence 
of an intermediate phase of conscious experience following death and 
prior to one’s next incarnation.43
 
  
Wallace also argues that this immaterial form of consciousness—known as substrate 
consciousness—is discoverable through meditative experience:   
[T]he hypothesis of the substrate consciousness rejects both Cartesian 
dualism…and the belief that the universe is exclusively physical.  
Moreover, it may be put to the test of experience, regardless of one’s 
ideological commitments and theoretical assumptions.44
 
 
As the above quotation illustrates, there are very significant methodological differences 
in the arguments of the classical theists and in the arguments of Wallace. Classical theists 
tend to focus on the doctrinal aspects of religion and attempt to secure Christian doctrinal 
claims by means of theological and philosophical arguments. Wallace’s approach places 
much more emphasis on the role of experience. Wallace calls his approach, 
“contemplative science,” and he views it as a kind of via media between doctrinal 
religion and materialist science.   
The human mind cannot be thoroughly comprehended only through the 
scientific examination of the brain and behavior; the human soul cannot be 
fathomed only on the basis of divine revelation. Science is not equipped to 
explore the spiritual dimensions of existence, for its tools have been 
designed to measure physical processes. Science and religion may yet 
prove to be complementary, but only if adherents of both return to the 
primacy of experience.45
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 A central claim in Wallace’s thought is that the West has not developed an 
adequate science of consciousness largely because it views consciousness through the 
cramped optics of scientific materialism: 
[T]he West presently has no pure science of consciousness that reveals the 
nature, origins, and potentials of this natural phenomenon, and it similarly 
lacks an applied science of consciousness that reveals means for refining 
and enhancing consciousness and thereby achieving eudaimonia. But this 
does not necessarily imply that all other human civilizations throughout 
history have been equally deficient.46
 
  
The issue of the origin of the psyche is a central focus in Wallace’s contemplative 
science project, especially the claim that the mind cannot be identified with the brain.  
Wallace offers both positive and negative arguments concerning the origin of the psyche.  
This section examines and critiques these arguments.   
Wallace’s Negative Arguments about Naturalism and 
 
a Naturalistic Explanation of Consciousness 
 
Much of Wallace’s work is premised on the notion that scientific naturalism or 
materialism cannot adequately account for the emergence and existence of the conscious 
mind. Scientific materialism is in fact a “dogma” that obscures and prevents the 
development of an authentic science of consciousness.47 Wallace understands scientific 
materialism in light of five central notions: objectivism, reductionism, the closure 
principle, monism, and physicalism.48
                                                          
46Ibid., 58. 
 The principle of objectivism requires that science 
 
47See B. Alan Wallace, The Taboo of Subjectivity: Toward a New Science of Consciousness 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 145-175. 
 
48Ibid., 17-27. 
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deal with empirical facts that are testable by empirical methods and verifiable by third-
person means. The closure principle holds that the physical world is causally closed: 
there are no causes other than physical causes. Monism, reductionism, and physicalism 
are closely related: reality is composed of fundamental stuff—i.e., the stuff defined by 
physics and macro-phenomena can be understood in light of the causal work being done 
at lower levels. 
However successful these principles might have been in launching modern 
science, Wallace argues that they have been disastrous for the study of mind because they 
entirely omit a first-person subjective perspective and lead people to believe that the 
brain is the exclusive origin of the conscious mind.    
Are the methods devised for the study of objective, physical phenomena 
sufficient for the scientific study of subjective, mental phenomena? At this 
point, all answers are expressions of faith, for it is obvious that physical 
and biological sciences have not yet comprehensively explained the 
origins, nature, or causal efficacy of consciousness or any other mental 
phenomenon. Great advances have been made recently in discovering the 
neural correlates of an increasing range of mental processes, but none of 
these explains the “hard problem” of how these physical events give rise 
to subjective experience. But there are compelling reasons for skepticism 
about the neurobiological reduction of the mind to the brain.49
 
    
Wallace’s negative arguments mirror anti-naturalist arguments that have been 
discussed throughout the dissertation. The “compelling reasons for skepticism” amount to 
an assertion of the Correlation Claim regarding the relationship between mind and brain. 
In light of the arguments developed thus far in this dissertation, such skepticism is 
misplaced. We should be skeptical of principled arguments against the bio-psychological 
explanation of consciousness, not of the nascent science of the mind-brain. Wallace 
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repeatedly claims that there is no explanation of the hard problem of consciousness, and 
this is true to a point, but Wallace must establish that there cannot in principle be a 
naturalistic solution to the hard problem, and surely this is an imprudent move given the 
relative youth of both neuroscience and consciousness studies and given the resources 
naturalism has for explaining subjectivity. 
 Brain-consciousness science is not a completed science. Neuroscience itself is an 
incredibly young discipline. The neuron doctrine was established a mere century ago.  
Serious scientific research on consciousness is less than two decades old and still in a 
pre-paradigmatic phase. Given these factors it is hardly surprising that there is no solution 
to the hard problem currently available. Is Wallace really ready to assert that we cannot 
have a bio-psychological explanation of consciousness at this early stage of 
consciousness research? There is a massive amount of evidence from the history of 
science that is a very unwise choice. Chapter One spent an extensive amount of time with 
the most philosophical rigorous claims that consciousness could never be explained in 
terms of brain processes: they simply are not compelling. They assume that our concepts 
of both consciousness and the brain are fixed; however, given the youth of neuroscience 
and the infancy of scientific work on consciousness, this is not a particularly prudent 
judgment. 
Wallace also presents a rather monolithic analysis of naturalism and 
underestimates the degree to which naturalism can accommodate subjectivity. Wallace’s 
thinking is mired in the same kind of dichotomous thinking that has been critiqued 
throughout this dissertation. Wallace seems to equate naturalism or materialism with the 
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view that only objective physical facts exist; he opposes this with the dualist view that 
there are objective physical facts and subjective nonphysical facts. However, explaining 
away consciousness or placing it outside the physical world are not the only options. A 
robustly naturalistic perspective can accommodate both objective physical facts and 
subjective physical facts. Subjective physical facts are objective physical facts 
experienced “from the inside” with the characteristics of transparency and 
perspectivalness. Wallace does not discuss the range of positions open to the naturalist 
nor does he consider in detail any scientific approach to consciousness or the 
considerable scientific problems dualism generates.   
 In the position of this dissertation, the brain-consciousness problem is epistemic 
and not metaphysical. Conscious mental states can be understood in terms of objective 
physical facts and subjective physical facts. Subjective physical facts are not facts that 
hover somehow “over and above” objective physical facts. They are epistemologically 
novel, but not ontologically novel. They are objective physical facts viewed from a 
transparent, first person perspective. Consciousness and the conscious self are virtual 
realities created by the brain. Such a position forms the hard core of a scientific research 
program and takes subjectivity seriously while cohering better with established scientific 
knowledge about the world. Such a position may in fact turn out to be wrong empirically, 
but it is surely too early to determine that, and principled arguments that resist the claim 
that the mind can be explained in terms of the brain simply are not compelling. 
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Wallace’s Case for Buddhist Religious Dualism 
Wallace’s arguments about consciousness go far beyond negative property dualist 
arguments about the irreducibility of conscious mental properties. He makes very robust 
metaphysical claims about the nature of substrate consciousness. Wallace’s skepticism 
about the scientific study of consciousness is matched by a confidence about Buddhist 
claims regarding the substrate consciousness. Wallace argues that fundamental truths 
about the nature and origin of consciousness can be uncovered through meditative 
practice. Buddhist thought understands mental activity (Pali: javana; Sanskrit: chitta) as 
grounded in a more fundamental ground state of consciousness known as the ground of 
becoming (bhavanga) in early Theravada Buddhism and as substrate consciousness 
(alayavijnana), in the Great Perfection (Dzogchen) school of Tibetan Buddhism. This is 
the individual stream of consciousness that carries on from one lifetime to the next. 
Buddhists describe its fundamental characteristics as luminosity and cognizance. Thus in 
human being’s consciousness is related to brains and bodies, but it emerges from the 
substrate consciousness. According to the Great Perfection tradition of Buddhism, this 
ground state of consciousness is normally inaccessible, as it is manifested mainly in deep 
sleep. However, with the cultivation of Buddhist meditative practice or samadhi, the 
substrate consciousness can be actively experienced. 
Buddhist contemplatives claim that with the achievement of a highly 
advanced degree of samadhi known as samatha or meditative                      
quiescence, one gains experiential access to the relative ground state of 
consciousness known in the Great Perfection (Dzogchen) school of 
Tibetan Buddhism as the “substrate consciousness (alayavijnana). This, 
they claim, is the individual stream of consciousness from which the 
psyche and all the physical senses emerge. According to their findings, the 
  
193 
psyche is conditioned by the body and its physical interaction with the 
environment, but it emerges from the substrate consciousness.50
 
      
This state of meditative quiescence is not simply a powerful experience, it discloses the 
fundamental nature of consciousness, most importantly, the notion that “consciousness 
can only come from consciousness”: 
Contemplatives who have explored this immaterial dimension of reality 
have discovered a principle of conservation of consciousness that 
manifests in every moment of experience. No constituents of the body—in 
the brain or elsewhere—transform into mental states and processes. Such 
subjective experiences do not emerge from the body, but neither do they 
emerge from nothing. Rather, all objective mental appearances arise from 
the substrate, and all subjective mental states and processes arise from the 
substrate consciousness.51
 
  
While substrate consciousness is clearly a notion of immaterial mind, Wallace is careful 
to distinguish it from the notion of soul: 
While this description of the substrate consciousness may appear to be a 
Buddhist version of an immaterial soul, it is important to note the 
differences between this experientially based account and various 
philosophical and theological speculations about the soul. Contemplatives 
who have achieved samatha commonly depict this dimension of 
consciousness as a stream of arising and passing moments of awareness, 
so it is not a single entity persisting through time, nor is it unchanging.  
Moreover, it influences the psyche and is conditioned by physical and 
mental events, so it is not independent.52
 
 
In turn, the individual stream that is substrate consciousness is grounded in yet a third 
dimension of consciousness, primordial consciousness (jnana) or the Buddha-nature. As 
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the psyche emerges from substrate consciousness, so all streams of substrate 
consciousness originate from primordial consciousness. 
This is regarded in the Mahayana Buddhist tradition as the ultimate 
ground state of consciousness….The realization of this state of 
consciousness is said to yield a state of well-being that represents the 
culmination of the Buddhist pursuit of eudaimonic well-being, knowledge, 
and virtue. With such insight, it is said that one comes to understand not 
only the nature of consciousness but its relation to reality as a 
whole.…The substrate consciousness can allegedly be ascertained with the 
achievement of the advanced states of Samadhi, whereas primordial 
consciousness can be realized only through the cultivation of 
contemplative insight (vipashyana). Thus, Buddhism postulates this 
dimension of awareness not as a mystical theology, but as a hypothesis 
that can be put to the test of immediate experience through advanced 
contemplative training open to anyone, without a leap of faith that violates 
reason.53
 
 
Thus meditative practice is seen as providing not only experiential-ethical transformation 
but insight into the nature of consciousness itself. Wallace claims that this experience is 
open to all who engage in meditative practice, thus it can be put to the test of experience.  
He also points to cross-cultural and interreligious convergence regarding contemplative-
mystical experience: 
There are many important differences between Buddhist and Christian  
theories of consciousness, and between scientific and contemplative 
theories of space. But in the midst of these doctrinal and theoretical 
differences, there may be a hidden ground on which these diverse 
traditions ultimately converge. If so, I believe they are converging on the 
most important truth that can be known and experienced.54
   
 
 Wallace holds that different religious traditions share a mystical-contemplative-
experiential core, and that this experiential core yields insight into “the most important 
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truth that can be known and experienced.” A great deal of Wallace’s thought sounds like 
a version of perennial philosophy that sees all religions united around a common 
mystical-contemplative core. Wallace himself makes this association at one point in his 
writings: 
This integrative view, asserting a common ground to some of the deepest 
contemplative insights of diverse traditions despite the differences in their 
institutional doctrines, has come to be known in modern times as the 
perennial philosophy. Under the domination of so much postmodern 
thinking in the current academic study of religion, this is presently not in 
vogue, but it has been endorsed to varying degrees by many influential 
religious scholars, including William James, Rudolf Otto, Aldous Huxley, 
Ninian Smart, Huston Smith, and Robert Forman. 
Over the centuries, Buddhism, like Christianity, has produced a 
rich diversity of ways of viewing ultimate reality, the phenomenal world, 
and human nature.  But there may be a luminous common ground in their 
deepest contemplative insights that is temporarily veiled by the biases and 
obscurations of the human mind. 55
 
 
 An important question for perennial philosophy is what “the most important 
truth” or “luminous common ground” consists in. Perennialists typically hold that 
different religious traditions share a core common experience that transcends the 
doctrinal particularities of individual religious traditions. Wallace here makes somewhat 
of a different claim. He affirms a “luminous common ground” shared between diverse 
religious traditions, but links this common ground specifically to Buddhist claims 
regarding the substrate consciousness. In other words, he offers an affirmation of 
universal mystical-contemplative experience, but links this experience with highly 
particular Buddhist beliefs. Wallace claims this experience of the substrate consciousness 
includes the experiential verification of Buddhist beliefs regarding karmic rebirth. “Belief 
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in reincarnation is prevalent in all schools of Buddhism, initially stemming from the 
Buddha’s experience of enlightenment….This contemplative discovery of the existence 
of past lives has allegedly been replicated by many generations of Buddhist meditators 
who have developed samadhi and used it to explore the nature of origins of 
consciousness.”56
While Christian and materialist beliefs regarding what happens at death 
remain largely unquestioned within their respective communities, theories 
of reincarnation do lend themselves to experiential investigation and 
rational analysis. Over the part forty years, scientists have identified and 
studied several thousand cases of young children from all over the world 
who have accurately reported alleged memories of their past lives. The 
late Ian Stevenson, professor emeritus of psychiatry and the former 
director of Personality Studies at the University of Virginia, pioneered this 
line of research and wrote extensively on it….More scientifically 
compelling evidence comes from the field of “near death” and “out-of-
body-experiences.”
 Wallace also argues that claims regarding reincarnation are amendable 
to scientific research: 
57
 
 
Wallace’s contemplative science project contains a number of claims about 
meditation and meditative experience. Indeed claims about meditative practice and 
experience are at the crux of the Buddhism-mind science dialogue. A firestorm erupted 
over the invitation of the Dalai Lama to speak at the 2005 meeting of the Society of 
Neuroscience. Was the Dalai Lama discussing a technique with certain empirically 
assessable physical and mental health benefits, or was he rather offering a tacit form of 
Buddhist apologetics? These same sorts of ambiguities occur throughout the writings of 
Wallace, and an analysis of the Buddhism-mind science dialogue involves sorting out and 
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analyzing various claims regarding Buddhist meditation and experience. The 
complexities involved in making sense of claims regarding meditation in the Buddhism-
mind science are described well by Donald Lopez: 
The claim here is that Buddhist meditation works. However, in order to 
understand the laboratory findings, such a claim requires that one first 
identify what is Buddhist about this meditation, describe what the term 
meditation encompasses in this case, and explain what works means, 
especially in the context of the exalted goals that have traditionally been 
ascribed to Buddhist practice. Although these goals are numerous and 
variously articulated across the tradition, it can be said that their ultimate 
aim is not self-help but a radical reorientation toward the world—and in 
many articulations, a liberation from it—either for oneself or for all 
beings.58
 
 
Wallace’s writings contain a number of claims regarding meditation. Proper 
analysis of Wallace’s work involves differentiating the numerous claims he makes about 
meditation and meditative experience. There are at least seven different claims regarding 
Buddhist meditation within Wallace’s writing: (1) Meditative techniques have physical 
and mental health benefits; (2) Meditative techniques have moral benefits; (3) Meditative 
techniques can be used by all regardless of their cultural and religious background; (4) 
Contemplative/meditative experiences have interreligious and cross-cultural similarities; 
(5) Meditation shows that consciousness is nonphysical; (6) Meditative practice and 
experience is the best way to bridge the concepts of religion and science; (7) Meditation 
shows that the claims of Tibetan Buddhism concerning the substrate consciousness are 
true. 
                                                          
58Donald Lopez, Buddhism and Science: A Guide for the Perplexed (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), 207. 
  
198 
There is nothing, in principle that a naturalist would object to in the first four 
claims, significant objections can be raised about the last three claims, however. 
One very important claim that Wallace makes with regard to philosophy of mind is the 
claim that that meditative experience reveals consciousness to be immaterial.   
Certainly, the prior arguments of this dissertation would caution against a premature 
move from the introspective experience of consciousness to metaphysical claims about 
the nonphysical nature of consciousness. Conscious experience may certainly seem to be 
nonphysical, but that doesn’t mean that it is nonphysical, and there are good scientific 
and philosophical reasons for thinking that consciousness is physical. Dualism does not 
cohere well with the findings of physics, evolutionary biology, and neuroscience, and 
positive arguments for dualism fail.   
Moreover, as Chapter Two argued, the sense that consciousness does not seem to 
be physical can be accounted for in completely naturalistic terms. There are a number of 
neurological and psychological factors that bias human beings toward dualistic thinking. 
Neurologically, we do not see brain activity when we are thinking, nor do we sense the 
brain. Further, the brain does not appear in our conscious thought; all of our experience is 
“out-of-brain” experience, but that does not mean that it is literally out of the brain. If the 
claims of Antti Revonsuo, Thomas Metzinger, and Olaf Blanke are correct, the virtual 
experience of being “outside our brains” and even “outside our bodies” is entirely 
amenable to scientific study. Earlier sections in Chapter Two explored how psychological 
factors also contribute to a dualist bias. We have two separate psychological systems for 
navigating the physical world and social world. One by-product of these evolutionary 
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adaptations is that they predispose us to think of the world in terms of body and soul. 
Death also places impossible constraints on our theory of mind: we cannot know what it 
is “like” to be dead, i.e., consciously simulate a permanent state of unconsciousness.  
This coupled with the fact that some mental states are easier to imagine the absence of 
than others, dispose us to strongly dualist afterlife beliefs and to represent dead agents’ 
minds in certain ways. The notion of minds enjoying an intermediate state between 
rebirths would seem to fit nicely into this framework.   
Contemporary scientific research tells us that we have a predisposition to dualist 
thought.  A separate strand of psychological research pioneered by Richard Nesbitt, 
Timothy Wilson, and Daniel Wegner points to the fallibility of a number of our common 
sense introspective judgments. Given this research, plus the enormous philosophical and 
scientific problems associated with dualism, claims that consciousness introspection 
resolve the mind-body problem in favor of dualism should be greeted with a certain 
amount of suspicion. Such research cautions against a slide from folk phenomenology 
and folk psychology to metaphysical claims about dualism. If this is true of ordinary 
states of consciousness, it certainly should be true of altered states of consciousness, 
however profound.   
Wallace also makes a number of thick claims regarding contemplative-meditative 
experience. In his writing on contemplative and meditative practices, Wallace links four 
important claims: (1) that the experiential dimension and the mystical-contemplative 
strands of the world’s religious traditions represent these traditions at their most 
authentic; (2) that mystical-contemplative experiences provide a common ground 
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between different religious traditions; (3) that these experiences are metaphysically 
significant in that they are disclosive of a transcendent immaterial reality; and (4) that this 
reality is in fact the substrate consciousness described in Tibetan Buddhism.   
One very common conception of religion in the West today locates the essence of 
religion in an experiential core and sees this experiential core as something shared across 
diverse religious traditions. This view is frequently referred to as the Perennial 
Philosophy, following Aldous Huxley’s book by that name. The claims of Perennial 
Philosophy can be understood both descriptively and normatively. The descriptive claim 
is that (some) religions locate the essence of religion in experience. The normative claim 
is the claim that an experiential focus provides the most adequate approach to the study 
of religion (or religion and science). There are reasons to be skeptical of both the 
descriptive and normative claims of Perennial Philosophy.  
History provides one reason for skepticism regarding the descriptive claims of 
Perennial Philosophy. A cursory glance at the history of Christianity provides an 
example.  While there is a very significant strand of neo-platonic mysticism in 
Christianity, the tradition also contains a long-standing suspicion of religious and 
mystical experience that stretches from Paul to Martin Luther to the twentieth century 
Protestant theologian Karl Barth and his followers. Even where the mystical-experiential 
element of religion is affirmed (e.g., in Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism) it is 
typically regarded as a divine gift limited to a select few. Further, such traditions have 
constantly stressed the content (i.e., the Christocentric nature) of even the most apophatic 
forms of Christian mysticism.   
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Recent historical analyses of religious experience by Wayne Proudfoot, Robert 
Sharf and others argue that it is in the context of modernity that claims about religious 
experience become elevated.59
By emphasizing the experiential dimension of religion—a dimension   
inaccessible to strictly objective modes of inquiry—the theologian could 
forestall scientific critique. Religious truth claims were not understood as 
pertaining to the objective or material world, which was the proper domain 
of science, but to the inner spiritual world, for which the scientific method 
was deemed inappropriate…
 Experience rises to prominence as a result of modern 
scientific, historical, and cultural challenges to theology and the study of religion more 
generally. By locating the essence of religion in experience—as opposed to scripture or 
doctrine—theologians could evade the corrosive effects of modern historical and 
scientific inquiry:  
60
 
 
The notion that all religions shared a common experiential core also provided an apt 
solution to an increasing awareness of cultural pluralism: 
By the twentieth century it had become difficult for Christian theologians 
to simply ignore the existence of non-Christian traditions, much less to 
smugly assert Christian superiority. But to take other traditions seriously 
entailed the risk of rendering Christianity merely one of several competing 
systems of belief. In privileging religious experience, theologians could 
argue that all religious traditions emerged from, and were attempts to give 
expression to, an apprehension of the divine or the ultimate. Differences in 
doctrine and forms of worship are to be expected due to vast differences in 
linguistic, social, and cultural conditions. What is key, however, is that as 
a response to a fundamentally human (and thus pancultural and 
ahistorical) sense of the transcendent, all religions could lay some claim to 
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truth. This allowed Christian theologians to affirm the validity of Christian 
revelation without necessarily impugning their non-Christian rivals.61
 
 
The historical, social, and natural sciences presented a challenge not only to 
Christian theology, but to the academic study of religion more generally. If religion was 
something that could be studied historically, socially, psychologically, and biologically, 
why was there a need for a separate discipline of “religious studies”? Many scholars of 
religion justified the existence of their discipline precisely through appeal to the sui 
generis character of religious experience. As Sharf notes, “By construing religion as 
pertaining to a distinct mode of ‘experience,’ the scholar of religion could argue that it 
ultimately eludes the grasp of more empirically oriented disciplines.”62
 This genealogy of the notion of religious experience does not rule out that claim 
that experience may be a fruitful approach to the study of religion in the present, but it 
does caution against an anachronistic reading of premodern religious traditions.  Here one 
might raise the objection that while the “turn to experience” may be relatively recent in 
the West, meditative-contemplative experience looms much larger in Eastern traditions 
like Hinduism and Buddhism. Indeed, these are precisely the claims that Wallace seems 
to be making with regard to Buddhism. In light of this, it is certainly significant that a 
number of Buddhologists caution against such a reading of premodern Eastern traditions. 
Referring specifically to the issue of meditation, Donald Lopez notes: 
  
It is useful to recall that the vast majority of Buddhists over the course of 
Asian history have not practiced meditation. It has traditionally been 
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regarded as something that monks do, indeed that only some monks do; 
the monastic codes make repeated reference to the needs of meditating 
monks, suggesting that they represented a group of specialists within the 
monastic order….In the Theravada cultures of Sri Lanka and Southeast 
Asia, there has been a long tradition of dividing monastic practice into two 
categories: the vocation of texts and the vocation of meditation. In 
commentaries dating from as early as the fifth century, a preference was 
expressed for the former….And there are major forms of Buddhism, most 
notably the Pure Land traditions, in which the practice of meditation does 
not play a central role at any state of the path…63
              
  
In a series of provocative articles, Robert Sharf has argued that this focus on 
experience in the modern West greatly influenced the reading of Eastern religious 
traditions as grounded in experience from their inception.  He cautions against reading 
premodern Buddhist texts as exalting personal experience.   
The notion that Asian religions are more experientially rooted than their 
Western counterparts is one of those truisms so widely and 
unquestioningly held that corroboration of any kind is deemed 
superfluous.  But when we turn to premodern Asian sources, the evidence 
is ambiguous at best. Take, for example, the many important Buddhist 
exegetical works that delineate the Buddhist marga or “path to 
liberation”…These texts are frequently construed as descriptive accounts 
of meditative states based on the personal experiences of accomplished 
adepts. Yet rarely if ever do the authors of these compendiums claim to 
base their expositions on their own experience. On the contrary, the 
authority of exegetes such as Kamalasila, Buddhaghosa, and Chih-i lay not 
in their access to exalted spiritual states but in their mastery of, and 
rigorous adherence to, sacred scripture.64
 
   
Sharf also cautions against too close a link between meditation and personal experience: 
 
The notion that meditation is central to Asian religious praxis might seem 
to support the thesis that Asian traditions exalt personal experience. But 
here too we must be cautious: contemporary accounts of Asian meditation 
typically presume that they are oriented toward meditative experience, and 
thus such accounts must be used with considerable caution. Besides, while 
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meditation may have been esteemed in theory, it did not occupy the 
dominant role in monastic and ascetic life that is sometimes supposed. 
(This point is often overlooked by scholars who fail to distinguish between 
prescriptive and descriptive accounts.) Even when practiced, it is by no 
means obvious that traditional forms of meditation were oriented toward 
the attainment of “extraordinary states of consciousness.” Meditation was 
first and foremost a means of eliminating defilement, accumulating merit 
and supernatural power, invoking apotropaic deities, and so forth. This is 
not to deny that religious practitioners had experiences in the course of 
their training, just that such experiences were not considered the goal of 
practice, were not deemed doctrinally authoritative, and did not serve as 
the reference points for their understanding of the path.65
 
   
The elevation of personal experience in fact happens through Eastern scholars thoroughly 
immersed in Western thought: 
The valorization of experience in Asian thought can be traced to a handful 
of twentieth-century Asian religious leaders and apologists, all of whom 
were in sustained dialogue with their intellectual counterparts in the West. 
For example, the notion that personal experience constitutes the heart of 
the Hindu tradition originated with the prolific philosopher and statesman 
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. Like his European and American predecessors, 
Radhakrishnan argued that “if philosophy of religion is to become 
scientific, it must become empirical and found itself on religious 
experience” and “it is not true religion unless it eases to be a traditional 
view and becomes personal experience.66
   
  
 There are philosophical as well as historical issues with the modern turn to 
religious experience. The modern turn to experience typically involves claims that 
religious traditions share experiential “luminous common ground” despite their 
significant doctrinal and cultural differences. In the twentieth century, this view came to 
be known as the perennial philosophy. The rendering of experience in perennial 
philosophy is deeply problematic and has come under much fire as the result of 
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developments in twentieth century thought. As Sharf and other have noted, the rendering 
of experience in perennial philosophy rests upon patently Cartesian assumptions: 
The notion that the referent of the term “experience” is self-evident 
betrays a set of specifically Cartesian assumptions, according to which 
experience is held to be immediately present to consciousness….The 
rhetoric of religious experience, predicated as it is on Cartesian dualism, 
allowed scholars to distinguish the universal experiential ground of 
religion on the one hand, and its diverse culturally bound manifestations 
on the other, created an opposition that recapitulates the classical 
Cartesian bifurcation of mind and matter.67
 Twentieth century thought called attention to the cultural-linguistic mediation of 
thought and experience, and scholars advocating constructivist positions in both religious 
studies and theology have offered extensive critique of perennial philosophy and the 
notion of universal unmediated experience.
 
68
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 Constructivists provide a trenchant critique 
of the perennial philosophy and its Cartesian assumptions, but constructivism itself risks 
falling into a sort of dualism in construing human beings as socially constructed blank 
slates operating independently of brain and body. The problem with constructivism is not 
its stress on cultural-linguistic mediation; it is that it fails to link this mediation with the 
brain and body. Constructivist positions go wrong not in taking mediation seriously, but 
rather by not taking mediation seriously enough. This is not the place to develop a 
constructive account of religious experiences, but surely such an account needs to attend 
to what might call the “double mediation” of brain and body, on the one hand, and culture 
and language on the other. Such a double mediation involves a complex and reciprocal 
relationship between brain and body and culture and language. What is significant is that 
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such an account places one in a position to posit potential cross cultural similarities in 
religious experience without resorting to the metaphysics of the perennial philosophy. 
Commonalities in experiences deemed religious may be due to the much more mundane 
fact that human beings share a common biology. Whatever the case, contemporary 
historical, philosophical, and scientific analysis of the notion of religious experience 
gives one ample cause for skepticism regarding Wallace’s claim that religion and science 
are best bridged by a return to the primacy of experience. An adequate account of 
religious experience surely needs to attend more to the cultural-linguistic and biological 
mediation of religious experience.   
Wallace’s experiential focus is closely linked with a commendable concern to 
address issues of religious diversity, and Wallace frequently points to experiential 
“common ground” between Buddhism and Christianity in particular. However, there is a 
deep ambiguity in Wallace’s treatment of experience and religious diversity. Wallace 
affirms a universal experiential common ground between religious traditions but links 
that experiential common ground to very particular Buddhist claims regarding the 
substrate consciousness and karmic rebirth. Many who advocate forms of the perennial 
philosophy do so as a response to the challenge of religious diversity. Such perennialists 
also tend to be pluralists with regard to religious epistemology, claiming that no one 
particular religious tradition has a privileged explanatory purchase on religious truth or 
experience. It is important to see the difference between this pluralist stance and 
Wallace’s position. Wallace’s stance is not pluralism but a version of what has been 
called inclusivism. The inclusivist argues that there may well be a common experience 
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that links religious traditions, but that one tradition enjoys a privileged explanatory 
purchase with regard to those experiences. Wallace seems to assign Buddhism such a 
privileged rule and does not seem to regard Christianity and Buddhism as two equally 
valid paths, as other perennialists are apt to do. What is difficult to see is why one 
religious tradition should enjoy such an explanatory privilege.    
 It is hardly surprising that Buddhist cultures would generate powerful 
experiences of the substrate consciousness, including experiences involving the notions 
of karma and rebirth. What is much more dubious is the claim that Christian, Jewish, and 
Muslim mystics are also experiencing the substrate consciousness in spite of what they 
themselves claim to be experiencing. Wallace’s linking of universal religious experience 
with the Buddhist notion of the substrate consciousness raises perplexing issues with 
regard to religious diversity and interreligious dialogue. The claim that one religious 
tradition is positioned to explain more adequately the religious experiences of another 
tradition strikes many today as both imperialistic and arrogant, as do claims that one 
religious tradition has a unique grasp of the truth. An awareness of cultural diversity 
contributes to this impression, but, the rise of modern science also contributes to 
skepticism regarding religious claims. Science has not only problematized religious 
claims about the world; it has also been able to develop a method for adjudicating 
differences and transcending cultural particularities in a way that religion simply has not 
been able to do. There are good reasons for accepting evolution over intelligent design 
theory, and for accepting the heliocentric versus the geocentric theory. While the theory 
of evolution and the heliocentric theory were developed in highly particular cultural 
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contexts they involve empirical claims about the world and are articulated in a manner 
that is publically accessible and verifiable. Religious claims to truth typically lack this 
empirical and public status.  
Religious believers themselves recognize the epistemic status of science, and 
frequently appeal to science as part of an apologetic defense of their particular religious 
tradition. Wallace, for example, seems to suggest that science can potentially provide a 
verification of Buddhist beliefs. This specifically occurs with reference to belief in 
reincarnation/rebirth. It is also not surprising the Hindu-Buddhist cultures saturated in 
beliefs about reincarnation/rebirth would produce individuals claiming to have 
experienced or lived an earlier life. What is dubious is the claim that the truth of 
reincarnation is the best explanation of these experiences. Wallace points to the work of 
University of Virginia psychiatrist, Ian Stevenson, to add empirical support to his 
reincarnation claims. Wallace simply asserts that the scientific community fails to take 
this work seriously, and fails to engage any of the massive critical commentary that has 
accumulated around Stevenson’s work.69
                                                          
69For an overview of such critiques see Paul Edwards, Reincarnation: A Critical Examination 
(New York: Prometheus Books, 1996). 
 The same is true for Wallace’s appeal to out-of-
body experiences (OBE) and near-death experience (NDE). These are interesting altered 
states of consciousness, and they are fully amenable to empirical study and research. 
None of this research however indicates that such experiences are direct evidence of the 
existence of an immaterial soul or an immaterial substrate consciousness. In fact, the ease 
at which bodily self-representation can be manipulated neurologically and 
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psychologically, would seem to support a naturalistic, bio-psychological explanation of 
such phenomena.   
 The purpose of this chapter was to highlight the implications of the demise of 
mind-body dualism for religious thought. Sophisticated attempts to retain forms of 
religious dualism, such as those of Philip Clayton and B. Alan Wallace, are simply not 
compelling. The implications of the demise of dualism for dialogue between religion is 
science is discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
SHIFTING THE RELIGION AND SCIENCE CONVERSATION:  
BIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF MORALITY AND ITS IMPACT UPON 
METAETHICS AND RELIGON 
Recap of the Dissertation Argument 
 There is currently a wild diversity of positions on the relationship between 
religion and science. This dissertation seeks to make some sense of that wild diversity by 
looking at a particular kind of science: the science of the mind-brain. One of its guiding 
insights is that the mind sciences surface in a particularly acute way one of the most 
foundational issues at stake in discussions of the relationship between religion and 
science: the issue of the nature of mind and the debate between dualism and naturalism.  
Resolving the debate between dualism and naturalism establishes important constraints 
for thinking about the relationship between religion and science and for a constructive 
approach to religion more generally. 
Chapters One, Two, and Three focused on various aspects of the debate between 
dualism and naturalism. In Chapter One, I made the case that dualism is a fundamental 
aspect of religious traditions like Christianity and Buddhism and continues to be present 
in much contemporary religious and theological literature that seeks a harmonious 
integration of religion and science. Many religious traditions understand certain aspects 
of reality as literally spiritual, i.e., not part of the physical world described by the natural 
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sciences, and many academic theologians interested in religion and science are prepared 
to defend these dualist beliefs as metaphysical claims about the nature of the human 
person and the nature of the cosmos. I called this stance “religious dualism.” Religious 
dualism includes forms of classical theistic supernaturalism, but it extends far beyond 
this. Many theologians engaged in the religion and science dialogue repudiate 
supernaturalist theism while retaining a theistic dualism. Religious dualists all hold 
versions of the thesis that consciousness can exist without neural correlates or any 
physical substrate at all.   
 Having established the foundational role of dualism within much religious 
thought, I turned to the evaluation of these dualist claims on the basis of the 
contemporary philosophy and science of the mind-brain. My concern in Chapters One 
and Two was to assess the notion of dualism as a doctrine about human persons. In those 
chapters, I attempted to assess what light the contemporary mind sciences could shed on 
the traditional mind-body or consciousness-brain problem. Chapter One presented the 
debate between naturalism and dualism as a debate about the adequacy of a bio-
psychological explanation of consciousness and argued that principled dualist, mysterian, 
functionalist/autonomy of psychology objections to a vertically integrated bio-
psychological approach to consciousness are simply not compelling. Such claims are 
typically rooted in inadequate deductive criteria of explanation and reduction and as such 
fail to appreciate the resources a naturalistic, bio-psychological approach has for taking 
subjectivity seriously. The mind-body or brain-consciousness problem was resolved in 
favor of a neurophilosophical, inflationist form of naturalism.   
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 Chapter Two then argued that the contemporary mind sciences not only call 
dualism into question; they also help explain the genesis of robust dualist intuitions in 
human thought. Such an explanation is part of the burden of proof for naturalists.  
Naturalists not only have to show that dualism is false; they also have to provide a 
compelling naturalistic explanation of dualism. The cognitive neuroscience of the self 
and the cognitive science of religion both figured prominently in this task. Insights from 
cognitive neuroscience of the self and the cognitive science of religion were drawn upon 
to explain everyday “out-of-brain” experiences and more extraordinary “out-of-body” 
experiences. Such experiences are real and vivid enough, but can be explained in entirely 
naturalistic terms in light of the notions of a transparent phenomenal self model, the 
notion of the self as a “virtual reality,” and the notion of bodily self representation and 
multi-sensory integration.   
In terms of cognitive science, it was shown that dualism emerges as an 
evolutionary by-product of other directly adaptive inference systems: folk physics, folk 
biology, and folk psychology. Dualism emerges as a consequence of the fact that we have 
two different inference systems for reasoning about social reality (folk psychology) and 
reasoning about physical reality (folk physics), and from the fact that our mind reading 
abilities tend to overshoot as a result of the fact that much of our social reasoning occurs 
offline and that some mental states are easier to imagine being without than other mental 
states. It was argued that the fact that mind-body dualism comes so naturally to human 
beings contributes to the genesis of other supernatural concepts like god-concepts. Here 
dualism couples with another by-product of human cognition: the tendency to over-
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attribute agency and design. The promiscuous nature of agency detection and theory of 
mind leads us to see “faces in the clouds,” to see the biological and non-biological world 
as designed for a purpose, and to see natural events as symbolic communications.   
 Chapter Three then turned to address the religious-theological implications of the 
demise of dualism. I addressed two attempts to integrate religious dualism with the mind 
sciences. It was argued that Philip Clayton’s attempt to retain a theological dualism while 
jettisoning dualism as a doctrine about human persons was unsuccessful as was B. Alan 
Wallace’s more experientially focused defense of religious dualism from a Buddhist 
perspective. 
The Implications of the Naturalistic Conclusions of this 
Dissertation for the Religion and Science Dialogue 
 Having recapped the major moves of the dissertation, it is time to take stock of the 
conclusions thus far and their bearing on issues concerning religion and science.  
Literature on religion and science tends almost inevitably to understand the relationship 
between the two in terms of conflict, independence, or integration. In light of this 
taxonomy, the conclusions of this dissertation seem to be a straightforward example of 
the conflict model, and indeed they are. However, what is seldom recognized by those 
who adhere to these various models is that questions concerning the relationship between 
religion and science are domain specific. This dissertation has argued that claims about 
metaphysical dualism are an important part of many religious traditions, and if its 
conclusions thus far are correct, these claims conflict with what contemporary philosophy 
and science tells us about the nature of mind. The contemporary philosophy and science 
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of the mind brain supports naturalist or physicalist rather than dualist conclusions.  
Dualist claims, however, are simply one aspect or dimension of religion, and issues 
concerning metaphysics and the mind-body problem are merely one point of intersection 
between the claims of religion and the claims of science. No claims have been made that 
metaphysical dualism forms the “essence” of religion or that religion collapses tout court 
with the demise of dualism. 
 The mind sciences and a naturalism informed by the mind sciences have much 
more to contribute to the study of religion than a debunking of dualism. Accepting 
metaphysical naturalism hardly means that there can be no interesting points of 
intersection between religion and science. The realm of factual and metaphysical 
claims—such as those involved in the mind-body problem—is an important point of 
intersection between religion and science, and a point of intersection that is conflictual 
and not favorable to religion. But the debate concerning metaphysical questions like the 
mind-body problem is hardly exhaustive of the potential points of intersection between 
religion and science,  and the mind sciences can illuminate religion in a much more 
significant manner than simply telling us that the dualist claims embedded within 
religious traditions are likely false. In particular, there are questions about morality and 
value that religious traditions are deeply concerned with, and that the mind sciences have 
increasingly shed light on. In this chapter, I turn from metaphysics and the mind-body 
problem to morality as a point of intersection between religion and science.       
Note that this proposal is nearly the exact opposite of the “independence” 
approach to religion and science advocated by Stephen Jay Gould and others. The issue 
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of metaphysical truth claims has dominated discussions of religion and science, and 
Gould was one of the first to recognize the limits of approaches to religion and science 
framed in terms of total conflict (e.g., New Atheism/Intelligent Design/Creationism) or 
comprehensive integration (e.g., Christian theologies of science):  
…[W]hen we must make sense of the relationship between two disparate 
subjects (science and religion in this case)—especially when both seem to 
raise similar questions at the core of our most vital concerns about life and 
meaning— we assume that one of two extreme solutions must apply: 
either science and religion must battle to the death, with one victorious 
and the other defeated; or else they must represent the same quest and can 
therefore be fully and smoothly integrated into one grand synthesis. But 
both extreme scenarios work by elimination—either the destruction of one 
by another, or the merger of both into a large and pliant “whole ball of 
wax” without sharp edges or incisive points.1
 
 
 Gould aptly diagnoses the problems and limits of the conflict and integration 
approaches, but his own cure is deeply problematic.  Gould famously (or notoriously) 
proposes that religion and science be understood as “non-overlapping magisteria” 
(NOMA). “The net, or magisterium, of science covers the empirical realm: what is the 
universe made of (fact) and why does it work that way (theory). The magisterium of 
religion extends over questions of ultimate meaning and moral value.”2
                                                          
1Stephen Jay Gould, Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life (New York: 
Ballantine, 1999), 31. 
 Where conflict 
and integration strategies tend to view all of religion and science exclusively in terms of 
one domain—metaphysical truth claims—the NOMA strategy recognizes multiple 
domains but goes on to assign science and religion exclusive rights to each domain: 
science gets the domain of facts while religion gets the domain of values. Gould’s 
recognition of multiple domains is laudable; his approach goes wrong in his parsing of 
 
2Ibid., 6. 
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issues in terms of non-overlapping magisteria. There is no reason to think that religion 
cannot make factual claims (whether the claims are true is another matter), further, there 
is no reason to think that religion is the sole repository of morality and values or that 
science might not shed interesting light on issues of morality and meaning. I have argued 
that religious traditions like Buddhism and Christianity have made and continue to make 
claims about the nature of the human person and the nature of the world, and that these 
claims intersect in interesting ways with the claims of modern science. I have also argued 
that there are good reasons to be skeptical of these claims in light of modern science; 
however, this point of conflict does not exhaust areas of intersection between religion and 
science, and I suggest that it is precisely in the realm of ethics and morality where a more 
fruitful exchange might occur.   
Points of Intersection between Religion and Science:  
 
Metaphysics and Morals 
 
 The approach to religion and science advocated in this dissertation sees both the 
metaphysical and moral approaches as essential. Claims about metaphysics and morality 
are intimately related; however, it is important to recognize that fundamentally different 
questions are at stake when pursuing religion and science from the perspective of 
metaphysics and when pursuing it from the perspective of morality.  
 I first want to make some points about the metaphysical intersection and the 
conclusions that have been reached about it thus far in this dissertation. I have argued that 
issues concerning metaphysics will inevitably create a conflict between religion and 
science. The dualist vision found in religious traditions like Buddhism and Christianity 
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simply does not cohere well with the contemporary philosophy and science of the mind-
brain. Many recoil from the conflict stance because it seems inherently dogmatic and 
polemical, but there is no reason why the honest registering of intellectual disagreement 
has to occur in a dogmatic and polemical manner. 
Does naturalism commit one to a position that is dogmatic, polemical, and anti-
religious? It is hard to see why this should necessarily be the case. The worry about 
dogmatism can be assuaged by recognizing that the form of naturalism defended in this 
dissertation is a fallibilist form of naturalism. Chapters One, Two, and Three have argued 
that a modest, fallibilist form of naturalism is the most adequate stance to adopt at this 
point in time concerning claims about the nature of mind. These are provisional 
conclusions that could all change on empirical grounds. Empirical evidence and 
philosophical arguments might develop that lead in dualist rather than naturalist 
directions. At this point in time, however, this is unlikely.   
There is nothing dogmatic about this at all; it is simply following the evidence 
wherever it leads. As noted above, a more dogmatic kind of naturalism is actually 
implicit in the seemingly irenic independence/NOMA stance. This stance does 
dogmatically assert that religious claims have/should have no ability to make factual 
claims about the nature of the world and the nature of the human person. The naturalism 
defended here in no way entails the claim that religion does not or should not make 
metaphysical claims; it is simply skeptical about the truth value of such dualist claims. 
That is to say it advocates a certain intellectual stance, but this is far from implying any 
disrespect for those who hold dualist and supernaturalist positions. Far from dogmatic 
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table thumping that marks the end of dialogue, the direct naming of conflict provides the 
basis for a more robust religion and science dialogue.   
There is no reason why conflict has to preclude dialogue and even friendship 
between those holding wildly divergent positions. A model for what I have in mind is 
suggested by David Hume in his Dialogues on Natural Religion. It is significant that 
Hume uses the genre of dialogue to probe central issues concerning religion. It is 
particularly significant to note that the deep philosophical and religious differences 
between Philo and Cleanthes occur in the context of mutual respect and deep and abiding 
friendship. In his commentary on the Dialogues, William Lad Sessions remarks: 
[T]hey deeply trust and respect and like each other.  They do not merely 
understand each other’s subterfuges and strategies; they have no fear of 
divulging their deepest hopes and views to one another, even though they 
do not see things from a single point of view…Theirs is not an 
arrangement of convenience or domination; it is, to borrow George Fox’s 
great phrase, a society of friends. This society, I believe…is intended to 
model for Pamphilus an enticing form of life, one that can explore the 
great issues of religion without erupting into superstition or enthusiasm—a 
form of life that can enfold deep difference and honest debate within its 
respect for persons.3
 
 
Frank acknowledgement of conflict can in fact contribute to a more robust 
religion and science dialogue, but I want to suggest that naturalism has a broader 
significance for religion, theology, and spirituality. Naturalism has a relevance for 
religion that goes far beyond providing supernaturalists with a friendly sparring partner. 
One sees this when the point of intersection between religion and science is shifted from 
metaphysics to morality.   
                                                          
3William Lad Sessions, Reading Hume's Dialogues: A Veneration for True Religion (Bloomington 
& Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002), 230. 
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Shifting to the issue of morality is not punting on metaphysics, but rather a 
pragmatic recognition that such discussions only get one so far. The shift allows for 
collaboration between very different groups around an issue that is of common concern to 
all—the moral life. Questions of morality are simply of concern to everyone regardless of 
their religious commitments or lack thereof. Questions about morality thus typically 
engage a broader audience than issues of religious metaphysics. The shift to morality 
occurs naturally when one recognizes that dualist metaphysics is no longer tenable. But 
one does not have to accept metaphysical naturalism in order to appreciate ways in which 
scientific work in moral psychology might impact issues of morality and religion. In fact, 
such work may be an important resource for religious traditions. First, religious ethical 
claims are premised on certain claims regarding the human person and moral psychology. 
Many of these traditional philosophical-theological claims regarding the human person 
and moral psychology have been called into question by research in scientific moral 
psychology. Further, there are massive moral conflicts within religious traditions, and the 
traditional categories of philosophical and theological analysis have done little to either 
explain or assuage these points of conflict.  
I examine the intersection of mind science, morality, and religion in three 
sections.  As the last three chapters examined the implications of the mind sciences for 
the metaphysical claims embedded in many religious traditions, the remainder of this 
chapter examines the implications of the mind sciences—especially scientific moral 
psychology—for metaethical claims concerning the nature and origin of moral judgment 
that are imbedded in many religious traditions.     
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The first section is concerned with questions about the origins of morality, 
specifically the claim that religion lies at the origin of morality. The issue of the 
relationship between morality and religion (or morality and God(s)) is ancient and dates 
back at least to Plato’s Euthyphro dialogue. Such issues are far from being simply 
interesting, if esoteric, metaethical questions. Indeed, they cut to the core of the so-called 
“culture wars” in the United States. At least in the American context, moral pluralism and 
conflict is linked closely with questions of religious belief. The notion is widespread that 
religion is the source of morality and that one cannot be moral without a belief in God. 
Even some who are themselves atheists or agnostics believe that belief in God is essential 
to keeping the masses moral. On the other hand, certain parts of the “New Atheist” 
literature suggest not only that religion is false, but that it is very, very bad. Religion is a 
“delusion” or “spell” that “poisons everything.” Such literature gives the suggestion that 
belief in God may be inherently morally corrupting. 
In the past twenty years, a significant research program has been launched by 
psychologists studying morality that investigates people’s ability to distinguish between 
moral and conventional violations. As it turns out, research on the moral/conventional 
distinction sheds light on the relationship between religion and morality and the origin of 
morality. It is argued that such research casts doubt on the claim that religion—especially 
in the form of divine commands—is the origin of morality and that such research points 
to an emotional origin of morality. If religion is not the source of morality, how do 
religion and morality come to link up in the minds of so many people? It is argued that a 
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commonsense belief in the objectivity of morals provides an important link between 
morality and religion. 
The next section addresses the question of how emotion relates to reason in moral 
judgments and how both biology and culture contribute to the genesis of moral intuitions.  
These questions are explored in light of Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model of 
moral judgment. It is argued that this model sheds a great deal of light on issues 
concerning moral pluralism and conflict. Finally, the implications of this work for 
normative ethics and religious practices are addressed. 
Mind Science, Metaethics, and Religion I: 
Divine Command Theory and the Origins of Moral Judgment 
Religion and Morality 
Today, nearly two centuries after the Enlightenment and its emphasis on the 
autonomy of ethics, the opinion is still widespread in the United States that religion is the 
essential origin of morality. It is not difficult to find statements supporting this viewpoint. 
The nation’s presidents seem particularly fond of asserting this link between religion and 
morality. In a speech to an ecumenical prayer breakfast during the 1984 Republican 
National Convention, Ronald Reagan would remark: “The truth is, politics and morality 
are inseparable. And as morality’s foundation is religion, religion and politics are 
necessarily related.”4
                                                          
4New York Times, August 24, 1984 as quoted in Lawrence S. Cunningham and John Kelsay, The 
Sacred Quest: An Invitation to the Study of Religion (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 
2006), 125. 
 Even those who are not particularly religious seem to share the 
view that while religion may not be true, it is essential to morality. An important 
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corollary of this view is that naturalism has devastating consequences for morality and 
skepticism about whether atheists can, in fact, be moral people. This skepticism about the 
moral credentials of atheists has been well documented in sociological surveys5
Q: Surely you recognize the equal citizenship and patriotism of Americans 
who are atheists? 
 and is 
captured in the following interview with Reagan’s successor, George H.W. Bush 
(arguably the least religious president in the past thirty years). 
 
A: No, I don’t know that atheists should be considered as citizens, nor 
should they be considered patriots.  This is one nation under God.6
 
 
The comments of Reagan and Bush echo a popular sentiment that religion—
especially divine commands—are the sine qua non of ethics. This understanding of the 
origins of morality not only creates antipathy between nonbelievers and believers, it 
creates antipathy between religious believers who disagree about certain moral issues; 
both sides ground their moral convictions in the objective will of God. Much then might 
be gained by empirical investigation into the origins of morality and the relationship 
between religion and morality. There are, of course, many avenues by which questions 
concerning the relationship of religion and morality and the origins of morality might be 
fruitfully studied. Here I investigate these issues drawing upon a fruitful research 
trajectory developed in scientific moral psychology over the past twenty years that 
documents people’s ability to distinguish between moral and conventional violations.   
                                                          
5Penny Edgell, Joseph Gertais and Douglas Hartmann, "Atheists As "Other": Moral Boundaries 
and Cultural Membership in American Society," American Sociological Review 21, no. 2 (2006). 
 
6Free Inquiry 8, no.4 (1988), 16 as quoted in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Morality without God? 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 8. 
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I first introduce the moral/conventional distinction as defined and developed by 
Eliot Turiel and others. I then turn to Turiel and Larry Nucci’s application of the 
moral/conventional distinction to religious contexts, arguing that this work sheds much 
light on vexed question of the relationship between religion and morality. Specifically, it 
casts doubt on the claim that religion (especially in the form of divine commands) is the 
source of morality. If religion is not the source of morality what is? Next, drawing on R. 
James Blair’s work on psychopaths and work by Jonathan Haidt and Shaun Nichols on 
disgust, I argue for an affective basis for the moral/conventional distinction. Drawing in 
particular on the work of Shaun Nichols, I show how this affective base of morality also 
generates the belief in the objectivity of morals; following the work of Pascal Boyer and 
others, I argue that it is primarily though moral objectivity that religion and morality 
come to be linked. The implications of these findings are then discussed.  
Religion, Morality, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction 
 In the past twenty years, Eliot Turiel and his collaborators have launched an 
important research program documenting the ability of children to distinguish between 
morality and social convention. Conventions here are understood as agreed upon 
behavioral uniformities determined by a particular social system. “Conventions are part 
of constitutive systems and are shared behaviors (uniformities, rules) whose meanings are 
defined by the constituted system in which they are embedded.”7
                                                          
7E. Turiel, M. Killen, and C. Helwig, "Morality: Its Structure, Functions, and Vagaries," in The 
Emergence of Morality in Young Children, ed. J. Kagan and S. Lamb (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1987), 169.  As quoted in Shaun Nichols, Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral 
Judgment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 5. 
 Moral considerations, 
on the other hand, “stem from factors intrinsic to actions: consequences such as harm to 
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others, violations of rights, effects on the general welfare.”8
- Moral transgressions are viewed as wrong irrespective of the presence 
of governing rules, while conventional acts are viewed as wrong only 
if they are in violation of an existing rule or standard. 
 A number of important 
findings have been documented in empirical studies concerning the moral/conventional 
distinction in secular contexts: 
- Individuals view conventional standards as culturally relative and 
alterable, while moral prescriptions are viewed as universal and 
unchangeable. 
- The forms of social interaction in the context of moral events differ 
qualitatively from interactions in the context of conventions.  
Specifically, it was found that children’s and adults’ responses to 
events in the moral domain focus on features intrinsic to the acts (e.g. 
harm, justice), while responses in the context of conventions focus on 
aspects of the social order (e.g. rules, regulations, normative 
expectations). 
- Individuals view moral transgressions as more serious than violations 
of convention. 
- Prosocial moral acts are viewed as better or more positive than 
adherence to conventions.9
 
   
Larry Nucci extended Turiel’s work on the moral/conventional distinction into the 
religious sphere. As Nucci and Turiel note, the religious sphere raises interesting issues 
concerning the moral/conventional distinction not present in secular contexts:  
Religious frameworks provide a useful context for further research into 
children’s moral and social concepts. In the first place, some rules specific 
to particular religions, which by the criteria used in the domain model 
would be classified as nonmoral, are usually treated as important and 
binding on their members. Secondly, “moral” rules are often closely 
linked to religious authority. It may be, therefore, that religious people do 
                                                          
8Larry P. Nucci, "Children's Conceptions of Morality, Societal Convention, and Religious 
Prescription," in Moral Dilemmas: Philosophical and Psychological Issues in the Development of Moral 
Reasoning, ed. Carol Gibb Harding(Chicago: Precendent Publishing, 1985), 139. 
 
9Ibid., 141. 
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not distinguish between moral and non-moral religious rules. That is, they 
may view both types of rules as prescriptive and universally binding.10
 
 
Nucci and Turiel were concerned to see whether classic moral violations would be 
distinguished from other religious behaviors, and, most important for our purposes here, 
whether moral judgments would be made in a manner contingent upon religious 
considerations (e.g., God’s Word as revealed in the Bible, etc.). 
In one study, sixty-four Amish-Mennonite children were asked various questions 
about various moral (e.g., stealing, hitting, slander, damaging property) and non-moral 
issues (e.g. day of worship, work on Sabbath, baptism, head coverings, interfaith 
marriage, and premarital sex).11
(1)  
 The Amish-Mennonite children were asked three sets of 
questions. The question sets concerned rule alterability, act generalizability, and “God’s 
word contingency”: 
Rule Alterability: “Suppose all of the members of the congregation 
and the ministers agreed to alter/eliminate the rule about [the act], 
would it be wrong or all right for them to do that?  Why/why not?”12
(2) 
 
Act Generalizability: “Suppose that in another religion they don’t have 
a rule about [the act], would it be wrong or all right for them to 
[engage in the act] in that case?  Why/why not?”13
(3) 
 
“God’s Word Contingency”: Suppose there was nothing in the Bible 
about [the act], God hadn’t said anything about [the act], would it be 
wrong or all right for a Christian to [engage in the act] in that case?  
Why/why not?”14
 
 
                                                          
10Larry Nucci and Elliot Turiel, "God's Word, Religious Rules, and Their Relation to Christian and 
Jewish Children's Concepts of Morality," Child Development 64, no. 5 (1993): 1476. 
 
11Ibid. 
 
12Ibid., 1478. 
 
13Ibid. 
 
14Ibid. 
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Nucci and Turiel found strong distinctions between the moral and non-moral 
domains in all three question sets. With regard to alterability, the great majority of Amish 
subjects judged that it would be wrong for religious leaders to alter rules concerning 
stealing/hitting/slander/property damage [59/60/59/61 (N = 64)].15 This was the only set 
of moral questions where subjects most commonly made appeal to God’s law as a 
justification for their responses. God’s law justifications were cited most frequently (.58), 
followed by justifications that appealed to intrinsic features of the act (harm/ 
fairness/obligation) (.38), social system (.01), and other justifications (.03).16 While 
judgments regarding the alterability of non-moral religious rules were significantly lower 
in certain cases (e.g., only 27 subjects regarded the rule prohibiting interfaith marriage as 
unalterable by religious authorities), other non-moral rules were regarded as 
unalterable.17 Fifty-nine respondents regarded work on the Sabbath as unalterable by 
religious authorities. Here again, God’s law was the most commonly cited justification 
(.57), followed by social system (.34) and other (.11) justifications.18
Turiel and Nucci’s findings become more interesting with regard to 
generalizability and the God’s word contingency questions. Numbers were close to 
ceiling regarding the question of whether it would be wrong for members of another 
religion to steal/hit/slander/damage property even if that religion did not have a rule 
   
                                                          
15Ibid., 1480. 
 
16Ibid., 1481. 
 
17Ibid. 
 
18Ibid. 
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about that action [64/58/62/57 (N = 64)].19 In terms of the non-moral religious rules, 
despite their appeal to God’s law as a justification for the inalterability of these rules by 
religious authorities, numbers were quite low regarding the generalizability of non-moral 
religious rules. What is particularly interesting is the shift in frequencies of justifications.  
In the moral domain with regard to generalization, intrinsic features justifications were by 
far the most common (.77) with God’s law justifications accounting for a small 
proportion of justifications (.13).20 In the non-moral domain regarding generalizability, 
justifications were primarily based on social system (.64), followed by appeal to God’s 
law (.23) and other justifications (.09).21 With regard to the God’s word contingency 
question, the great majority of subjects regarding stealing/hitting/slander/property 
damage as wrong even if God had not made a rule about them [54/56/54/58 (N = 64)].22  
Here justification overwhelmingly focused on intrinsic features (.94) versus God’s law 
(.03) and other (.03) justifications.23 In short, the great majority of Amish subjects 
regarded moral violations not to be contingent upon God’s will. As Nucci and Turiel 
comment, “Nearly all subjects judged that actions in the moral domain constitute 
transgressions even in the absence of a command from God opposing the act because of 
the intrinsic consequences these acts have upon others.”24
                                                          
19Ibid., 1480. 
  On the other hand, non-moral 
 
20Ibid., 1481. 
 
21Ibid. 
 
22Ibid., 1480. 
 
23Ibid., 1481. 
 
24Ibid., 1481-1482. 
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religious violations were regarded as strongly contingent upon God’s will. No subjects 
regarded rules concerning day of worship, work on Sabbath, baptism, women’s head 
coverings, and interfaith marriage to be wrong in absence of a specific divine 
command.25
The relationship between God’s word and morality was probed further by Turiel 
and Nucci in an experiment with Dutch Calvinist children. Sixty-four Dutch Calvinist 
children were asked the following question based on the Euthyphro Dilemma: 
   
(4) “Open Question”: Suppose God had commanded [written in the Bible] 
that Christians should steal. Would it then be right for a Christian to 
steal?” “Do you think God would make a commandment saying that 
Christians should steal?”26
 
 
Most children maintained that God’s command to steal would not make it right to 
steal (11 of 16 at 10 and 12 years; 13 of 16 at 14 and 16 years).27 Nucci has replicated 
these findings across a number of religious traditions.28
The results from Study 1 provide evidence that Amish-Mennonite 
children’s conceptions of morality are not reducible to their knowledge of 
or adherence to religious rules. Consonant with prior research on Catholic 
subjects (Nucci 1982), the Amish-Mennonite and Dutch Reform Calvinist 
children evaluated moral issues in terms of justice and welfare 
considerations rather than precepts of the Bible or positions taken by 
religious authorities. As did the Catholics, the Amish-Mennonite children 
 Even children from very religious 
backgrounds do not see morality exclusively in terms of their religious commitments. As 
Nucci and Turiel write: 
                                                          
25Ibid. 
 
26Ibid., 1478. 
 
27Ibid., 1483. 
 
28Ibid. 
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generalized moral issues, and viewed moral rules as unalterable by 
religious authorities. They also viewed the status of moral transgressions 
as noncontingent on God’s word. Furthermore, most of the Dutch 
Reformed Calvinist children responded that God’s command would not 
make stealing right. These findings indicate that children from these 
groups maintain a distinct moral position based on justice and welfare 
criteria from which they apprehend the moral aspects of the Christian 
God.”29
 
 
The Origin of the Moral/Conventional Distinction 
   
 The moral/conventional distinction is interesting because it shows that moral 
judgments are arrived at independently of authority including religious authority and 
even God’s authority. If morality does not come from religion, where does it come from? 
Alongside theological and religious conceptions of morality and intimately related to 
them are conceptions of morality that understand moral judgment to be rooted in reason.  
Rationalism has exerted a massive influence on Western thought from philosophers like 
Plato, Aquinas, and Kant to moral psychologists like Piaget and Kohlberg. This model 
has been called into question by research in both neuroscience and psychology. This 
research suggests that it is affect rather than reason that drives many moral judgments and 
actions. 
The Affective Origins of Morality:  
 
Psychopaths and the Moral/Conventional Distinction 
 
 The moral/conventional distinction has been studied in a number of interesting 
contexts. Some of the most interesting findings concerning the moral/conventional 
                                                          
29Nucci, "God's Word, Religious Rules, and Their Relation to Christian and Jewish Children's 
Concepts of Morality." 
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distinction come from R. James Blair’s work with psychopaths and autistics.30 Blair’s 
research has documented that criminal psychopaths and children with psychopathic 
tendencies fail to treat moral violations and conventional violations as significantly 
different. Blair’s studies show that psychopathic adults and children fail to draw an 
adequate moral/conventional distinction and also tended to ignore considerations about 
the welfare of victims when justifying their responses.31 Children with psychopathic 
tendencies tended to regard moral violations as authority dependent.32 Psychopathic 
individuals seem to have a sense of right and wrong, but fail to distinguish between 
different kinds of wrongs or violations.33
                                                          
30The philosophical implications of Blair’s work are discussed in Shaun Nichols, Sentimental 
Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment and Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of 
Morals.  The following section is indebted to the work of both Nichols and Prinz. 
 Significantly, psychopaths do not seem to suffer 
from any rational defects. They do not differ from others on measures of intelligence.  
Perhaps psychopaths suffer from the loss of a critical faculty essential for moral 
reasoning. For example, perspective taking and theory of mind suggests itself. Such 
perspective-taking abilities have been an important focus in rationalist accounts of moral 
psychology. Testing this hypothesis, Blair found that psychopaths scored slightly better 
 
31R. Blair, "A Cognitive Developmental Approach to Morality: Investigating the Psychopath," 
Cognition 57, no. 1 (1995); R. Blair, "Moral Reasoning and the Child with Psychopathic Tendencies," 
Personality and Individual Differences 22, no. 5 (1997). 
 
32Blair, "Moral Reasoning and the Child with Psychopathic Tendencies." 
 
33In his discussion of psychopathy, Shaun Nichols illustrates this with a quotation from the 
presumed psychopath Ted Bundy.  “It was almost as if he [I] said it was wrong for all these things to 
happen.  “It is wrong for me to jaywalk.  It is wrong to rob a bank.  It is wrong to break into other people’s 
houses.  It is wrong for me to drive without a driver’s license.  It is wrong not to pay your parking tickets.  
It is wrong not to vote in elections.  It is wrong to intentionally embarrass people” (Nichols, 2004, 65). 
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than a control group on measures of perspective taking and theory of mind.34 Further, 
autistic individuals are known to have seriously impaired theory of mind and perspective 
taking abilities. Significantly however they do not manifest the difficulties that 
psychopaths do in drawing the moral/conventional distinction.35 In short, psychopaths 
seem to suffer from no rational deficit at all; however, psychopaths do show significant 
differences in emotion and affect. Blair and his colleagues have tested emotional 
response by showing psychopaths and a wide number of control groups pictures of both 
threatening and distressed faces.36 All of the control groups showed significantly 
heightened physiological responses to both the threatening and distressed faces; however, 
the psychopaths showed response to only the threatening faces. A number of other 
significant affective and emotional deficits have been documented in psychopathy.37
If moral properties were not essentially emotion-involving, then there 
should be a way of drawing the moral/conventional distinction without 
appeal to emotions. Psychopaths should be able to learn the difference. 
After all, psychopaths generally have intelligence quotients within the 
normal range. Some are extremely bright. They are often articulate and 
cunning. They have a great interest in learning to distinguish right from 
 This 
research suggests that moral concepts are essentially emotion-involving concepts.  Jesse 
Prinz makes this point well: 
                                                          
34R. Blair, C. Sellars, I. Strickland, F. Clark, A. Williams, M. Smith, and L. Jones, "Theory of 
Mind in the Psychopath," Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 7, no. 1 (1996). 
 
35R. Blair, "Brief Report: Morality in the Autistic Child," Journal of Autism and Developmental 
Disorders 26, no. 5 (1996). 
 
36R. Blair, "Responsiveness to Distress Cues in the Child with Psychopathic Tendencies," 
Personality and Individual Differences 27, no. 1 (1999). 
 
37See, for examples, the articles on psychopathy in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ed. Moral 
Psychology: Volume 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008). 
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wrong. Most psychopaths have long histories of misconduct….These 
histories put them into contact with people who take special care in 
helping them grasp morality. They often encounter concerned parents, 
teachers, lawyers, and law enforcers. Given this combination of exposure 
and motivation to learn, psychopaths should be more likely than others to 
develop ways of reliably identifying moral properties. The fact that they 
fail to master the moral/conventional distinction suggests that there may 
be no way to draw that distinction without adverting to or experiencing 
emotional responses. The distinction may be emotional to the core. Right 
and wrongness may be constituted by emotional reactions in us. Subtract 
these reactions and the distinction becomes as invisible as the color 
spectrum is to the blind. Psychopaths can carefully monitor the moral 
judgments of healthy individuals. They can sort familiar examples of good 
conduct into one bin and bad conduct into another, but they lack insight 
into the very essence of this division.38
 
 
The Affective Origins of Morality: The Moral Psychology of Disgust 
 
 Studies of disgust also shed significant light on the moral/conventional distinction 
and the role of emotion in moral judgment. Jonathan Haidt has done particularly 
interesting cross cultural work on people’s reactions to harmless taboo violations. Are 
such actions subject to moral condemnation, and if so, why? Haidt’s subjects varied in 
nationality, socioeconomic status (SES), and age. Subjects were presented with a number 
of harmless taboo violations: a family eats its pet dog after it was hit by a car, a women 
cuts up a national flag and uses the strips to clean her toilet, a man uses a chicken carcass 
for masturbation and afterwards cooks and eats the carcass.39
                                                          
38Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
 Haidt and his colleagues 
found that a significant number of groups condemned these actions morally. Haidt was 
particularly concerned with the issue of why these actions were condemned. Perhaps the 
actions were understood to have harmful consequences even though they really did not. 
 
39Jonathan Haidt, Silvia Helena Koller, and Maria G. Dias, "Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is It 
Wrong to Eat Your Dog?," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65, no. 4 (1993). 
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Or perhaps they were morally condemned because one was bothered by seeing such an 
action.  The study found that among the groups that morally condemned these actions, the 
bother probe was a better predictor of negative judgment than the harm probe. Such a 
finding fits well with an understanding of moral judgments driven by emotional 
intuitions. Differences between the “moralizing” and “permissive” groups also supports 
the thesis that emotional judgment is the cognitive default that sometimes can be 
overridden by more explicitly cognitive processes.40 High SES groups—college 
students—in both the United States and Brazil tended not to judge the actions as moral. 
People from less Westernized cities tended to be more condemning, and children in both 
the United States and Brazil were more condemning than adults.41
These three findings make sense in light of the model of moral judgment 
we have been developing, according to which intuitive emotional 
responses drive prepotent moral intuitions while “cognitive” control 
processes sometimes rein them in. Education is to a large extent the 
development of one’s “cognitive” capacities, learning to think in ways that 
are abstract, effortful, and often either nonintuitive or counterintuitive.  
The westernization factor is closely related. While westerners may not be 
any more “cognitively” developed” than members of others cultures, the 
western tradition takes what is, from an anthropological perspective, a 
peculiarly “cognitive” approach to morality. Westerners are more likely 
than members of other cultures to argue for and justify their moral beliefs 
and values in abstract terms….Moreover, western culture tends to be more 
pluralistic than other cultures, explicitly valuing multiple perspectives and 
an intellectual awareness that alternative perspectives exist. Finally, the 
capacity for “cognitive control” continues to develop through 
 As Joshua Greene 
reflects: 
                                                          
40Joshua D. Greene, "The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul," in Moral Psychology: Volume 3: The 
Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development, ed. Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008). 
 
41Jonathan Haidt, Silvia Helena Koller, and Maria G. Dias, "Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is It 
Wrong to Eat Your Dog?" 
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adolescence….Children like adults, are very good at feeling emotions such 
as anger, sympathy, and disgust, but unlike adults they are not very good 
at controlling their behavior when experiencing such feeling.42
 
  
Haidt and his colleagues have also manipulated disgust through hypnotic 
suggestion and the alternation of environmental factors in order to assess the effect of 
such manipulations on moral judgment.43 In one set of experiments, half of a group of 
highly-hyponotizable subjects was given the post-hypnotic suggestion to feel disgust 
upon reading the word take. The other half was given the suggestion to feel disgust upon 
reading the word often. The “take” group received three moral violation vignettes 
containing the work “take,” three neutral buffer stories that contained neither the word 
“take” or a moral violation, and three moral violation stories containing the word 
“often.”44 Likewise the “often” group received three moral violation vignettes containing 
the word “often,” three neutral buffer stories, and three moral violation stories containing 
the word “take.”45 The moral violations included accounts of a sexual relationship 
between second cousins, a man eating his already dead dog, a congressman taking bribes, 
an ambulance-chasing lawyer, a shoplifter, and a student stealing library books.46
                                                          
42Greene, 56. 
 
Participants evaluated both “how disgusting” and “how morally wrong” the behavior in 
the vignette by picking slash makers on a line ranging from not at all disgusting/ 
 
43Thalia Wheatley, and Jonathan Haidt, "Hyponotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgment More 
Severe," Psychological Science 16, no. 10 (2005). 
 
44Ibid., 781.  
  
45Ibid. 
 
46Ibid., 780-781. 
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extremely disgusting and not at all morally wrong/extremely morally wrong. Wheatley 
and Haidt found that moral transgressions were viewed as more disgusting when their 
hypnotic disgust word was embedded in the vignette than when it was absent.47 Further, 
they sound that the presence of the disgust word increased the severity of moral 
judgment.48
In one of the studies conducted, a story was included where there was no violation 
at all: “Dan is a student council representative at his school. This semester he is in charge 
of scheduling discussions of academic issues. He [tries to take up] [often picks] topics 
that appeal to both professors and students in order to stimulate discussion.”
  
49  Haidt and 
his colleagues predicted that with no violations of any kind subjects would have to 
override their feelings of disgust and most did. However, one third of all subjects who 
encountered their disgust word in the story still rated Dan’s actions as somewhat morally 
wrong. In another set of experiments, Haidt and colleagues manipulated disgust 
environmentally.50 Subjects were asked to make moral judgments at either a clean desk 
or a dirty desk filled with fast food wrappers and dirty tissues. Those at the dirty desk 
made moral judgments more severe for individuals scoring in the upper half of a scale 
measuring “private body consciousness.”51
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48Ibid. 
 
49Ibid., 782. 
 
50S. Schnall, J. Haidt, and G. Clore, "Irrelevant Disgust Makes Moral Judgment More Severe, for 
Those Who Listen to Their Bodies" (University of Virginia, 2004). 
 
51Ibid. 
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 Haidt’s studies of disgust provide further evidence for the emotional origins of 
morality. They also provide evidence that the scope of morality is much broader than the 
harm/justice based norms that figure so centrally in modern Western conceptions of 
morality. Shaun Nichols has also done interesting experimental work on disgust, 
particularly in relation to the moral/conventional distinction. In Nichols’s “sentimental 
rules” explanation of the moral/conventional distinction, the basis for the moral/ 
conventional distinction lies in the fact that moral norms are backed by affect while 
conventional norms are not. Norms backed by affect will be regarded as more serious and 
less authority contingent than norms that are not affectively backed. Importantly, like 
Haidt and in contrast to Blair, Nichols understands affect-backed norms as broader in 
scope than harm-based norms. Nichols tested his sentimental rules account of the 
morality by replacing the moral/conventional distinction with a disgusting/conventional 
distinction. Subjects were presented with moral violations, disgusting violations, and 
conventional violations. Nichols found that subjects tended to treat disgusting violations 
as less permissible, more serious, and less authority contingent than the affect-neutral 
conventional violations.52
                                                          
52Shaun Nichols, "Norms with Feeling: Towards a Psychological Account of Moral Judgment," 
Cognition 84 (2002). 
 Nichols also tested the disgusting/conventional distinction in a 
manner analogous to Blair’s application of the moral/conventional distinction to 
psychopaths. There an affective defect impedes psychopath’s abilities to distinguish 
between moral and conventional violations. Nichols wanted to see if different sensitivity 
to disgust would produce different judgments concerning the seriousness and authority 
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contingency of a disgusting violation. Nichols found that while there was no statistically 
significant difference between low and high disgust subjects on the permissibility 
question, the low disgust group regarding the disgusting violation as much less serious 
and also as more authority contingent.53
Commonsense Moral Objectivism and the Relationship 
   
Between Religion and Morality 
 As a philosopher, Nichols has been particularly concerned to address the 
implications of the findings of scientific moral psychology about the centrality of 
emotion in moral judgment to issues about moral objectivity. “Moral objectivity” is a 
notoriously multivalent term. Epistemic moral objectivity is related to the notion of 
impartiality and freedom from bias. This is not the notion of objectivity under discussion 
here. Here we are discussing metaphysical or ontological moral objectivity: roughly, the 
notion that certain actions are right or wrong, good or bad in and of themselves. Nichols, 
along with a number of other contemporary moral psychologists and moral philosophers, 
argues that these experimental findings support Humean non-objectivism.   
The basic thesis of moral objectivism…is that the moral status of an action 
is constituted by the action “as it is in itself” and accordingly, true moral 
judgments are nonrelativistically true.  Humean sentimentalism is often 
regarded as directly opposed to moral objectivity in this sense…. 
According to Humean sentimentalism, morality hangs entirely on the 
particular emotional repertoire of humans. Here is one place where Hume 
seems to be making this point: “If we can depend upon any principle, 
which we learn from philosophy, this, I think, may be considered as 
certain and undoubted, that there is nothing, in itself, valuable or 
despicable, desirable or hateful, beautiful or deformed; but that these 
attributes arise from the particular constitution and fabric of human 
sentiment and affection” (1742 [1987], 162).  Norman Kemp Smith 
                                                          
53Ibid. 
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paraphrases Hume’s view using much the same language: “Moral 
judgments, in marking out the good and the evil, have their source not in 
the eternal nature of any independent reality, but solely in the particular 
fabric and constitution of the human species”…In brief, moral judgment 
depends on certain emotions, and these emotions themselves are rationally 
arbitrary, so moral judgment, as we know it, is not objective.  No action is 
wrong simpliciter. At best, an action is wrong relative to a population – 
the population of individuals that share a certain emotional repertoire. A 
more careful way to frame the Humean conclusion here is that the 
commonsense commitment to objectivity is unwarranted. Given the 
emotional basis of moral judgment, we are not justified in our belief that 
morality is objective.54
 
 
 Nichols argues objectivist ontology of morals is philosophically suspect but also 
has done initial empirical research that indicates that a belief in moral objectivity may be 
the default stance of commonsense metaethics. Experiments on the moral/conventional 
distinction provide evidence for a certain kind of objectivity. We can call this kind of 
objectivity non-conventional objectivity. Indeed, some of the literature on the moral/ 
conventional distinction seems to regard evidence for non-conventional objectivity as 
evidence for objectivity simpliciter. However, as Nichols notes, non-conventional 
objectivity does not exhaust the kinds of metaphysical objectivity. A key philosophical 
notion of metaphysical objectivity turns on the notion of response-dependence. A 
commitment to moral objectivity is seen as a commitment to the view that moral 
properties are not response dependent.   
Nichols conducted an experiment to test for a commitment to moral objectivity in 
this broader sense. Nichols and Trisha Fold-Bennett prepared vignettes concerning 
gustatory (“yummy”), moral (“good”), and aesthetic (“beautiful”) properties and then 
asked children questions about generalizability and preference dependence.  
                                                          
54Nichols, Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment, 184. 
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GENERALIZABILITY 
Now, think about a long time ago, before there were any people. There 
were still Grapes, just like the grapes now. Way back then, before there 
were people, were grapes yummy? 
 
PREFERENCE DEPENDENCE 
You know, I think grapes are yummy too. Some people don’t like grapes.  
They don’t think grapes are yummy. Would you say that grapes are 
yummy. Would you say that grapes are yummy for some people or that 
they’re yummy for real? 
 
GENERALIZABILITY 
Now, think about a long time ago, before there were any people. There 
were monkeys back then too. Way back then, before there were people, 
when one monkey helped another monkey that got hurt, was that good? 
 
PREFERENCE DEPENDENCE 
You know, I think it was good for the monkey to help the other monkey.  
Some people don’t like it when monkeys help each other when they’re 
hurt. They don’t think it’s good when monkeys do that. Would you say 
that when one monkey helps a hurt monkey that is good for some people 
or that it’s good for real? 
 
GENERALIZABILITY 
Now, think about a time long ago, before there were any people. There 
were roses back then too. Way back then, before there were people, were 
roses beautiful? 
 
PREFERENCE DEPENDENCE 
You know, I think roses are beautiful too. Some people don’t like roses.  
They don’t think roses are beautiful. Would you say that roses are 
beautiful for some people or that they’re beautiful for real?55
  
 
Significantly, Nichols found that while children regarded properties like 
“yummy” and “fun” as response dependent, children tended not to regard moral and 
aesthetic properties as response dependent. There is thus initial experimental evidence 
that objectivism is the default stance of folk metaethics. The commitment to an 
                                                          
55Ibid., 174.  See Shaun Nichols and Trisha Folds-Bennett, "Are Children Moral Objectivists?  
Children's Judgments About Moral and Response-Dependent Properties," Cognition 90, no. 2 (2003).  
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objectivist metaphysics of morals may be similar to the commitment to metaphysical 
dualism: a false position that is nonetheless the cognitive default.   
 What is interesting is that this evidence about people’s understanding of moral 
objectivity gives us a plausible point of contact between religion and morality. Religious 
subjects regarded moral violations as non-contingent upon God’s will. Thus, following 
Nucci’s experimental evidence across a variety of religious traditions, it is unlikely that 
religion (i.e., divine commands) is the origin of the belief in moral objectivity. The origin 
of the belief in moral objectivity plausibly lies in the affectively charged nature of our 
moral beliefs. The cognitive mechanisms giving rise to religion and morality are likely 
separate, but they become linked in important ways. One important link is moral 
objectivity. On the one hand, moral objectivity makes religious beliefs more salient.  On 
the other hand, a religious/theological context helps to sustain commitment to moral 
objectivity. The notion that religious beliefs are in some ways parasitic on moral beliefs 
and that morality makes religious representations more salient has been underscored by 
Pascal Boyer. 
Moral intuitions are part of our mental dispositions for social interaction.  
But why are they connected to gods and spirits and ancestors? To 
understand how such beings fit with moral understandings, consider two 
facts that I mentioned earlier. First, our moral intuitions suggest to us, 
from the youngest age, that behaviors are right or wrong by themselves, 
not depending on who considers them, or from what point of view. 
Second, gods and spirits and ancestors are generally considered interested 
parties in moral choices and moral judgments, rather than providers of 
codes or rules. These two facts are just two aspects of the same mental 
processes…. 
So concepts of gods and spirits are made more relevant by the 
organization of our moral understandings, which by themselves do not 
especially require any gods or spirits. What I mean by relevant is that the 
concepts, once put in this moral context, are easy to represent and that 
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they generate many new inferences. For instance, most people feel some 
guilt when acting in a way that they suspect is immoral. That is, whatever 
their self-serving justifications, they may have the intuition that an agent 
with full description of the situation would still classify it as wrong. Now 
thinking of this intuition as “what the ancestors think of what I did” or 
“how God feels about what I did” provides an easy way of representing 
what is otherwise extremely vague. That is, most of our moral intuitions 
are clear but their origin escapes us, because it lies in mental processes 
that we cannot consciously access. Seeing these intuitions as someone’s 
viewpoint is a simpler way of understanding why we have these intuitions.  
But this requires the concept of an agent with full access to strategic 
information…. 
To sum up, then: Our evolution as a species of cooperators is 
sufficient to explain the actual psychology of moral reasoning, the way 
children and adults represent moral dimensions of action. But then this 
requires no special concept of religious agent, no special code, no models 
to follow. However, once you have concepts of supernatural agents with 
strategic information, these are made more salient and relevant by the fact 
that you can easily insert them in moral reasoning that would be there in 
any case. To some extent religious concepts are parasitic upon moral 
intuitions.56
 
 
 Moral intuitions help make religious beliefs more relevant and salient. While not 
the source or origin of commitment to moral objectivity, it may also be that this 
religious/theological context helps to preserve a commitment to moral objectivity. Shaun 
Nichols explores this idea: 
Although religious considerations do not seem to explain the acquisition 
of the belief in objectivity, religious beliefs might play an important role 
in shoring up the belief in objectivity. The relationship between religion 
and morality is complicated, of course. Perhaps most importantly, most 
people regard voluntarism (or Divine Command Theory) as implausible—
that is, at least many adults think that right and wrong are not decided by 
God, and Nucci’s evidence suggests that even Amish teenagers share this 
view. Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly part of the doctrine surrounding 
many religions, including those in the Abrahamic tradition, that morality is 
objective. The moral truths, if not created by God, are certainly known by 
                                                          
56Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought (New York: 
Basic Books, 2001), 189-191. 
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God. This would provide an important preservative role for the belief in 
objectivity.57
  
 
 The previous several sections have reached some tentative conclusions regarding 
the origins of morality and the relationship of religion to morality: (1) Religion, 
especially in the form of divine commands, is not the likely origin of morality; (2) 
Morality likely has its origins in human emotions; (3) As such, moral properties are 
response-dependent properties; (4) Morality is non-objective but morality is commonly 
regarded as objective; (5) Moral objectivity is one possible way in which religion and 
morality link up. 
These findings cast interesting light on recent debates between atheists and 
theists, particularly on issues concerning divine command ethics and theological accounts 
of moral objectivity. While there are many ways to formulate a religious or theological 
ethics, divine command theory enjoys widespread popularity, and atheist critics of 
religion typically make divine command theory the object of their attack. But it may be 
that both theists and atheists have exaggerated the importance and significance of divine 
command ethics. 
Recall that in Turiel and Nucci’s research, even very religious children regarded 
canonical moral violations to be wrong in the absence of a specific command from God, 
and even very religious children thought that a divine command could not render a moral 
transgression right. There is thus initial empirical evidence that even very religious 
children tend to reach moral judgments in a manner that is largely autonomous from 
religion. This has important descriptive and normative implications. Descriptively, it 
                                                          
57Nichols, Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment, 183. 
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indicates that one must look elsewhere for an account of the origins of morality and the 
sources of our morality judgments. From a more normative standpoint, it casts doubt on a 
naïve equation of belief in God with moral goodness and the absence of such a belief 
with moral badness. If divine commands play such a negligible role in the moral 
judgments of very religious children, one could hardly see them as the sine qua non of 
morality. If divine command ethics has such little empirical traction with regard to the 
moral judgments of members of religious communities, it can hardly be regarded as 
essential to ethics or as a prescription for societal health. There hardly seems to be a 
justification for regarding those who approach ethics in a manner autonomous from 
divine commands as morally suspect, unless one is prepared to regard Amish and Dutch 
Calvinist children as morally suspect or at least deeply mistaken in the way they go about 
making moral judgments. It may be that divine command ethics is a form of theological 
correctness. A religious belief explicitly endorsed by members of certain religious 
communities that actually plays a negligible role in actual concrete moral judgments.     
Interestingly, this research cuts both ways. Atheists also tend to place a great deal 
of emphasis on divine command ethics, focusing on its negative aspects; but moral 
judgments based on divine commands may be less common than atheists think, even in 
traditions (e.g., Dutch Calvinism) that emphasize theological voluntarism. Indeed atheists 
and secularists might be heartened by the fact that most Dutch Calvinist children thought 
that stealing would still be wrong even if God had commanded/written in the Bible that 
they should steal. Atheists and theists may, in fact, share more in common in terms of 
their moral judgments than either side would initially think. There is some initial 
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evidence pointing in this direction. In the Harvard Moral Sense Test, Marc Hauser and 
his colleagues have analyzed the responses of two hundred thousand people representing 
diverse cultural and religious backgrounds. Subjects were presented with a contrast 
between a harmful action and a significant benefit in terms of lives saved. Responses to 
the dilemmas are remarkably similar across cultural and religious differences. As Hauser 
notes, “More specifically, in dozens of dilemmas, and with thousands of subjects, the 
pattern of moral judgments delivered by subjects from a religious background do not 
differ from those who are atheists.”58
                                                          
58 Ilkka Pyysiainen, and Marc Hauser, "The Origins of Religion: Evolved Adaptation or by-
Product?," Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14, no. 3 (2009): 106. 
 Religion no doubt interacts with and shapes 
morality in interesting ways, but it is doubtful that religion is the origin of morality. The 
traditional worry that “if God is dead, then everything is permitted” seems unfounded. 
Interestingly, there may be a group for whom “all is permitted,” but what appears to be 
absent in this group is not belief in God or even intelligence or a crucial cognitive 
capacity but rather the absence of a crucial emotional repertoire. Work on psychopaths 
and disgust underscores the centrality of emotion in moral judgment. This makes moral 
truths anthropocentric truths and moral properties response dependent properties. 
However, human beings tend to be objectivists about morality, and this commonsense 
belief in moral objectivity may provide a plausible point of contact between religion and 
morality. Moral objectivism is a false but extremely common metaethical thesis that links 
up with religion in important ways. Religious belief and commitment to moral objectivity 
seem to go hand in hand. Goodness or rather “The Good” is located entirely outside the 
human person in a transcendental realm which human beings can access. There are many 
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who believe that a theologically grounded moral objectivism is essential for normative 
ethics. Thus Linda Zagzebski writes: 
Isn’t the theist as much faced with the problem of moral pluralism as is the 
non-theist? In response, it seems to me that it is certainly true that the 
theist is faced with a certain amount of skepticism about his own particular 
moral judgments. Theism does not guarantee the possession of moral truth 
to the believer. However, the theist has a better way of dealing with the 
problem of moral pluralism in two ways. First, the theist has another 
source of moral knowledge in divine revelation and the teachings of the 
Church….This is not to suggest that the theist has no problems with doubt 
about the interpretation of God’s will. Such a suggestion would be naïve.  
But again, the Christian concept of providence provides confidence that 
these problems are resolvable.59
 
 
Theological objectivism seems to provide a neat solution to the problem of moral 
pluralism. However, there exist multiple religious communities and even within religious 
communities— say the Anglican Communion or the Roman Catholic Church—there is 
robust disagreement on moral issues. These moral disagreements simply mirror those of 
secular society. Contrary to Zagzebski’s claim that the theist has a better way of dealing 
with the challenge of moral pluralism, appeal to a transcendent source of moral 
objectivity seems to make moral disagreement even more intractable, as claims about the 
transcendent have proved difficult if not impossible to adjudicate. Peter Byrne aptly 
describes these difficulties: 
There is more than one claim to be the source of true revelation and the 
true Church. Where there is agreement on these things, we can find 
disagreement over how they should be interpreted. The fact of moral 
diversity itself encourages disagreements on what is religious authority 
and how it is to be interpreted. Finally, if Zagzebski is right, we should 
expect to find that those in receipt of the true revelation on moral matters 
                                                          
59Linda Zagzebski, "Does Ethics Need God?," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of 
Christian Philosophers 4, no. 3 (1987), 302. 
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and those possessing the teachings of the true Church in this area should 
stand out as having greater moral knowledge than those less fortunate. 
These folk should stand out as the ones able to rise above disagreements 
and settle them.  Their views are not subject to the relativities and 
uncertainties others are enmired in.  Is there such a group of moral agents?  
Who are its members?60
 
 
There have yet to be any compelling answers to the questions raised by Byrne. There are 
thus numerous problems with a theological account of moral objectivity. In terms of 
metaphysics, theological objectivism assumes the truth of theism, and as noted in the 
previous chapters of this dissertation, there are many reasons to be skeptical about the 
truth of theism. Secondly, there is a massive amount of empirical evidence implicating 
the emotions in moral judgment. This research calls into question the plausibility of 
moral properties like “good” and “bad” “right” and “wrong” existing independently of 
homo sapiens. In terms of epistemology, there is no sort of consensus on the moral issues 
the way there is with other objective properties (e.g., the roundness of the Earth). As 
Byrne’s quote illustrates, this lack of consensus exists both between even within religious 
communities. Transcendental claims about moral objectivity are problematic on both 
metaphysical and epistemological grounds, but such claims also might be problematic 
from a moral standpoint. Moral objectivism contributes to the intractability of moral 
disputes, especially when couched in theological terms. It may enhance a cognitive bias 
that has been termed “direct realism”: the well-documented psychological tendency to 
regard oneself or one’s group as right and others as biased. Jonathan Haidt highlights the 
ethical dangers of such a stance: 
                                                          
60Peter Byrne, The Moral Interpretation of Religion (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 80. 
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If I could nominate one candidate for ‘biggest obstacle to world peace and 
social harmony,’ it would be naïve realism because it is so easily ratcheted 
up from the individual to the group level: My group is right because they 
see things as they are. Those who disagree are obviously biased by their 
religion, their ideology, or their self-interest.61
 
  
One might be well advised to abandon or at least bracket claims about moral 
objectivity and to analyze more deeply the sources of moral pluralism and conflict. The 
next sections will provide such an analysis focusing on the relationship of reason and 
emotion and biology and culture in morality. 
Mind Science, Metaethics, and Religion II: Jonathan Haidt and 
Joshua Greene on the Relationship of Emotion and Reason in Moral Judgment 
Work on the centrality of emotion in morality fits nicely with evidence from 
contemporary psychology concerning the centrality of automatic intuition in human 
thought. 
Intuitions are the judgments, solutions, and ideas that pop into 
consciousness without our being aware of the mental processes that led to 
them…Moral intuitions are a subclass of intuitions, in which feelings of 
approval and disapproval pop into awareness as we see and hear about 
something someone did or as we consider choices for ourselves.62
 
 
Work on the intuitions and automatic processing has led to a rediscovery of the 
unconscious in contemporary scientific, experimental psychology. This is not the 
psychoanalytic unconscious of Freud and his followers but rather an adaptive 
                                                          
61Jonathan Haidt, The Happiness Hypothesis: Finding Modern Truth in Ancient Wisdom (New 
York: Basic Books, 2006), 71. 
 
62Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph, "Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions Generate 
Culturally Variable Virtues," Daedalus 133, no. 4 (2004). 
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unconscious with roots in the evolutionary past of human beings.63
(1) Intuitive Judgment Link 
 Psychologists are apt 
to understand human beings in light of dual process models: many cognitive processes 
occur fast and automatically and outside of conscious awareness; however, human beings 
can also deliberate about things in a more explicit and conscious manner. The notion of 
dual processing systems and the fact that many moral judgments seem to be driven by 
emotion-laden intuitions raises important questions about how reason functions in moral 
judgment. Jonathan Haidt has developed a social intuitionist account of moral judgment 
that seeks to account for the complex interplay between reason and the passions in moral 
judgment. Haidt offers his social intuitionist model as an explicit alternative to rationalist 
models of moral psychology; however, reason does not disappear in this account. It 
simply is given a more complex role. Haidt proposes a six-step model of moral judgment. 
The model is offered here not as a definitive guide to moral judgment but as a helpful 
heuristic tool for thinking about emotion, reason and their respective roles in moral 
judgment.  Haidt proposes six links in moral judgment: 
(2) Post-hoc Reasoning Link 
(3) Reasoned Persuasion Link 
(4) Social Persuasion Link 
(5) Reasoned Judgment Link 
(6) Private Reflection Link64
 
 
The evidence reviewed above concerning the primacy of emotion in moral judgment 
supports the claim that moral judgments are primarily driven by affect-laden intuitions.  
                                                          
63See Timothy D. Wilson, Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002). 
 
64Jonathan Haidt, "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to 
Moral Judgment," Psychological Review 108, no. 4 (2001). 
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The primacy of the Intuitive Judgment Link stands in contrast to traditional models of 
rationalist moral psychology which understand moral judgments to be caused exclusively 
by reasoned judgment and private reflection. Haidt rejects the rationalist model on the 
basis of evidence for the primacy of emotion in moral judgment, such as that reviewed 
above; however, he also rejects this model on the basis of evidence concerning the nature 
of reasoning. Rationalist models cannot account for the dual-process nature of human 
cognition, and the post-hoc biased nature that much of our reasoning takes. Haidt’s model 
does not deny a causal role to reason in moral judgment, but offers a more complex 
account of how that causality occurs. Haidt’s model also does not deny the role of 
reasoned judgment or private reflection, but simply points to their rarity. 
Emotion, Post-Hoc Reasoning, and Morality: 
Joshua Greene’s Critique of Rationalist Deontology 
The notion of dual-processing systems and the fact that many moral judgments 
seem to be driven by affect-laden intuitions raise important questions about how reason 
functions in moral judgment. One striking discovery in contemporary cognitive science 
and neuroscience is that when a causal explanation of a behavior is hidden from 
conscious introspection, human beings will generate a rational explanation for the 
behavior in question. Evidence for this post-hoc, confabulatory reason comes from both 
neuroscience and social psychology. Perhaps the most dramatic example of post-hoc 
confabulatory reason comes from studies of so-called “split brain” patients. These 
patients had their corpus collusums severed surgically to prevent severe epileptic 
seizures. Roger Sperry, Joseph Bogen, and Michael Gazzaniga did ground breaking work 
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on such patients.65 Some of the most important findings were discovered in presenting 
images to the two separated hemispheres of the brain. For instance, an image of a hat 
presented to subjects’ right visual field is processed by their left hemisphere, the 
hemisphere that also controls the speech centers of the brain. Thus if an image of a hat is 
flashed to the left hemisphere, when asked to respond, the person would say “hat;” 
however, if an image was flashed to the right hemisphere—which does not control 
speech—when asked to respond, the patient—responding from the verbal left hemisphere 
would say nothing. When asked to point with their left hand to the image, the subject 
would point to the image of a hat.66 Some of the most interesting experimental results 
occurred when Gazzaniga flashed images simultaneously to the right and left 
hemispheres. A picture of a chicken claw would be flashed to the left hemisphere while a 
picture of a snowy scene would be flashed to the right. When asked to point to what they 
had just seen, the person would point to a chicken with his right hand and to a shovel 
with his left hand. When the patient was asked to explain his two responses, the patient, 
responding from the verbal left hemisphere, remarked: “Oh that’s easy. The chicken claw 
goes with the chicken, and you need a shovel to clean out the chicken shed.”67
                                                          
65M. Gazzaniga, J. Bogen, and R. Sperry, "Some Functional Effects of Sectioning the Cerebral 
Commissures in Man," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA 48 (1962). 
 
Importantly, Gazzaniga argues that the confabulatory/interpretive role of the linguistic 
centers of the left hemisphere is not unique to split-brain patients. Gazzaniga refers to the 
 
66Ibid. 
 
67Michael Gazzaniga, The Social Brain (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 72. 
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linguistic centers on the left side of the brain as the “interpreter module;” its job is to 
“interpret” behaviors even though it has no access to the real causes of such behaviors.68
 A great deal of social psychological research has uncovered a similar pattern of 
using reason to construct a plausible explanation for a behavior whose actual causal 
source is hidden from consciousness. In an early experiment of this sort, Richard Nisbett 
and Timothy Wilson set up a display of five identical pairs of panty hose in a row in a 
store and asked shoppers to select a pair of the pantyhose. Subjects tended to pick from 
the right side of the display, but when asked as to why they picked the pair that they did, 
they offered responses emphasizing the superiority of their selection—knit, sheerness, 
etc.—however, the actual choice had nothing to do with these factors because the items 
were in fact identical.
 
69
 Joshua Greene has recently applied evidence concerning both the emotional 
nature of moral judgments and the post-hoc confabulatory character of much of our 
reasoning to philosophical theories of morality. Greene is particularly interested in 
contrasting deontological and consequentialist patterns of moral judgment. Deontology 
and consequentialism are both rationalist theories of morality. Typically using the 
language of rights and duties, deontology holds that certain actions are right or wrong 
irrespective in and of themselves and irrespective of consequences. The criteria that one 
uses to reach deontological judgments are rational criteria. Consequentialist or 
teleological accounts of morality assess the moral value of an action solely on the basis of 
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69Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson, "Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on 
Mental Processes," Psychological Review 84 (1977). 
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its consequences. Formally articulated forms of deontology and consequentialism have 
been around for around 200 years; however, an evolutionary perspective views human 
morality within a much broader scope. In light of this evolutionary perspective, Greene 
proposes that there may be more to deontology and consequentialism than meets the eye. 
…I propose…that the terms “deontology” and “consequentialism” refer to 
psychological natural kinds. I believe that consequentialist and 
deontological views of philosophy are not so much philosophical 
inventions as they are philosophical manifestations of two dissociable 
psychological patterns, two different ways of moral thinking, that have 
been part of the human repertoire for thousands of years. According to this 
view the moral philosophies of Kant, Mill, and others are just the explicit 
tip of large, mostly implicit psychological icebergs. If that is correct, then 
philosophers may not really know what they’re dealing with when they 
trade in consequentialist and deontological moral theories, and we may 
have to do some science to find out.70
 
 
 Greene, in particular, points out that scientific data raises significant questions 
about the purported rational credentials of deontological moral philosophy. Recall that 
deontology holds that certain actions are right or wrong irrespective of their 
consequences, and that reason provides the basis for such moral judgments. Greene 
presents evidence from a number of sources that show a correlation between 
deontological judgments and alarm-like emotional responses. Greene proposes that 
deontological judgments are in fact driven by emotion rather than reason and that 
deontological reasoning/philosophy serves as a post-hoc justification of an affectively 
valenced moral intuition. Evidence of correlation between emotion and deontological 
moral judgments comes from neuroimaging studies of moral dilemmas, studies 
evaluating attitudes toward punishment, and studies concerning the moral condemnation 
                                                          
70Greene, 38. 
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of harmless actions. Greene’s own empirical research centers on the neuroimaging of 
people engaging various moral dilemmas, such as the “trolley” and “footbridge” problem. 
   In the trolley dilemma, a runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be 
killed if it continues on its present course.71 The only way to save the five people is to hit 
a switch that will move the trolley to a side track where it will kill one person instead of 
five. In the footbridge dilemma, a runaway trolley also threatens to kill five people—only 
in this instance you are standing next to a large stranger on a footbridge, and the only way 
to save the five is by pushing the stranger onto the tracks.72
                                                          
71Joshua D. Greene, R. Brian Sommerville, Leigh E. Nystrom, John M. Darley, Jonathan D. 
Cohen, "An Fmri Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment," Science 293 (2001). 
 These two moral dilemmas 
generate quite different conclusions. The consensus in the trolley dilemma is that it is 
more acceptable to save five lives at the expense of one; however, the consensus with 
regard to the footbridge dilemma is that one cannot save five lives at the expense of one. 
In short, people tend to show a consequentialist response to the trolley dilemma and a 
deontological response to the footbridge dilemma. Why? This question has vexed 
philosophers. Some have sought to offer a normative justification for distinguishing 
between the two cases. Thus the trolley dilemma is an example of the principle of double-
effect where someone is harmed as a side effect of an action, whereas footbridge involves 
using someone as a means. However, responses remain the same in the “loop” version of 
the trolley dilemma. The trolley is headed toward five people, a side track branches off 
but in this case loops around and would kill the 5 people if the person was not on the 
sidetrack. As in the trolley case, people judge that turning the trolley is morally 
 
72Ibid. 
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acceptable in order to save five lives, but here, as in the footbridge case, the person is 
used directly as a means.73
 Thus in both dilemmas there is a strong intuition that the moral dilemmas are 
importantly different and yet people have a hard time explaining exactly what the 
difference is. “How is it that nearly everyone manages to conclude that it is acceptable to 
sacrifice one life for five in the trolley dilemma but not in the footbridge dilemma, in 
spite of the fact that a satisfying justification for distinguishing between these cases is 
extremely hard to find?”
  
74
The rationale for distinguishing between personal and impersonal forms 
of harm is largely evolutionary. “Up close and personal” violence has been 
around for a very long time, reaching far back into our primate 
lineage….Given that personal violence is evolutionarily ancient, predating 
our recently evolved capacities for complex abstract reasoning, it should 
come as no surprise if we have innate responses to personal violence that 
are powerful but rather primitive. That is, we might expect humans to have 
negative emotional responses to certain basic forms of interpersonal 
violence, where these responses evolved as a means of regulating the 
behavior of creatures who are capable of intentionally harming one 
 Greene and his colleagues proposed a purely descriptive 
approach to these issues. Greene’s group hypothesized that the difference between the 
dilemmas was to be made on emotional rather than rational grounds. The hypothesis was 
that “up-close and personal” moral situations like the footbridge case are much more 
emotionally salient than the impersonal situation found in the trolley case. It is an 
emotional judgment that drives the judgment of the impermissibility of the act. The basis 
of drawing this personal/impersonal distinction was largely evolutionary: 
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another, but whose survival depends on cooperation and individual 
restraint.75
 
 
This prediction was exactly what was observed. Responding to personal moral dilemmas, 
as compared with impersonal and nonmoral dilemmas produced increased activity in 
areas associated with social and emotional processing including the posterior cingulate 
cortex, the medial prefrontal cortex, the amygdala, and the superior temporal sulcus.76 By 
contrast, both impersonal and non-moral dilemmas produced activity in areas associated 
with “higher cognition”: the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and inferior parietal lobe.77 
Greene also tested reaction times regarding the impermissibility/permissibility of actions 
in the personal and impersonal moral dilemmas. Personal violations involve a strong 
emotional inclination not to perform the act. Thus ‘no’ responses regarding the 
permissibility of a personal moral dilemma should be quick while ‘yes’ responses should 
take longer because one has to overcome initial emotional resistance.78 This is exactly 
what was observed, with no differences in reaction times in the impersonal or non-moral 
conditions.79
                                                          
75Greene, "The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul," 43. 
 The tendency toward consequentialism or deontology can be explained as a 
function of emotion: There is a tendency toward consequentialism when the emotional 
response is low and toward deontology when the emotional response is high. 
 
76Greene, "An Fmri Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment." 
 
77Ibid. 
 
78Ibid. 
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 This same framework can be applied to other dilemmas.  Peter Singer, for 
example, famously raised the question of why people experience a strict obligation to 
wade into a pond to save a nearby drowning child but no corresponding obligation to 
donate to organizations helping sick starving children across the globe. Both situations 
involve a substantial benefit with negligible cost to the person performing the action. This 
pattern of response is exactly what one would expect under Greene’s hypothesis where 
characteristically deontological responses are elicited in personal contexts evoking an 
emotional response.   
…[P]eople tend to believe, in a characteristically deontological way, that 
they are within their moral rights in spending their money on luxuries for 
themselves, despite the fact that their money could be used to dramatically 
improve the lives of other people. This is exactly what one would expect if 
(1) the deontological sense of obligation is driven primarily by emotion, 
and (2) when it comes to obligations to aid, emotions are only sufficiently 
engaged when those to whom we might owe something are encountered 
(or conceived of) in a personal way.80
 
 
 A similar pattern can be observed in attitudes toward punishment. 
Consequentialist theories of punishment focus solely on the positive consequences of the 
punishment. Deontological theories focus on retribution, on giving wrongdoers what they 
deserve. Experimental evidence has shown that people tend to be retributivists and that 
this retributivism seems to be emotionally driven, and people punish in proportion to the 
extent that transgressions make them angry.81
                                                          
80Greene, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul,” 48. 
 Greene cites Haidt’s studies of the moral 
 
81Ibid., 50-55.  See J. Baron, R. Gowda, and H. Kunreuther, "Attitudes toward Managing 
Hazardous Waste: What Should Be Cleaned up and Who Should Pay for It?," Risk Analysis 13, no. 2 
(1993); D. Kahneman, D. Schkade, and C. Sunstein, "Shared Outrage and Erratic Rewards: The 
Psychology of Punitive Damages," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 16 (1998); J. Baron and I. Ritov, 
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condemnation of harmless actions as further evidence of the correlation between emotion 
and deontology. Many people understood a classic deontological violation (failing to 
keep one’s promise to visit one’s mother’s grave) as morally wrong, and recall that the 
bother probe was a better predictor of moral condemnation than the harm probe.82
 Greene presents in a number of examples where deontological judgments 
correlate closely with emotion. Someone who defends rationalist deontology has to 
explain the correlation and as rationalists they cannot say that emotions cause the 
deontological judgment.   
 
Thus, in light of these data, there are a series of coincidences for which 
various rationalist deontologists must account. For example, according to 
Judith Jarvis Thomson…and Frances Kamm…, there is a complicated, 
highly abstract theory of rights that explains why it is okay to sacrifice one 
life for five in the trolley case but not in the footbridge case, and it just so 
happens, that we have a strong negative emotional response to the latter 
case to not to the former. Likewise, according to Colin McGinn and 
Frances Kamm, there is a theory of duty that explains why we have an 
obligation to help Singer’s drowning child but not comparable obligation 
to save starving children on the other side of the world, and it just so 
happens that we have strong emotional responses to the former individuals 
but not the latter. According to Kant and many other legal theorists…, 
there is a complicated abstract theory of punishment that explains why we 
ought to punish people regardless of whether there are social benefits to be 
gained in doing so, and it just so happens that we have emotional 
responses that incline us to do exactly that.  The categorical imperative 
prohibits masturbation because it involves using oneself as a means, and it 
just so happens that the categorical imperative’s chief proponent finds 
masturbation really, really disgusting.83
                                                                                                                                                                             
"Intuitions About Penalties and Compensation in the Context of Tort Law," Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty 7 (1993). 
 
 
82Greene, "The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul," 55-58. See Haidt, "Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is 
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For Greene, the correlation is best explained by regarding deontological moral 
philosophy as a post-hoc rationalization of an emotionally driven moral intuition. 
Deontology, then, is a kind of moral confabulation. We have strong 
feelings that tell us in clear and uncertain terms that some things simply 
cannot be done and that other things simply must be done. But it is not 
obvious how to make sense of these feelings, and so we, with the help of 
some especially creative philosophers, make up a rationally appealing 
story….Deontology, I believe, is a natural “cognitive” expression of our 
deepest moral emotions.84
 
 
The conclusions drawn thus far are the following: much of moral judgment is driven by 
emotional intuitions and that reason often functions as a post-hoc justification for 
intuitions.   
Emotion and Reason in Jonathan Haidt’s Social Intuitionist 
 
Model of Moral Judgment 
 
The notion that moral judgment is driven by emotional intuitions and that reason 
often functions in a post-hoc manner does not rule out a causal role for reason to play in 
moral judgments. The relationship between reason and emotion in the Social Intuitionism 
is complex, and Haidt’s model allows for reason to play a causal role in several ways.  
Recall that Haidt’s model is a six-step approach to moral judgment: 
(1) Intuitive Judgment Link 
(2) Post-hoc Reasoning Link 
(3) Reasoned Persuasion Link 
(4) Social Persuasion Link 
(5) Reasoned Judgment Link 
(6) Private Reflection Link85
 
 
                                                          
84Ibid., 63. 
 
85Haidt, "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral 
Judgment." 
 
  
259 
We have discussed the first two links in Haidt’s model: (1) Intuitive Judgment 
Link, (2) Post-Hoc Reasoning Link. These links emphasize the intuitive aspects of the 
Social Intuitionist Model. Importantly, Haidt’s model does not deny that reason may play 
an important role in moral judgment. His model includes a role for both (5) Reasoned 
Judgment and (6) Private Reflection, aspects of moral judgment emphasized in much 
traditional philosophy and in rationalist moral psychology. While these more private 
forms of moral reasoning may play a causal role in moral judgment, Haidt argues that 
these links are utilized relatively infrequently. Haidt argues that reason tends to exercise a 
causal role primarily within a social context. The role of social aspects of the Social 
Intuitionist Model are captured in the (3) Reasoned Persuasion Link and (4) Social 
Persuasion Link. This sensitivity to others and to group norms should not come as a 
surprise given the ultra social nature of homo sapiens.   
Only human beings cooperate widely and intensely with nonkin, and we 
do it in part through a set of social psychological adaptations that make us 
extremely sensitive to and influenceable by what other people think and 
feel. We have an intense need to belong and fit in, and our moral 
judgments are strongly shaped by what others in our ‘parish’ believe, even 
when they don’t give us any reason for this belief.86
 
  
 Given this context, the moral intuitions of others can influence one’s own moral 
intuitions, even if no explicit reasoning is used. This dynamic is captured in what Haidt 
calls Social Persuasion. The social intuitionist model also allows reason to play a causal 
role in moral judgment. He proposes that the reasoning used to justify one’s moral 
judgment can exert a causal effect on the moral intuitions of others. This is the Reasoned 
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Persuasion Link. Haidt argues that because of the strongly affective nature of morality, 
reasoned persuasion will work more by triggering affectively valanced intuitions in the 
listener than by providing logically compelling arguments. As noted above, the social 
intuitionist model also allows for more private forms of reasoning—cases where people 
reason their way to a conclusion to override an initial intuition. One can see this for 
example in Greene’s discussion of response latencies in personal, emotion-involving 
moral dilemmas. However, “such reasoning is hypothesized to be rare, occurring 
primarily in cases where the initial intuition is weak and the processing capacity is 
high.”87
The Biological and Cultural Origins of Moral Intuitions 
 The Private Reflection Link allows for the spontaneous activation of new 
intuitions and role taking with regard to these new intuitions. Thus, a person comes to see 
an issue or dilemma from more than one side and thereby experiences conflicting 
intuitions. Thus while highlighting the centrality of emotional intuitions in moral 
judgment, three of the six links in Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model allow for reasoning to 
play a causal role: (3) Reasoned Persuasion, (5) Reasoned Judgment, (6) Private 
Judgment.   
 Where do such moral intuitions and the judgments and virtues that they generate 
come from? An appealing aspect of the social intuitionist model is that it overcomes 
dichotomies between nativism and empiricism in thinking about the origins of morality. 
Haidt understands intuitions as having their origin in biology and evolution but also as 
profoundly shaped by immersion in various culture complexes. As such intuitions serve 
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as a bridging concept between higher level social science and lower level biology. What 
sorts of moral intuitions would human beings be prone to develop? Haidt and Joseph 
surveyed five major contemporary analyses of cross cultural universals and tallied the 
most frequently mentioned social situations where people were prone to respond either 
positively or negatively. The winners were suffering/compassion, reciprocity/fairness, 
hierarchy/respect, and purity/disgust. It is not hard to see the adaptive functions that each 
of these modules could perform. 
 Reflecting on suffering, hierarchy, and reciprocity Haidt and Joseph write:  
…[T]he prolonged dependence characteristic of primates, especially 
humans, made it necessary, or at least beneficial, for mothers to detect 
signs of suffering and distress in their offspring.…Psychological 
preparation for hierarchy evolved to help animals living in social groups 
make the most of their relative abilities to dominate others.…Similarly, a 
readiness for reciprocity evolved to help animals, particularly primates, 
reap the benefits of cooperating with non-kin.88
 
  
Human morality is thus not infinitely malleable but neither is it set in stone.  
There are several reasons for this variability. First, drawing upon Dan Sperber’s 
distinction between proper domain and actual domain—the proper domain is the original 
adaptive trigger; the actual domain is anything that triggers the module—the four moral 
modules can extend well beyond their original adaptive triggers. For example, disgust, 
can be extended beyond contaminants and waste products to whole social groups. 
Secondly, different cultures make relative use of the four modules, and it is not possible 
for any one culture to emphasize all of the intuitions. Haidt sees the acquisition of 
morality as similar to the acquisition of phonology. Just as no one language can use all 
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the clicks, labials, and glottal stops, “a culture that emphasized all of the moral intuitions 
would risk paralysis as every action triggered multiple conflicting intuitions.” Thus 
cultures tend to emphasize the different modules to varying degrees  
Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment offers a robust account of 
moral pluralism, conflict, and diversity to augment the account developed in the earlier 
sections of this chapter. There we saw that people tend to see divine commands as 
essential to moral judgment, when in fact they are not, even in very religious 
communities. Likewise, people tend to see moral properties as part of the objective 
furniture of the universe, when in fact they are most likely response-dependent properties 
that depend on certain emotions. The Social Intuitionist Model shows how reason as well 
as religion can provide a potent source of moral conflict. We think of moral judgments as 
caused by reason when in fact reasoning may come in after the judgment has been made. 
As Jonathan Haidt has noted we are prone to two profound illusions with regard to the 
moral life. First, we tend to believe that our moral reasoning (tail) drives moral judgment 
(dog) (wag-the-dog illusion). Secondly, we tend to believe that successful rebuttal of 
arguments will change other’s moral opinions (wag the other dog’s tail illusion).   
The bitterness, futility, and self-righteousness of most moral arguments 
can now be explicated…[In a debate about morality] both sides believe 
that their positions are based on reasoning about the facts and issues 
involved (wag-the-dog illusion). Both sides present what they take to be 
excellent arguments in support of their positions. Both sides expect the 
other side to be responsive to such reasons (the wag-the-other-dog’s-tail-
illusion). When the other side fails to be affected by such good reasons, 
each side concludes that the other side must be closed minded or insincere. 
In this way, the culture wars over issues such as homosexuality and 
  
263 
abortion can generate morally motivated players on both sides who believe 
that their opponents are not morally motivated.89
 
   
Moral intuitions and virtues are shaped by culture and differ profoundly cross 
culturally, according to the degree to which the various intuitive building blocks of 
morality—suffering, reciprocity, hierarchy, purity—are emphasized. Knowledge of these 
factors alone is not sufficient to resolve issues, but they create an awareness of the 
complexities involved in moral matters and rule out simplistic solutions. 
Mind Science, Metaethics, and Religion III: Implications of Scientific Moral 
Psychology for Normative Morality and Religious Practices 
 We have ruled out an approach that sees morality as flowing from religion, 
specifically from divine commands. Contemporary natural and social science calls into 
question such claims concerning moral rationalism. Moral judgments are driven by 
emotion-laden intuitions and profoundly shaped by social and cultural interaction. Where 
does this leave issues of normative morality and religion? It is argued that the findings of 
scientific moral psychology support a virtue ethics as the best approach to normative 
morality. Worries about the normative implications of both the Social Intuitionist Model 
of moral judgment and virtue theory are then addressed. Finally, it is argued that the 
focus on emotion and virtue may open the door to a positive valuation of certain religious 
practices and a fruitful point of contact between religion and science. This claim is 
investigated in light of Richard Davidson’s work on Buddhist mindfulness meditation. 
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Scientific Moral Psychology, Virtue Ethics, and 
Issues of Normative Moral Evaluation 
 In terms of the issue of normative implications, a number of naturalistic moral 
philosophers and scientific moral psychologists have argued that a virtue based 
understanding of morality is most adequate in light of our scientific understanding of the 
human person. Jonathan Haidt endorses the turn to virtue theory in several places.   
We believe that virtue theories are the most psychologically sound 
approach to morality.…Such theories fit more neatly with what we know 
about moral development, judgment, and behavior than do theories that 
focus on moral reasoning or the acceptance of higher level moral 
principles such as justice.90
 
 
In another location Haidt writes: 
 
I believe that this turn from character to quandary was a profound mistake 
for two reasons. First, it weakens morality and limits its scope. Where the 
ancients saw virtue and character at work in everything a person does, our 
modern conception confines morality to a set of situations that arise for 
each person only a few times in a given week” tradeoffs between self-
interest and the interests of others. In our thin and restricted modern 
conception, a moral person is one who gives to charity, helps others, plays 
by the rules, and in general does not put her own self-interest too far ahead 
of others…. 
The second problem with the turn to moral reasoning is that it 
relies on bad psychology. Many moral education efforts since the 1970’s 
take the rider off the elephant and train him to solve problems on his own. 
After being exposed to hours of case studies, classroom discussions about 
moral dilemmas, and videos about people who faced dilemmas and made 
the right choices, the child learns how (not what) to think.  Then class 
ends, the rider gets back on the elephant, and nothing changes at recess.91
 
  
The philosopher and moral psychologist William Casebeer makes a similar point.  
“Ultimately, the correct situation makes the moral psychology that is required by virtue 
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theory the most neurobiologically plausible, although this is a tentative, defeasible 
conclusion, and more work is needed to confirm it.”92
 The task of normatively evaluating theories grounded in moral emotions and 
virtue becomes more difficult but not an impossibility. What is lost is simply the false 
clarity that theological and rationalist approaches aspire to. Theological and rationalist 
approaches have dominated Western approaches to ethics, and frequently these two 
approaches are knit together. Both of these approaches involve commitment to strong 
forms of moral objectivity. One consequence of this is when such views collapse, people 
tend to think that the only alternative left is subjective relativism. Descriptive accounts of 
morality, such as Haidt’s social intuitionist model, raise a number of worries for 
normative morality. In Haidt’s account, virtues are the products of biologically based 
intuitions shaped by culture. Both the social and the intuitionist aspects of morality raise 
concerns. The worry about intuitionism is that there is no way to check and transform 
intuitions and no role for reasoning to play in moral judgment. The worry about social is 
that virtues are culturally specific and that there is no way of evaluating cross cultural 
claims.  
 
 Owen Flanagan has done important work on naturalistic ethics that dovetails with 
many of the findings discussed above. The worry about the relativity of virtue to social 
context Flanagan refers to as the “internalist” objection. “The only measure of what 
constitutes flourishing, excellence, enlightenment is in fact what norms are avowed, 
                                                          
92William D. Casebeer, "Moral Cognition and Its Neural Constituents " Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience 4 (2003). 
  
266 
practiced, considered best from inside the culture.”93
We are always because it is the nature of the human condition, in some 
kind of internalist predicament. But normative assessment, moral 
improvement, and so on, must come from the dialectical space of our own 
norms, the norms of those who live differently, and in the space of meta-
norms for resolving disagreements or deciding to live tolerantly without 
agreement. This means that the internalist predicament admits of degrees 
and that to the degree that we reflect widely, from a perspective that 
includes other moral conceptions, we are going external in some 
meaningful sense of the term ‘external’
 However, this state of affairs does 
not preclude cross-cultural comparison and evaluation; it simply represents honestly the 
epistemic situation human beings find themselves in. What is precluded is not cross-
cultural comparison and evaluation; what is precluded is doing such an analysis from an 
impossible transcendental standpoint. As Flanagan notes: 
94
 
  
In light of this, Flanagan proposes meta-norms for addressing and evaluating moral issues 
from a vantage point broader than one’s own culture. What Flanagan calls his key meta-
norm involves engaging in a process of wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) when a key 
issue is at stake in terms of norms, virtues, etc. 
WRE is a normative test that says we ought to test our ideas about life by 
bringing them into the widest space of reasons possible. The test, in order 
to be psychologically realizable, involves taking as genuine all credible 
contending options available in the space of meaning. Or, perhaps more 
credible and judicious, it requires reflecting widely when there are 
misgiving about norms, values, and virtues and when internal scrutiny 
does not yield a satisfactory solution.95
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Another norm Flanagan suggests addresses the worry about the intuitive nature of many 
of our moral judgments. Flanagan calls this an “intuition-checking meta-norm (ICMN): 
If nature has gifted us with a moral system that operates mostly intuitively 
and if intuitions are not always reliable, then we positioned to propose 
another meta-norm that instructs us to check and double check intuitions 
and gut reactions: Pay close attention to your intuitive moral responses 
and to the confidence you experience about the validity of your norms and 
values. Consider alternatives. Let us call this the intuition checking meta-
norm.96
  
  
 This foregoing analysis has called into question many of the metaethical 
commitments found within religious traditions, but an emphasis on moral emotions and 
virtue may provide a fruitful point of contact between religion and science. Indeed, much 
of the Buddhism-mind science dialogue has taken this direction. The final section of this 
chapter examines this approach, focusing especially on the work of Richard Davidson. 
A Fruitful Approach to Religion and Science: The Buddhism-Mind 
Science Dialogue on Meditation, Affective Style, and Emotion 
 Contrary to the impression of some Westerners, Buddhism is not a kind of paleo-
naturalistic philosophy. At least in its Tibetan versions, it involves what—at least to 
Western eyes—amount to strong dualist (or idealist) claims. These claims have already 
been illustrated in the writings of the Dalai Lama and B. Alan Wallace. This dissertation 
argued that these claims are as problematic as the dualist claims advanced within Western 
monotheistic traditions. Interestingly, however, there has been a substantial engagement 
between contemporary mind science and Buddhism where these ontological claims about 
the nature of mind do not figure prominently at all. Where the dialogue between 
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Christianity and the mind science has focused almost exclusively on metaphysical issues, 
the Buddhist-dialogue centers not so much on the metaphysical and doctrinal aspects of 
religion as its moral and experiential dimensions.97
As was illustrated in the previous chapter, claims about Buddhist meditation are 
complex, and in many cases there are strong metaphysical claims embedded in the notion 
of meditation. For instance, Chapter Three analyzed B. Alan Wallace’s claims that 
meditation shows consciousness to be non-physical and that meditation shows that the 
claims of Tibetan Buddhism are true. However, in much of the Buddhism-mind science 
dialogue these metaphysical claims are bracketed in favor of a focus on the physical, 
mental, and moral benefits of mindfulness meditation. This stems from the awareness that 
there are certain aspects of Buddhist meditation that are amenable to scientific study and 
certain aspects that are not. Christian dialogue tends to focus on the integration of 
metaphysical beliefs with the claims of science. Buddhist dialogue focuses on practices 
and brackets metaphysical issues in the dialogue itself, focusing on issues that are 
publically accessible and empirically tractable. Here the dialogue sets up a scientific 
research program to study religious practices. Thus, much of the Buddhism-mind science 
dialogue itself occurs on naturalistic terms. Chapter Four has already made a case for not 
just bracketing but for suspicion regarding the metaphysical claims of religious dualism, 
but here the important point is that scientific and religious parties agree to a 
methodological bracketing of these claims in creating a scientific research program.  
 Meditation rather than metaphysics 
tends to mediate the Buddhism-mind science dialogue.   
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Dialogue takes the form of a scientific research program rather than a discussion of the 
implications of science of Buddhist metaphysics.   
The neuroscientist Richard Davidson has developed a scientific research program 
for the study of mediation to perhaps the greatest extent.  In a discussion of the study of 
meditation from a scientific perspective, Davidson and his colleagues Antoine Lutz and 
John Dunne point to the need to tease apart: (1) close descriptions of meditative 
techniques and states, (2) the metaphysical or soteriological requirements that must be 
met by these states as expressed in authoritative textual sources.98 They use the Tibetan 
Buddhist practice of “Open Presence” as an example. On the one hand, discussion of this 
practice includes descriptions of techniques and the phenomenal experiences that should 
follow. “For example, discursive techniques for de-emphasizing the objectification of 
sensory content… and the consequent loss of a sense of subject-object duality.”99   
According to Lutz, Dunne, and Davidson:  “these parts of the traditional account lend 
themselves to investigation inasmuch as they describe techniques and results for which 
neural correlates may be plausibly postulated and tested.”100
Buddhist philosophical concerns also demand that the state of open 
presence reflects the ontological foundation of all reality, and Buddhist 
notions of nirvana also require that the realization of that state will lead 
the adept to attain inconceivable physical and mental powers….From a 
 However, additional 
metaphysical or ontological claims are often made about such states: 
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neuroscientific perspective, however, these claims do not lend themselves 
readily to analysis or description. Thus, from the vantage point of the 
researcher who stands outside the tradition, it is crucial to separate the 
highly detailed and verifiable aspects of traditional knowledge about 
meditation from the transcendental claims that form the metaphysical or 
theological context of that knowledge.101
 
   
 Interestingly, this approach is endorsed not only by Western scientists but by 
figures within the Tibetan Buddhist tradition. Reflecting on a dialogue between Tibetan 
Buddhists and Western scientists on the topic of “transforming destructive emotions,” the 
Dalai Lama expresses a willingness to separate the practice of meditation from its 
embedding within a Buddhist context: 
A central claim of Buddhist practice is to reduce the power of destructive 
emotions in our lives. With that aim in mind, Buddhism offers a wide 
range of theoretical insights and practical methods. If any of these 
methods can be shown through scientific tests to be of benefit, then there 
is every reason to find ways to make them available to everyone, whether 
or not they are interested in Buddhism itself.102
 
  
Richard Davidson is concerned to take up questions about well-being, happiness, 
and flourishing in an empirically tractable manner and also to see how certain practices—
specifically mindfulness meditation—can lead to changes in the regions of the brain 
implicated in affective style and moral judgment. An important discovery in recent 
affective neuroscience and psychology is that an individual’s happiness is constrained in 
important ways by a happiness set point or their affective style, the “consistent 
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differences in individuals with regard to emotional reactivity and regulation.”103
Many of the parameters of affective style, such as the threshold to 
respond, magnitude of response, latency to peak response, and recovery 
function, are features that are often opaque to conscious report, though 
they may influence the subjective experience of emotion. These 
parameters of responding can be measured in many different response 
systems including both the central and peripheral systems….In previous 
work, we have argued that variations in some of these parameters in 
particular response systems are especially relevant to vulnerability to 
mood, anxiety, and other disorders and also to resilience….One of the 
important developments in emotion research in general, and in affective 
neuroscience, in particular, is the capacity to objectively measure these 
parameters of responding.
  
Certainly, the broad notion of affect style is nothing new: Hippocrates and Galen offer 
interesting discussions of affective personality differences. However, until quite recently, 
the study of affective style has been based almost exclusively on phenomenological self-
reports. This extends to the taxonomy of psychiatric disorders as listed in the DSM-IV.  
Much of the work of Davidson’s lab is concerned with penetrating below the 
phenomenological level.   
104
 
 
 Davidson and his colleagues have been particularly concerned to identify the 
neural correlates of affective style and to raise the question of the degree to which 
affective style might be adjusted. Davidson’s group links affective style with the ratio of 
left-to-right activation in the frontal/anterior regions of the brain, especially the pre-
frontal cortex (PFC). In short, greater leftward activation is associated with a more 
positive affective style while greater rightward activity is associated with a more negative 
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affective style.105 Evidence for the relationship between left-to-right PRC activation and 
affective style comes from lesion studies and EEG and fMRI studies of normal brains.  
Depressive symptoms tend to be manifested in patients with LPFC damage. The common 
interpretation of this is that the LPFC is responsible for certain aspects of positive 
emotion and capacity for positive emotion is impaired with damage to this brain region.  
Studies with normal subjects have found that LPFC-RPFC can be shifted in lawful ways 
by inducing negative or positive affect.106 Further, extreme LPFC and RPFC activity 
predicts one’s dispositional affect as measured in scales like the PANAS and BIS/BAS. 
PFC activity also predicts one’s reaction to certain emotional situations (emotional 
reactivity). Subjects with strong LPFC activity experienced positive film clips more 
positively and subjects with strong RPFC activity experienced negative movie clips more 
negatively.107
 Davidson’s group is also interested in the question of the degree to which PFC 
activity can be altered—its neuroplasticity. Tentative indications of the neuroplasticity of 
emotional circuitry can already be found in studies of animals and humans. Such research 
on the plasticity of the brain’s emotional circuits is still in its infancy. “Whether repeated 
practice in techniques of emotion regulation lead to more enduring patterns of brain 
activation is a question that has not been answered.”
 
108
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 Davidson and his colleagues tested the effects of an 8-week course on a group of 
novice meditators from a biotechnology firm in Madison, Wisconsin versus a control 
group placed on a waiting list.109 The training consisted of a class that met weekly for 
two point five hours, home practice, and one seven-hour retreat given during the sixth 
week of the program.  Brain electrical activity was measured by EEG before, 
immediately after, and four months after the training period. Subjects in the meditative 
group showed both a significant difference in trait negative affect and showed 
significantly larger increases in left sided anterior activation.110 There was also a 
significant difference in immune response in relationship to the leftward shift. Subjects 
received an influenza vaccine after completing the program. Influenza antibody titers 
were significantly higher in the meditators than in the control group. Subjects with the 
largest lefthand shift in the brain in fact showed the largest increase in antibody titers.111
 In another study, Davidson and his colleagues examined plasticity in some of the 
neural circuitry associated with empathy and compassion. This study builds on research 
linking the insula and anterior cingulate gyrus with empathic response. Davidson and 
colleagues were concerned to investigate the effects of meditation on these areas of the 
brain.   
 
To cultivate [compassion] practitioners in a number of traditions have 
developed meditative practices, which are thought to be essential to 
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counteract self-centered tendencies. Techniques included concentration 
exercises that train attention, behavioral training such as the practice of 
generosity, cognitive strategies including reflection on the fleeting nature 
of the self and empathic strategies such as shifting perspectives from self-
oriented to other-oriented, or the visualization of the suffering of others. 
Traditionally, such mental training comprises years of scholastic study and 
meditative practice. The long-term goal of meditators undergoing such 
training is to weaken egocentric traits so that altruistic behaviors might 
arise more frequently and spontaneously.112
 
 
Davidson and his colleagues scanned the brains of novice and expert meditators while 
meditating and while at rest and when exposed to negative, positive, and neutral sounds.  
Davidson and his colleagues predicted and found a group by state by valence interaction.  
Expert meditators while in the state of meditation showed more activation in the insula 
and anterior cingulate cortices, especially in response to negative sounds than novice 
meditators. As Davidson summarizes the tentative conclusions: 
Because novices and experts differ in many respects other than simply the 
extent of meditative training (such as culture of origin and first language), 
longitudinal research that follows individuals over time in response to 
compassion training will be needed to further substantiate our findings. It 
will also be essential to assess the impact of such emotional training on 
behavioral tasks involving altruism, and more generally, emotional 
reactivity and regulation. The long-term question is to evaluate whether 
repeated practice in such techniques could result in enduring changes in 
affective and social style. The fact that large and systematic changes in 
brain function were observed in response to auditory emotional stimuli 
presented during the meditative practice of compassion, and the fact that 
robust differences were observed between experts and novices suggests 
that the next steps to evaluate the behavioral impact of this training and to 
longitudinally assess its effects are warranted.113
 While empirical studies of meditation are still in their infancy, they show that 
there are empirically tractable ways to explore issues of religion and science, whatever 
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the results. An approach to religion and science that focuses on the cultivation of 
empathy and compassion may prove more significant than approaches focusing on the 
defense of problematic metaphysical positions like mind-body dualism. A naturalistic 
perspective in no way rules out a positive valuation of religious practices. 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter began with a discussion of the conclusions reached in the first three 
chapters of this dissertation and their bearing on issues of religion and science. Having 
focused largely on the impact of the mind sciences on issues of mind-body dualism and 
its impact on religion, this chapter shifted from metaphysics to morals, specifically 
metaethical questions concerning the nature and origin of moral judgment. As the 
previous chapters had used contemporary mind science to shed light on metaphysical 
issues concerning mind-body dualism and its impact on religion, this chapter examined 
the implications of the mind sciences for metaethical questions concerning the nature and 
origin of moral judgment and its impact on religion. A major point of this exercise was to 
shed light upon the issues of moral pluralism and moral conflict between religious 
believers and secular naturalists and between religious believers themselves.   
 Because divine command ethics figures so prominently in discussions of morality 
and religion, this issue was treated first in light of contemporary work in moral 
psychology concerning the moral/conventional distinction. Contrary to popular 
impressions, it was argued that divine commands are not a likely source of moral 
judgment, as even very religious children reach moral judgments in a manner that is 
largely autonomous from divine commands. If this is the case, non-religious citizens can 
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hardly be faulted for explicitly seeking moral wisdom in a manner that is autonomous 
from religion. At the same time, secular fears regarding divine command ethics may also 
be misplaced.   
 Drawing on work on psychopaths and the moral psychology of disgust, it was 
then argued that emotion likely drives much moral judgment. The emotional origins of 
morality make moral properties response dependent properties; however, there is initial 
evidence that people tend to be objectivists about morality. It was proposed that religion 
and morality may link up over such issues. It was argued that belief in the objectivity of 
morality, while often seen as essential to morality, may actually be problematic and 
contribute to the intractability of moral disputes.   
 The issues of moral pluralism and the nature of moral conflict were further probed 
in light of Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist account of moral judgment and Joshua 
Greene’s analysis of deontological moral philosophy as a post-hoc rationalization of 
emotional intuitions. A prime source of moral conflict lies in that fact that moral 
judgments are driven by culturally shaped intuitions with reason playing a post-hoc role.  
However, that causality is usually interpreted backwards. We think reason drives our 
moral judgments and that we can change the opinions of others simply through rational 
argument. When this strategy fails, we conclude that the other side is not morally 
motivated.   
 Finally, the implications of scientific moral psychology for normative morality 
and for religion were discussed. Contemporary moral psychology leads to a focus on 
virtue ethics. This focus on virtue ethics makes the task of normative evaluation much 
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more challenging. A model for addressing these issues was discussed through the work of 
Owen Flanagan. In terms of religion, this chapter has primarily concentrated on how 
science can shed light on the metaethical claims embedded in many religious traditions. 
Claims that morality is rooted in divine commands or even objectively grounded in a 
transcendent realm accessed through reason were viewed with suspicion, but this does 
not rule out a positive valuation of religious practices. Indeed, this may be one of the 
most fruitful avenues of religion-science dialogue and illustrated in Richard Davidson’s 
research on Buddhist mindfulness practices
 278 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Questions about human nature, the existence of God and the soul, and the nature 
and origin of morality have been central questions in both the Western philosophical and 
theological traditions. In this sense, the questions that this dissertation addresses are quite 
traditional; however, the answers that the dissertation proposes break strongly with both 
inherited theology and a great deal of philosophy. The reason for this break comes from 
the explosion of natural scientific knowledge in the past three centuries and especially the 
explosion of knowledge concerning the mind-brain in the past hundred years.   
Theologians have sought various ways to respond to the challenges of the 
sciences. Perhaps the most common approach has simply been to ignore the problem or 
to fail to recognize that there even is a problem. For all of its intellectual sophistication, 
one can read a great deal of theology today and never realize that there was a scientific 
revolution, a theory of evolution, a neuroscientific revolution, or that the majority of the 
world’s population is not Christian.  Sometimes the lack of scientific knowledge is 
simply due to disciplinary specialization. Other times, the ignorance is principled.   
Like other humanists, theologians are apt to make strong Geisteswissenschaften/ 
naturwissenschaften distinctions like those discussed in Chapter Two. Others retreat to a 
faith commitment that insulates itself from critique from “the world.” Still others 
passionate about the pursuit of social justice see questions about the impact of science 
upon religion as distractions from the task of liberation. But surely an authentic faith 
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must be intellectually credible and speak to an audience beyond one’s particular 
confessional community. Just as surely, a passion for justice must be informed by the best 
scientific data and theories concerning society, the human person, and the world. From 
this standpoint, it is sobering to note that the intellectual beliefs of theologians are at odds 
with many of their academic colleagues. 
Theologians and religious studies scholars interested in ‘religion and science’ 
laudably engage the sciences in often sophisticated and profound ways. These 
theologians do have a sense of the challenges the science and naturalistic philosophy pose 
for religions today, but there is a line that most will not cross: rejecting a commitment to 
some form of metaphysical dualism (especially in the case of God). In a sense, 
theologians have stopped short in their analysis of science. They have attempted to 
address the challenges of the sciences without addressing the challenge of naturalism.  
The analysis of this dissertation has shown that naturalism is not a dogma that many 
scientists and philosophers are mired in. The analysis of this dissertation has shown that 
claims about metaphysical dualism and metaethical objectivism cannot be sustained. 
Rather than a negative verdict on theology, this dissertation has provided constraints 
within which a credible theology might operate. In this understanding, the task is not to 
preserve traditional dualist beliefs at all costs but to develop theology, religion, and 
spirituality in ways that are intellectually credible. 
Aside from calling dualism into question, this dissertation has also been 
concerned to spell out what explanation in naturalist terms amounts to. Here a crucial 
concern was to overcome the dichotomy of autonomy versus reduction. This dissertation 
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called into question versions of the autonomy thesis premised upon metaphysical 
dualism, the notion that consciousness cannot be explained in bio-psychological terms 
because consciousness just is not physical. It has also questioned claims about the 
autonomy of psychology based upon the doctrine of multiple realizability and claims 
about the autonomy of the humanities based on a principled Geisteswissenschaften/ 
Naturwissenschaften distinction. At the same time, it has called into question strong 
versions of reductionism and eliminativism that fail to take phenomenal consciousness 
and higher level disciplines seriously. 
The dissertation has also sought to spell out fruitful approaches to the religion and 
science dialogue beyond the conversation stopping approaches so common today. One of 
its central points in this regard is that religion and science do conflict over issues of 
metaphysical dualism; however, this conflict need not be a conversation stopper. Conflict 
does not preclude respectful arguments over issues like dualism, and, in fact, 
disagreement is essential to move such arguments forward. To this end, this dissertation 
spells out the kinds of arguments and considerations dualists would have to address in 
order to defend their position. Despite its skepticism about dualist commitments, this 
does not mean that there might not be other interesting conversations about religion and 
science. In Chapter Four, it was proposed that a conversation about morality might take 
place on different terms than a conversation about metaphysics. This approach was 
pursued by looking at the implications of scientific moral psychology for metaethical 
claims about the origins of morality and moral judgment. The point was not to argue a 
specific stance on a moral issue or to argue that religious believers or naturalists are more 
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ethical than the other but to challenge the metaethical assumptions that typically frame 
such debates. This dissertation has barely scratched the surface on issues concerning 
religion and science, mind and brain, and their mutual relationship, but it has established 
a naturalistic framework—at once metaphysical, explanatory, and methodological—in 
which these questions can be further pursued.
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